Passionate Scholarship: Recent Anthropologies of Emotion

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Passionate Scholarship: Recent Anthropologies of Emotion

James M. Wilce, Jr.


JIM WILCE, Associate Professor of Anthropology at Northern Arizona University, is the author of Eloquence in Trouble: Poetics and Politics of Complaint in Rural Bangladesh (Oxford University Press, 1998), which moved Wilce’s interest in emotion in directions suggested by linguistic anthropology, conversation analysis, and Bakhtinian translinguistics. His edited volume, Social and Cultural Lives of Immune Systems (Routledge, 2003), bridges biocultural and sociocultural anthropologists’ visions of stress and the immune system; his own two chapters deconstruct Western concepts of emotion. Wilce’s current book manuscript, Crying Shame: Metaculture, Modernity and Lament extends his interest in semiotics to focus on representations of emotional Others and traces the global flows of ideologies of language and rationality. In addition to these books, Wilce has authored many articles and book chapters, including “The cultural construction of emotion” (Oxford Companion Encyclopedia of Sociology and Social Anthropology, 2003); “Genres of memory and the memory of genres: Forgetting ‘lament in Bangladesh’” (Comparative Studies in Society and History, 44(1), 159–185, 2001); “The poetics of madness: Shifting codes and styles in the linguistic construction of identity in Bangladesh” (Cultural Anthropology, 15(1), 3–34, 2000); “The Kalimah in the Kaleidophone: ranges of multivocality in Bangladeshi Muslims’ Discourses” (Ethos, 26(2), 229–257, 1998); “The pragmatics of ‘madness’: Performance analysis of a Bangladeshi woman’s ‘aberrant’ lament (Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry, 22(1), 1–54, 1998); and “I cannot tell you all my troubles’: Conflict, resistance, and metacommunication in Bangladeshi illness interactions” (American Ethnologist, 22(4), 927–952, 1995).

Address correspondence to Jim Wilce, Box 15200, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, AZ 86011–5200. E-mail: jim.wilce@NAU.EDU
Emotions are cultural constructions. Emotions are products of interactions and histories. Emotion terms are like color terms, reflecting universals more than particulars. Emotions are the hard-wired reflexes of early hominid evolution. Languages are merely windows on universal emotions. Languages significantly impact the experience of variable social sentiments. “Emotion” has a meaning largely fixed by evolutionary psychology. “Emotion” does not mean one thing; it has no essence. True? False? All of the above? Anthropologically relevant discussions of emotion have tended to reproduce tired binaries—universalism or relativism, biology versus culture. The books reviewed here make some attempt at transcending these, with mixed results.

The context of the academic discussion deserves more scholarly attention. It cannot be separated from our own political histories—histories of modernism and its tendency toward a kind of lament over a lost past of simplicity and directness of experience and expression, or a history of feminism and its need to deconstruct inherited polarities, especially that of “rational male versus emotional female” (Martin, 2001). Martin’s recent articles explore the significance of manic-depression and the ups and downs of emotion’s value (so to speak) in light of the history of late capitalism. That sort of exploration of the broadest contexts of emotion is required in a fully developed sociocultural theory thereof. Although our comfort level may rise and fall with history, as Martin argues, the subtext of scholarly studies of emotion may well be a discomfort under the burden of scholarly rationalism. And yet, history in general and the histories I have just alluded to are marginal to all but one of the books under review (Reddy’s), while another eschews histories in favor of History—millions of years of hominoid and hominid evolution (Turner’s). I make no secret of finding Reddy’s work the most satisfying.

**COMMUNICATING EMOTION: SOCIAL, MORAL, AND CULTURAL PROCESSES**

Sally Planalp’s book is part of Cambridge’s Studies in Emotion and Social Interaction, a series that has played an extremely important role in shaping
anthropological understandings of emotion, although its editors and contributors are by no means all anthropologists. Having spanned two decades, it is understandable that the series lacks perfect cohesion. But the difference between Bråten (1998) and Planalp, for example, is striking. Planalp’s intended audience seems to be undergraduate students in a course that might touch on emotion in a department of communication (her disciplinary home), and compared with Bråten’s collection it offers little new theory, no new methods, and no findings of her own. Rather, she presents a fine textbookish review of the literature combining scholarship with the folksiness of a self-help book in popular psychology. That is to say her work is eclectic.

