JAMES M. WILCE, JR.

THE PRAGMATICS OF "MADNESS": PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF A BANGLADESHI WOMAN'S "ABERRANT" LAMENT

ABSTRACT. A fine-grained analysis of the transcript of a Bangladeshi woman's lament is used to argue for an anthropology of "madness" that attends closely to performance and performativity. The emergent, interactive production of wept speech, together with the conflicting use to which it is put by the performer and her relatives, is linked problematically to performance genres and to ethnopsychiatric indexes of madness. Tuneful weeping is taken by relatives to be performative of madness, in a sense something like Austin's. Yet, exploration of the divergent linguistic ideologies which are brought to bear on the lament not only enables more nuanced ethnographic treatment but also has reflexive ramifications for medical and psychological anthropology. This leads to a critique of the referentialism in our own treatment of language. The role played by transparent reference is overshadowed by indexicality and by dialogical processes of proposing and resisting labels for speech genres attributed to the "mad."

But power is more than an authoritative voice in decision-making; its strongest form may well be the ability to define social reality, to impose visions of the world. Such visions are inscribed in language and enacted in interaction. Although women's everyday talk and women's 'voice' and consciousness as evidenced in expressive genres have been studied quite separately . . . both can be understood as strategic responses, often of resistance, to dominant, hegemonic cultural forms. Often the form is a culturally defined opposite, as well as the ideology. Thus attention to linguistic detail, context of performance and the nature of the dominant forms is essential. (Gal 1989: 27)

What is my illness that I should take medicines? By calling me 'mad' they prevent me from speaking! (Latifa)

INTRODUCTION

Sophocles said "Whom the gods would destroy they first make mad." Could it be that kin and neighbors, at times, do something similar? The key problem for this paper is to show the link between a series of laments of a young Bangladeshi woman and the fact that the kin who heard them label the performer mad, thereby undermining her "footing."[1] There are few published transcripts of the speech of those understood to be mad in Third World countries, let alone accounts of local evaluations of their aesthetic productions, to compare with this attempt. Along with analyzing

the text of the lament as it was embedded in multiparty talk, I also describe
the response of a Bangladeshi academic seminar in my recordings and
transcripts. While kin denied the artfulness of the lament, the seminar
was happy to assign it a genre label and romanticize it as folklore. The
performer's kin exercised power brutally at times, but power also works
in subtler ways. As Gal and the young Bangladeshi woman Latifa herself
attest, perhaps its greatest influence is manifest in the selectivity of both
familial and academic reactions as ideologies of language.

   In common with others in the western academic tradition, medical
anthropologists tend to take language – even the complaints of "patients"
– as an unproblematic tool, a transparent medium for accurate reference
(Kuipers 1989: 102, cf.; Good 1994; Das 1996). Both medical and anthro-
pological interviews are typically treated, not as performances creating
(contested) contexts of their own (Briggs 1984, 1986), but as oppor-
tunities in which free agents are able to intend and achieve reference
to presupposed medical realities. Medical anthropology has tended to
speak of healing realities, illnesses, and diseases as socially constituted in
some vague sense, whereas linguistic anthropological studies have shown
them to be entities produced by the very discursive forms in which they
are expressed (Kuipers 1989). The denotative-referentialist ideology of
language pervading western academia as well as popular discourses (what
Good 1994 calls the empiricist philosophy of language) ignores its perfor-
mative, culturally-constitutive potential.[2] In contrast, I will argue herein
that examining the interactive nature of a lament performance by Latifa
points toward a more adequate account of the processes whereby persons
are labeled "mad" in Bangladesh and elsewhere.

   What linguists call "performativity" is the creative and entailing (vs.
reality-presupposing) aspect of language, the power of "speech acts" to
constitute social reality.[3] Performance theory has informed neither medical
anthropology's analyses of routine medical encounters nor its reflections
on its own methods, particularly its reliance on interviews unbalanced by
naturalistic observation. Whereas denotative referentialism presumes one
form is as good as another to convey the form-neutral "content" of speech,
performance inherently involves "an assumption of accountability to an
audience for *the way in which communication is carried out*" (Bauman
1975: 293, emphasis added). Thus a text-centered, purely formalist account
of texted weeping as verbal art will be inadequate. Nor are the intentions
and referential acts of agents such as those described herein always the
most relevant dimensions for analysis. The lament discussed here abun-
dantly manifests the indexical-entailing power of speech-in-interaction
functioning quite apart from individual intent.