Planalp’s original contribution is an extended metaphor. In place of worn-out theories of communication such as the “boxcar theory” of information exchange in which communication is likened to exchanging the contents of a boxcar (compare critiques of the “conduit metaphor,” e.g., Wilce & Price, 2003), Planalp proposes a model of “communication as weaving meaning” (p. 41). The weaving is joint, interactive. Her weaving metaphor includes subtropes such as scripts (pp. 42–43); a “tapestry,” after all, can tell a story. Why weave with colored thread, i.e., why communicate with emotions? Planalp uses the metaphor to address three functions of emotional communication—“we weave with colors simply because thread is colored, because we want to coordinate with others who are weaving the fabric with us, and ... to serve certain purposes or functions—to keep us warm, to inspire great deeds ... [etc.]” (p. 68).

Borrowing from cognitivist theories of emotion, Planalp offers not only a metaphor but a more formal process model I take to be a metanarrative that captures the forms of the stories constituting feelings. The five components that “appear in most [such as cognitive or process] theories” are “1) objects cause precipitating events; 2) appraisal; 3) physiological changes; 4) action tendencies/action/expression; and 5) regulation” (p. 11). Having proposed this early on, however, Planalp does not return to it as she moves on—for instance, to a brief cross-cultural survey (her last chapter). This strategy of consigning cultural diversity to a final chapter is one she shares with Kövecses and Turner and contrasts sharply with the other two books.

Planalp introduces some of the trappings of semiotic theory, though she does not systematically draw on semiotics. She recognizes the layering of emotional reality in concepts like the “meta-mood scale” (p. 33) and “meta-shame” (“shame about being ashamed,” p. 178). Planalp’s neglect of semiotics weakens her work, in my view. Her exploration of the communication of emotion would benefit from a distinction between pure indexicality and reference (a “duplex” sign that is both indexical and symbolic, a sign that both points and denotatively asserts something drawing on
a semantics that appears to transcend context). The distinction would have helped her theorize the difference between empathy and emotional contagion (Hatfield et al., 1994; Lyon, 2003). It would clarify her argument on pp. 62–66, in my estimation, if she framed the difference this way. Empathy relies on conveying a feeling by reference and predication, while contagion entails the effects of pure indexes of emotion that would be hard to reduce to semantico-referential content. Missing a similar opportunity to draw on embodiment theory and on Bråten’s book (which appeared just before hers in the Cambridge series), Planalp evokes the notion of emotion as “e-motion” but does not draw on Bråten’s rethinking of emotion. Bråten (1998) traces the development of emotion and intersubjectivity back to early experiences of mutually attuned embodied action. Instead, representing gesture as “communicating emotion,” she implies that the emotion being communicated is an inward essence; that is precisely what the concept of emotion as e-motion could help her transcend.

Does Planalp offer a truly social model of emotion? Her vision of the social emerges gradually. Chapters 4 and 5 are entitled “How is Emotional Meaning Constructed Through Communication?” and “How is Emotional Meaning Both Personal and Social.” The social appears in chapter 4 in the guise of face-to-face interaction. This may be the primordial locus of sociality, as conversation analysts argue, but to see its relation to social structure readers must wait for chapter 5. And only in the last chapter, “How is Emotional Communication Grounded in Common Human Experience and Diverse Cultures?” do we hear of anything resembling ideologies or regimes of emotion, themes central to Reddy’s account and, I think, to a truly social theory of emotion.

**METAPHOR AND EMOTION: LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND BODY IN HUMAN FEELING**

*Metaphor and Emotion* followed *Communicating Emotion* in the Cambridge series mentioned above. Author Zoltán Kövecses is a cognitive linguist based in Budapest. Cognitive linguists’ interests in mind, language, and culture mark their kinship with Whorf and with his detractors. But Kövecses grounds his theory of emotion metaphors in the body, and specifically in an understanding of human biology that tends toward universalism. In a nutshell, he claims that “universal real physiology” (p. 165) underlies such “natural” metaphors, e.g., metaphors for anger that connect it with the purportedly universal association of “anger” with heat. Kövecses cites evidence that metaphorical indications of a sense of the body as a container are widespread and thus probably universal. Emotions are fluids, in this
widespread metaphorical system. Fluids that heat up (anger) create pressure, leading to such metaphors as “blowing off steam” (p. 170).

The “hydraulic model” of emotion is, to most scholars, a model—limiting and outdated—at best. But Kövecses’ claims are realist. “The natives say it is so” because it “is” so in this perspective. Kövecses implies that the old hydraulic model fits a newer cognitive perspective. Reddy, whose post-doctoral training in cognitive psychology (on top of his training as a historian and anthropologist) allows him to write with authority on the subject, paints a very different picture of the state of the art, with no room for realists’ claims about fluids under pressure.

Kövecses is clearly on to something; at least some of the metaphors of emotion he lists seem (on a priori grounds) salient, and the possibility that they fit into larger cognitive models (The Event Model) seems real. Kövecses has done his homework, collecting examples from a very genetically and geographically diverse sample of languages. However, I have serious methodological and theoretical questions about his work. What, first of all, does he count as data? Readers are left with only vague indications of sources and methods. Kövecses depends, it seems, on novels—especially romance novels—and interviews. Beyond those utterances whose source Kövecses declares (and they are the minority), his data are of totally uncertain origin.

Who exactly said, “I felt like two cents waiting for change” (from which he read the metaphor, A SHAMEFUL PERSON IS A WORTHLESS OBJECT, p. 32)? When was it said, and under what circumstances? Or is it, as it appears, an idiom whose current use and salience he simply takes for granted? For such data to be useful, we would want ethnographic discourse analytic data (on context, pragmatic and not just semantic meaning, etc.).

When Kövecses’ data do come from interviews, whose interviews are they? Kövecses tends to use native speakers of English (unlike himself) as interviewers. Chapter 6, “Emotions and Relationships,” draws on such interviews performed by a set of these native speakers who have some (unspecified) relationship to Kövecses. They asked interviewees for sentences “with the word friendship or friend in them” (p. 88). Ted Sablay, an American graduate student working with Kövecses, had research subjects complete sentences about love (p. 120). In other chapters, Kövecses relies on “dictionary data.” None of this could be called naturalistic data. He collects no naturally occurring spoken discourse. This problematizes his claims as to “the richness of linguistic data that has been offered in this work” (p. 184). Kövecses vision of linguistics excludes discourse and pragmatics, focusing solely on the semantics of dictionary entries and elicited utterances.

Kövecses’ treatment of “embodiment” is narrow at best. Following his earlier publications, he takes it for granted here that there is but one direction of causal interaction between body and cognition/language/
metaphors. That is, all human beings heat up when angry, enabling them to serve up hot metaphors. He might indeed be correct about the universality of physiological processes. But a richer discussion would take into account the arguments for the variability of human physiological responses conditioned by cultural environments (Lock, 1998). Wilce and Price (2003) argue that widely circulating metaphors might have some influence on physiology; the causal arrow might not point in only one direction as Kövecses assumes. Embodiment theory has blossomed since 1990 or so, drawing on divergent philosophical sources and pathbreaking analytic methods. To invoke “embodiment,” as Kövecses does, with no engagement with current debates over the body as locus of enculturation and as agent (for example), is a letdown.

Perhaps it is unfair to expect a cognitive linguist to be a social theorist. Still, it seems grossly inadequate for a book that makes some pretense to address the role of culture to do so, as Planalp did, in the very last chapter. Kövecses also raises the question of historical variation of emotion there, relying on the very interesting work of the Americanist historian of emotion Peter N. Stearns. (Stearns, founder of the Journal of Social History, is an important source for Planalp and Reddy as well.) Despite the usefulness of Stearns’ work, one would have preferred for Kövecses to have conducted original historical studies of his own, or at least to have reviewed more secondary sources than Stearns.

ON THE ORIGINS OF HUMAN EMOTIONS: A SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN AFFECT

Jonathan Turner’s book breaks new ground in presenting a coherent, albeit hypothetical, scenario for the evolution of human emotions, and thus for the large swaths of emotional terrain that he regards as beyond the reach of social construction. I have critiqued the previous sources for marginalizing the social. In this regard Turner’s evolutionary argument is a mixed bag. Sociality (or at least its tenuousness) is central to his hypothesis that natural selection favored those hominids who, in moving from trees to the African savannah, developed not only greater cortical control over, but also a greater range of, emotions. Apes have very little genetic predisposition for the sorts of complex, durable social networks seen among monkeys. Scattered bands of hominid ancestors on the savannah, lacking those protective networks, evolved a range and depth of “associative” (p. 79) or prosocial emotions that helped make up for the absence. A loose sort of sociality is thus central to this evolutionary scenario. But the social is quite marginal to Turner’s understanding of contemporary human emotion. That is, he
argues that social constructionist models of emotion have contributed about all they can to our understanding; it is time, in Turner's view, for social scientists to be trained in our evolutionary heritage—the neurological hardwiring of feelings—and stop beating their outdated constructionist drums. Like Planalp's, Turner's vision of the “social” is primarily face-to-face interaction rather than social structure. Even when he invokes the term “social structure,” his description of factors relevant to emotion makes it clear he has in mind small-scale interaction (p. 149).