Performance approaches facilitate reconsideration of the link between art and "madness," bringing linguistic-anthropological theory to bear on the verbal art performance of one who is called "mad" in Bangladesh to argue that both her performance and the label are dialogically constructed (Vološinov 1973; Bakhtin 1981).[4] In attending to Latifa's tuneful speech as performance rather than innocent reference, this article responds to a call from Kleinman (Kleinman, Das, and Lock 1996) and Rhodes to "shift our perception of boundaries" and focus on suffering rather than illness (Rhodes 1990: 172). Insofar as it resonates with Foucauldian approaches currently in use, medical and psychological anthropology will find much of this congenial, while its distinctly un-Foucauldian attentiveness to formal analysis may be refreshing and challenging. I believe an interpretive account of Latifa's performance will help us feel our way toward a new medical-linguistic anthropology.[5]

Meeting Latifa

Latifa sat before me in 1992, looking bedraggled as befit her grief, weeping on her aunt's bed in what would prove a vain attempt to persuade her matrikin to help her. It was her maternal uncles' home in which I lived in the field. Latifa was then about 22 years old. For a brief six months in 1990 she was married – a socially-approved arranged marriage to a Muslim cleric to which Latifa had not consented. Before marrying, in her high school career, she had achieved a reputation as a fine student. From what I know, her relations with her parents, two sisters, and two brothers were not under stress before marriage as they are now. By the time I knew her, Latifa's father neither appeared in person alongside her (as did her mother) nor was he mentioned in her conversation – an unexplained absence.

Latifa told me in 1992 that she regretted having complained (albeit mildly) about mistreatment during the first months of her marriage in 1990. A significant factor in that mistreatment was the failure of Latifa's brothers to give her husband's family a promised $1500 dowry.[6] At any rate, that mistreatment had largely ceased by the time her brothers intervened to force a divorce and claim for themselves the cash settlement. When I met her two years later, Latifa was still grieving the loss of her husband. Some of her extended family construed her weeping as a sign of love madness caused by charms purportedly planted around her father's house by her ex-husband.

At that time, Latifa's maternal cousins referred to her quite openly as *pāgal* – "mad, insane" – a label connoting condemnation of speech and behavior on moral, aesthetic, and pragmatic grounds. During my 1996 visit to Latifa's patrilineal home compound, by contrast, her father's kin spoke

of her as "greatly improved," though admitting she was still "grieving" (*dukkho kare*) over her ex-husband. They seemed bent on avoiding the label "mad."

The difference between maternal cousins and paternal kin uncles' evaluations of Latifa partly reflects their differing stakes. Those who feel morally obligated to arrange a new marriage for Latifa – her father's kin – have striven to protect her both by arranging "treatment" (as I saw in 1992) and by resisting stigma (in 1996).[7] Her maternal kin in 1992 were worried about the marital fate of their "own" sisters and daughters, and thus about Latifa tarnishing their reputation. Calling Latifa "mad" was a way of attending to several culturally-freighted indexes, indexes of madness upon which many Bangladeshis would agree – 1) Latifa wandered about ("aberrant," as I have labeled her lament in my title, is intended to invoke its roots in the Latin word for "wandering"), violating *pardā* (gender segregation rules); 2) she would not stop expressing herself, transgressing local aesthetic limits on the quantity and nature of speech[8]; 3) she used many grammatically unnecessary first-person pronouns (see line 13 of the transcript, *How can I bear this fire, sister o sister* in which the verb "bear" is already marked for a first-person subject, rendering Latifa's "I" redundant); and 4) her mode of expression was often tuneful. All of these, taken together, are viewed as a deviant attraction of attention to self.[9] In labeling Latifa mad, her cousins did not invent a notion of madness; there is widespread agreement in conceptualizing madness as both deviant egocentricity and either a sort of willfulness or part of a syndrome in which the *māthā* "head" is made *garam* "hot" by emotional words/actions which are under conscious control. Nor did Latifa's cousins act with conscious malice toward her; rather, their collective self-interest (either in keeping her from becoming "crazy" or at least in distancing themselves from behavior which brought disrepute on the family) prompted action.

In March 1992 Latifa walked the ten miles from her brothers' home to visit her mother's brothers' compound – my field home – for two weeks. She came to get help in her struggle against her brothers as she sought to be reunited with her ex-husband. Her relationship with her brothers was both close and problematic in that they had arranged her marriage and they had ended it. Latifa also has a younger sister who is married and lives in Dhaka; having seen them talk intimately and urgently about Latifa's troubles, my sense is that Latifa would derive emotional support from the sister if she lived nearer. Yet, when Latifa asked her sister to visit her ex-husband, the sister passed on this request to my field assistant and myself. Faisal did visit her ex-husband in May 1992; he had remarried, was divorced, and unfriendly to the idea of reconciliation with Latifa.

In fact, he expressed doubts about her mental or spiritual health, though something about him made Faisal wonder about his own normalcy. At any rate Latifa's sister's transfer of that responsibility to Faisal colors my perception of the relationship between the sisters, and contributes a note of ambiguity to my role as well. Bengali tradition depicts ego's mother's brothers as ego's supporters. Thus, that Latifa sought their support was not remarkable, but what about the timing of her visit during my residence? This co-occurrence raises the question of how Latifa perceived me, beyond calling me "brother" as did her maternal cousins. Even before March, she had learned of my presence there, since I had visited her brothers' home in January. Finally, their father was alive in 1992, but not visibly involved in these matters. His absence from Latifa's discourse remains a mystery, as he died in 1994.