Turner makes a fascinating and persuasive case for his speculations (that is what Turner calls them). If you have any interest in the brain and evolution, his story of the rise of our “emotion facility” (Turner's analogy to arguments about an innate “language facility” is intentional; see p. 122) will keep you turning the pages. While admitting that emotions are fine-tuned by social conditioning, he remains resolutely innatist about the capacity for even such emotions as shame, guilt, pride, and nostalgia (p. 77). The analogy with Chomskyan linguistics works this way: Children come into the world with a capacity for emotions like shame and guilt (as well as the more “basic” emotions like anger), emotions favored by selection because they contribute to the maintenance of social bonds and social structure. Still, they must be acquired (not, in Chomskyan parlance, learned). A window of opportunity for acquiring these emotions remains open until the age of eleven or twelve. Children deprived of this opportunity will never gain socio-emotional skills. But the emotions are not cultural products any more than Language—“The Human Language,” “universal grammar”—is in Chomskyan rhetoric.

Planalp constructs an extended metaphor involving weaving of threads, and she makes color a key to her metaphor. Kövecses (p. 15) also makes a link between color and emotion, asserting the similarity of the domain of emotion to the domain of color as represented by Berlin and Kay. Turner expands on that analogy throughout his book. He makes emotions out to be a natural class, and finds certain Basic Emotion Terms (the term, analogous to Basic Color Terms, is mine, though the concept is Turner’s). But we must ask: are their “primary emotions” or “basic emotions” like basic colors? If so, how many? The terms per se are not so important to Turner, who repeatedly denies the cognitive salience of language per se since language evolved after, and is in a real way parasitic to, the visual signaling of human emotion. Thought, for Turner, is imagistic and not linguistic, and in those exceptional moments when we think with words, it slows the process down painfully (p. 109). But Turner also uses the color analogy—a fixed number of primary emotions that combine to produce secondary emotions. Shame, for example, is a mixture of sadness, anger at self, and fear about consequences to self (p. 81).
To a large extent Turner (pp. 130–132) and Kövecses’ assertions of a universal set of emotions rely on Ekman’s (1980) research on facial expression of emotion. But Ekman’s studies and conclusions remain controversial. Partly in an attempt to transcend the particularities of words for emotion, Ekman and Friesen (1975), using techniques developed by Izard (1971), showed photographs of faces showing “basic” emotions to subjects in Papua New Guinea and elsewhere. As they are commonly cited, the Ekman studies “prove” that people everywhere recognize the same small set of basic emotions. However, the anthropologically sophisticated philosopher Jaap van Brakel (Van Brakel, 1993), Reddy (1993), and others have pointed out some problems. First, the “agreement” about facial expressions is highest among American respondents. Second, most of the non-Western respondents were college students—hardly isolated from globally circulating emotion concepts. Then, a review of Ekman-inspired studies shows that forced choice produces a far higher level of agreement than free choice (Van Brakel, 1993). Van Brakel goes on to note the difference in the accounts of Ekman and his social psychologist coauthors on the one hand and their sometime collaborator, the anthropologist Sorensen. We learn of untold (i.e., numerous and unmentioned) problems posed by the team’s incompetence in any New Guinean language, including their inability to monitor the process of narrating the pictures, and the mismatch between the question-answer format their method introduced (New Guinean assistants asking respondents questions) and any sort of local speech event (Sorenson, 1976). Thus Van Brakel, Reddy, and others reject any claim that “the emotions” are a natural class.

This said, Turner’s book is gripping. His diagrams and discussions of brain centers, hormones, and musculature relevant to emotion are very helpful to novices like me. And, despite their admitted resemblance to Just So Stories, Turner’s evolutionary hypotheses are quite persuasive. Brain tissue and communication do not preserve well. So evolutionary psychologists project backwards from the present. Turner’s Conclusion argues that, although many will say such speculation has no role in science, he regards it as necessary for advancing our understanding.

Turner has no consciousness of, or qualms about, perpetuating a grand narrative. Speaking on his behalf, “I have an interesting narrative and its scope is grand—what’s the problem?” What about the potential for his argument to provide support for a particular sort of politics? Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents envisions individuals as always thinly enculturated, endowed with an evolutionary heritage that makes them ill-at-ease in any orderly society. Similarly, Turner argues that our ape heritage means that we are, at root, always hankering for individual autonomy, never quite suited for complex networks and long-term stable social structures. Turner
envisions emotions working something like Freud’s superego—an internal guidance mechanism consisting of the innate capacity for shame and guilt, a capacity developed on the savannahs and designed to domesticate anger (and turn it against the self) and to motivate individuals to cooperate. Underneath it all is the desire to reject the social order and go scratch oneself. It is a vision that supports a conservative politics, one that undermines faith and investment in collective structures. Likewise, though I do not object to Turner’s claim to be advancing science, his lack of engagement with feminist critics of the imagery and rhetoric of evolutionary anthropology is striking. So, for instance, he reproduces a 1933 diagram from A. Schultz (1933) of the great apes in order to demonstrate that we belong with the other apes—and all four have obvious male genitalia (p. 22). Science with no self-reflexive attention to its own rhetorical structure is less and less appealing.

EMOTIONS IN CROSSLINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE

It is useful to compare Jean Harkins and Anna Wierzbicka’s collection of linguistic analysis of emotion terms-in-contexts with Kövecses’ linguistic approach to emotions. Both books declare allegiance to cognitive linguistics. Indeed Emotions in Crosslinguistic Perspective (ECP) appears in the series Cognitive Linguistics Research. But ECP prefers a “prototype approach” over a focus on metaphor; this, in part, explains the contributors’ attention to discourse context. Contributors to the Harkins and Wierzbicka collection collect and present many types of data. For example, Durst (“Why Germans don’t feel ‘anger?’” pp. 115–148) and Ye (“An inquiry into ‘sadness’ in Chinese,” pp. 359–404) draw on literature written over centuries. Goddard (“Hati: A key word in the Malay vocabulary of emotion,” pp. 167–196) also drew on a corpus—a collection of “contemporary informal Malay writing” (p. 168). Harkins’ own chapter (“Talking about anger in Central Australia,” pp. 197–216) drew on discussions (which she herself guided) of Arrernte words glossable by “anger” amongst three expert speakers, while simultaneously serving as scribe for the three. If other data that she uses come from naturally occurring talk, she does not make it clear how she recorded it. Note from these chapter titles the tendency to focus on individual words, albeit in context—for example, Malay Hati or Polish Przykro (the focus of Wierzbicka’s chapter, “A culturally salient Polish emotion: Przykro (pron. psblickro)” as local key terms, or on local glosses of English emotion words like “anger” or “sadness.”

Unlike Ekman and Turner, who imply that it is appropriate to imagine translation equivalences—such that there is a one-to-one correspondence
between anger and, for example, Zorn (German)—contributors to Emotions in Crosslinguistic Perspective never treat English as an appropriate base from which to analyze the emotion vocabularies of other languages. Instead, they all use Wierzbicka’s Natural Semantic Metalanguage or NSM to abstract out a prototype or script for local emotion terms that relies exclusively on the basic semantic building blocks that they claim are found in every language. Examples include GOOD and BAD, the caps indicating that these index universal concepts rather than the English words they appear to be. In fact the editors’ Introduction presents terms in several languages. Here is an example of the NSM scripts:

Pleased (X was pleased)

(a) X felt something because X thought something
(b) sometimes a person thinks:
(c) “something good happened
(d) I wanted this to happen”
(e) when this person thinks this, this person feels something good
(f) X felt something like this
   because X thought something like this (p. 15).

The introduction presents this sort of script as universally accessible, not dependent on English. The logic behind this claim is that, although emotion terms are not universal, there are semantic primes such as “think,” “want,” “feel,” and “something.” However, in her own chapter Harkins admits it might be impractical, as it evidently was in her own Arrernte fieldwork, to use “the full prototype structure” (p. 212). Indeed such formalism strikes this anthropologist as potentially awkward baggage to use with those we once unselfconsciously called informants.

But the problems go beyond the practicalities of fieldwork. What if people do not speak of feelings at all, or at least represent feelings and other inner states including illness as among a class of things that “strike” people. Bengali grammar works that way. People don’t “feel” good, bad, angry, or sick; all of those things “strike” them. One might ask, doesn’t that “mean” feel? Well, “mean” in what sense? Is that a translation-equivalent for some purposes? Yes, but what is being translated is a world, a form of life (Wittgenstein’s concept, taken up by Van Brakel in his argument about emotions). Recognizing this puts the brakes on the search for quick-and-dirty equivalence.

Enfield’s chapter, “Linguistic evidence for a Lao perspective on facial expressions of emotion,” (pp. 149–166) critiques Ekman’s universalism. He provides a useful description of the grammar of Lao descriptions of facial expressions. Why is it that so many scholars and even some linguists
perpetuate the folk view that language equals words, that to study emotion concepts is to study words, that grammar somehow represents such a late evolutionary adaptation that it could not encode emotion? Ignoring the grammatical resources of emotion, the focus of fine work by Ochs (1988) and Schieffelin (1990) is a sad reproduction of a limiting sort of consciousness. Enfield goes on to list Lao facial expression descriptors that do not fit neatly into any translocal scheme, including “smelly-face” and “rotten-face” (p. 156). (Note that Turner tries to construct a “syntax” of emotion gestures, which to me is a linguistic analogy that does not work, persuaded as I am of a modular view of cognitive capacities and of the uniqueness of linguistic syntax.)

It is refreshing to find in *ECP* some serious attention to cultural histories. Durst’s chapter takes a diachronic approach to three German emotion terms roughly corresponding to English “anger,” though he says “Germans don’t feel ‘anger.’” What they can feel are Zorn, Wut, and Ärger—but even these are not stable, “essentially German,” word-experiences. Durst finds that, over time, they have shifted toward an increasingly “psychological” sense:

The noun Ärger came into use not before the 18th century… The reflexive verb [sich Ärgern], then, could [originally] be interpreted as ‘to make oneself worse,’ that is, to aggravate one’s situation by doing something. As a result of the ‘psychological shift,’ the effect was attributed to the experiencer’s bad feeling, while the action was reduced to the process of thinking about a certain (‘annoying’) event (p. 141).

Rie Hasada’s chapter, “Meanings of Japanese sound-symbolic emotion words” (pp. 217–254) describes a language-particular manifestation of sound symbolism. Although Planalp and Turner certainly view intonation as key to the communication of emotion—and in fact Turner finds prosody more significant than that Johnny-come-lately, grammatical language—Hasada’s attention to sound is much more sophisticated. Hasada applies the NSM formalism to the sound-symbolic or psychomimetic words that so saliently index emotion in everyday Japanese talk as well as literature and film. A native Japanese metasemantic taxonomy divides Japanese onomatopoeic words (*giongo-gitaigo*) into three classes, including “psychomimes (*gijoogo*) which express one’s inner feeling or mental conditions” (p. 217). This is interesting, as far as it goes. But when we compare this to others’ assertions that language is incapable of representing inner states, we realize that more is at work in language than grammar or phonology; in fact linguistic ideologies mediate the relationship between language and emotion. Thus, what neither Hasada nor any of the other authors (except Reddy) explore is the situatedness of a Japanese language ideology that affirms the possibility of an iconicity between inner states and words.
THE NAVIGATION OF FEELING: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE HISTORY OF EMOTIONS

One problem plaguing the anthropology of emotion is a lack of clarity about the object of study. I do not mean to call for a one-size-fits-all definition of emotion, but for clarity as to whether the object is subjectivities, mental categories or inner representations of subjectivities, or some level of language (from sound to words to discourses) that either refers to or indexes emotion—or is it all of those? More than any of the other authors, William Reddy explicitly sets about exploring the interface of “feeling,” discourse, and sociocultural context. The Navigation of Feeling contributes new theory, methods that are at least new to anthropologists, and new findings.

Reddy, a historian and cultural anthropologist, focuses on literature, personal correspondence, and texts archived from eighteenth and nineteenth century France. Those text archives include copies of a newspaper that specialized in covering court cases and targeted a readership of attorneys and the educated classes (Gazette des Tribunaux), and the Tribunal civil de Versailles (court archives). These sources, while not typical ethnographer’s fare, are available for analysis and, with Reddy’s anthropological sensibilities, become appropriate grist for constructing a discourse-based account of the changing culture of emotion over a very interesting period in French history. The court archives include depositions from witnesses. The Gazette includes more of the “feats of eloquence by which attorneys sought to sway the court” (p. 297).

Reddy’s book demonstrates his postdoctoral training in developmental psychology (his field, after history and anthropology). He represents recent findings in cognitive psychology as undermining biological essentialism and Cartesian dualism. Cognitive psychology models lead him to define emotions as “goal-relevant activations of thought material that exceed the translating capacity of attention within a short time horizon” (p. 128). Citing research from the 1990’s, Reddy proposes “activation” and “translation” as concepts that have good-enough definitional clarity, and lack Cartesian taint enough to support a model of emotion credible to both scientists and poststructuralists. Activation is a state that renders thoughts and other inputs available for processing (p. 89). Full activation enables sustained attention. Reddy proposes a notion of translation. Whatever enters our attention—perceptual inputs of various sorts—requires various sorts of translation, for instance from sensory “codes” into linguistic codes. When we engage in feelings-talk, we attend closely not only to inner feelings but to others’ reactions. Feelings-talk translates subjectivities into words. Likewise, we translate the facial responses of those who hear our talk by
accessing various cultural codes (note here the implicit skepticism toward Ekman, the affirmation that facial expressions are cultural codes). Cross-modal or intersemiotic translation is always complex and only partially successful at best (p. 322). The stakes are high—because emotions are goal-relevant activations—and translation difficult, in part because goals shift. Our ever-shifting goals require constant “navigation.” In this extended metaphor, as Reddy presents it, steering alters the very chart guiding the navigator, and navigation alters the navigator's very self.

Reddy's borrowings from cognitive psychology come to life in conjunction with his adaptation of Austin’s concept of speech acts, particularly performative utterances. Reddy applies Austin’s insights to statements about a speaker’s emotions (pp. 96–111). At least for argument's sake, as Austin (1962) introduced his concept of performativity he distinguished “constatives”—merely descriptive statements—from “performatives.” Performatives are first-person, present tense utterances that name the speech act they perform, as in “I assert that [X]” (p. 97) and in that sense are “self-referential” (p. 105). They “do things” in the world if they are “happily” or felicitously performed, as when authorized persons say “We do hereby enact...” (p. 98). Statements about the speaker’s current emotions seem descriptive (or constative) on the surface, but in fact share with performatives structural (first-person, present tense) and functional features (changing some world). To signal their similarity with performatives, Reddy calls these first-person, present-tense statements of emotion emotives. What do they change? Reddy argues that they change the speaker and his/her feelings. Along with other inputs from within and without, the emotives themselves become involved in processes of activation and translation. He cites some examples of emotion-statements causing an increase in activation of the emotions named, and others in which the emotive backfires, causing increased awareness of “translation” and navigation problems, highlighting the never-quite-manageable flow of emotion in relation to social demands. One might thus feel like a hypocrite immediately after saying “I feel X.”

Reddy's prime example is the French Revolution's demands for sincere expressions of generosity toward “the people” and loyalty toward the people's revolution, demands that were coupled during The Terror (1793–1794) with the threat of death for insincere statements of loyalty. In interpreting such situations, in which “emotional regimes” allow more or less “emotional liberty,” including the freedom to be insincere, and particularly to change goals or undergo “conversion experiences” in response to shifting awareness of translation problems, Reddy demonstrates the political implications of his theory of emotion. Indeed, Reddy’s book is unique in this set for asserting political relevance. Some regimes cause comparatively more
emotional suffering” than others. He defines this suffering as acute goal conflict brought on, for example, by political torture to extract information—conflict between loyalty to compatriots and desire to live. An emotional regime is a “set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and emotives that express and inculcate them” (p. 129).

Reddy claims that his historicism and his model of emotives, emotional regimes, and emotional suffering enable him to transcend relativism and universalism. Rather than claiming that any particular emotions are universal or particular to an ethnographic context, he focuses on the variation in emotional regimes constrained as follows: all communities, in order to maintain some unity, must “provide a coherent set of prescriptions about emotions” (p. 61), and such prescriptions must yield to the constraints cognitive psychology has found on mental control. (I refer here to paradoxes of control, such that attempts to exclude a thought can heighten its activation; pp. 25–31). Indeed, if emotives are not strictly referential but self-altering, it is hard either to treat emotion talk as the reflection of putatively universal biology or to see it as floating above the real world. But then, too, these emotives cannot be seen as straightforward “expressions of feeling” since they are in part responses to the pressures of emotional regimes.

Thus Reddy can critique not only Western ideologies of emotion (so often a code for gender)—as anthropologists of emotion and poststructuralists in general have so ably done—but also any emotional regime. Reddy’s Austin-based semiotic approach helps get beyond the pitfalls of poststructuralism (reviewed, pp. 73–75) precisely because it focuses not on stranded signifiers but dynamic relations (of translation) across different sorts of codes (visual, sensory, linguistic, etc.). Reddy is thus able, unlike some Foucauldians, to find a political voice, advocating conditions that would constitute liberation (p. 74), i.e., emotional regimes that allow for relative emotional freedom; not surprisingly, he has angered some reviewers by rejecting political relativism. While I am generally sympathetic with Reddy’s project, I wish he had spilled a bit of reflexive ink on his American embrace of freedom as a summum bonum. In this limited aspect, I find a similarity between Reddy’s argument and Turner’s—both reflect an embrace of a peculiarly American worldview in which autonomy is the highest good.

SYNTHESIZING COMMENTS

Scholarly production does not take place in a vacuum. It is culture. And cultural processes are always shaped by reflections and judgments, such as “Is
this product (a new sentence, or a new film) a reflection of ‘our’ culture (of ‘the English language,’ or ‘modern film’)?” Thus, Greg Urban (2001) persuasively argues that to understand “culture,” we must understand “metaculture.” Academic metaculture includes judgments of what is and is not an effective argument. The books reviewed evince an awareness of how weary their audiences might be with universalism/relativism debates. Even Kövecses, who leans strongly toward universalism, evinces a discomfort with the binary: “We should not forever be imprisoned in the mutually exclusive camps of ‘universalists’ versus ‘relativists’ or ‘essentialists’ versus ‘social constructionists’ in regard to our views about the conceptualization of emotion” (p. 182). That is indeed welcome. But what is the way out?

I would advocate greater attention to global history as one key. Such attention should lead us to question the independence of the cases some have taken to confirm that individuals may live “in” truly different “cultures” but nonetheless experience “the same basic emotions.” Similarities as well as differences do exist among what Wittgenstein (1958) called “forms of life.” Indeed these similarities crop up and disappear constantly, giving lie to both relativism and universalism as two forms of essentialism (Van Brakel, 1993). What is “natural” is the tendency to essentialize (or set up emotional regimes, as Reddy describes); that is, as Van Brakel uses Wittgenstein to argue, it is a “natural” cultural process to strive for agreement on terms, judgments, etc. (to set up emotional regimes). But how can we regard college-educated Indonesians as culturally so different as to constitute a distinct case in an argument against (or for) relativism? And the role of colonial linguists in fixing semantic structures in dictionaries of languages around the world means that the independence of the languages is called into question. This follows because of the feedback effects of such metacultural products on the ostensibly distinct “languages” and “cultures” in question. If we deconstruct Self-and-Other, debates between universalism and relativism become meaningless, though the investigation of (shifting) differences and similarities must go on.

Anthropological studies of emotions obviously raise epistemological and methodological questions about how subjectivities can be known or studied. On the one hand it is inadequate to consign “real feelings” to a black box and to regard emotions as simply “discourses.” To say that feelings-talk is simply a language game with no real-world links is just another form of reductionism (of emotion to discourse). Yet, how can one know another’s experience? An anthropology of subjectivity that ignores objective histories that shape subject positions will wander in the wilderness. But to fit all debate into either subjectivist or objectivist molds is to ignore breakthroughs in the understanding of intersubjectivity coming from phenomenology. Reddy’s work contributes greatly to this, grounding the study of
emotion in a discourse analysis of emotives performed under shifting emotional regimes. These regimes are the objectivizing substrates of intersubjectivity. Reddy’s attention to discourse does not entail an agnosticism about feelings per se. The cognitive science on which he and the other authors reviewed here draw open “emotions themselves” to a new kind of rigorous study, while the discourse-analytic approach that he and the contributors to Harkins and Wierzbicka exemplify helps them avoid bio-reductionism. Neither can the language of emotions be reduced to words. The recognition of the role of discourse in mediating subjectivity does not (pace Turner) entail an understanding of cognition that requires all thought to be in words. Discourse as embodied (and thus visible and audible) praxis, as a historically and culturally regimented form of life, is central to the “lives” of human feelings.

NOTE

1. I am indebted to Jaap Van Brakel (personal communication, January 2003) for this line of questioning.

REFERENCES