During Latifa's visit I interviewed her, one of her brothers, and some of her cousins about her divorce, her so-called transgressions, their use of the label *pāgal*, and her treatment. Also, as part of the audience for her appeals, I recorded several, including the nighttime appeal to Latifa's great aunt (addressed as "sister") discussed below. In making these appeals, her rhetorical tool was lamentation.

Family and neighbors recognize there is something wrong with her. So might you and I, but what? And, for us, the objectivity of this "recognition" is problematized by our desire to listen to Latifa – we don't listen to the insane – as well as by our reading of Foucault and Goffman. Consider these problematics – the ambiguity of my dual position as anthropologist and "brother," the power of Latifa's weeping and the anger it stirred in others. Consider my obligation to relate to Latifa's brothers, whom she still calls "robbers and thugs" (which is to say they exercise power illegitimately); to her cousins; and to Latifa, when I wanted to join her in denouncing and resisting them. Such complexities have made her ongoing story the greatest emotional and moral challenge of my field experience. It was tempting for me to believe Latifa was not "mad" but just plain *mad*, though my 1996 visit raised fresh questions about her psychological state. How can Latifa keep hoping to be re-united with a man she now knows was remarried and divorced again and is not interested in any reconciliation with her? To me, such hope seems remarkably tragic; to at least some members of her extended family, abnormal. Like others called *pāgal*, Latifa objects to the medicalization of her life complaints (see epigraph, above).[10] Still, she was subjected to involuntary counter-treatment for love magic and is caught in a treatment system from which there seems no escape.

The dialogue this article interprets entails Latifa bemoaning how her brothers "murdered" her by ending her marriage, while her kin speak of

faith in Allah, and of a new marriage. But to pretend all of the interactive give-and-take may be reduced to this textual content, and to attribute that content to each actor's communicative intentions, would be to reproduce the personalist-intentionalist bias in western ideologies of language,[11] as well as the "referentialist bias" in medical anthropology. In fact, "Latifa's" performance is constituted by the *interaction* between an ideology of gendered language as spun out by her relatives saying "she is mad" even as she sings, and Latifa's presentation of self and an implicit ideology of language which is explicitly constructed in resistant dialogue with them.

Encountering Bangladesh, its laments, and its civilizational context(s)

In 1991–92 and for a month in 1996 I did fieldwork in the Chandpur district of Bangladesh, a four hour ferry trip from the capital city, Dhaka, in the *upazilā* (subdistrict) of Matlab.[12] Since I wanted to understand the idioms and experiences of Matlab troubles tellers, especially of those whose troubles could count as medical, I settled in an area with a great variety of practitioners. I also participated in the life of an extended family, including their troubles talk (a term I borrow from Jefferson 1981). When people heard of my interest in illness, possession, and ethnomedical practice, they sometimes led me to incapacitated relatives or neighbors. My involvement with some of these, including Latifa, became long-term.

Matlab in many ways reflects its region, northern South Asia. My adoptive family of prosperous peasants grow rice, potatoes, and jute – dominant crops in Matlab and most of Bangladesh. Bangladesh – once East Bengal, then East Pakistan, then a secular republic after achieving independence from Pakistan – embraced Islam as the religion of the state in the late 1970's. Sunni Islam dominates all but a few small areas of the country, although some Shi'a-derived observances such as Ashura, the commemoration of the death of Hasan and Husein, are evident. The mosque located within a few yards of my extended family's compound is presided over by my adopted uncle, and Islamic idioms figure largely in local politics (Wilce 1996). Village exogamy, virilocal residence, and patrilineal kinship reckoning help create a form of gender hierarchy – sexual segregation and exclusion of women from public domains (Wilce 1996) – justified locally in terms of Islam and strongly contrasting with south Indian patterns. The situation for women in Matlab is difficult: "To each less than she needs, from each more than she can do" (Papanek 1990). Within residential compounds, each nuclear family lives and cooks in a separate dwelling, but they share a common courtyard such as the one in which I stood the night I recorded Latifa's lament (Figure 1). Marriages are arranged, and the older "Islamic" norm of brideprice governing marital negotiations in Bangladesh before 1940 has given way to dowry and, in

Figure 1. Diagram of peformance setting.

fact, to demands for ever larger dowries. A prenuptial agreement (*kābin*) specifying a sum of money the groom will owe the bride's family if he divorces her is another part of these complex negotiations. For men to divorce women is not uncommon in rural Bangladesh. Men often divorce their wives if the couple fails to have children, or sons in particular. Divorce in Matlab, like most other forms of conflict, is managed by informal open-air gatherings of concerned parties with local power brokers attending as mediators.

Not only do social and economic conditions in Bangladesh have parallels throughout India and Pakistan, but speech genres in Matlab also have regional echoes. One hears in the Bengali speech of Muslims quite a few borrowed Perso-Arabic words. These include the word for lamentation, *zārī*, which in Bangladesh denotes a genre of call-and-response songs that my consultants in Matlab say are rousing and enjoyable, despite being performed during Ashura. From *zārī* is derived another Bengali word, *āhāzārī*, which denotes the violent mourning (falling down, beating one-self) seen at times of loss among Muslims in Bangladesh but also among Punjabi Hindus (Das 1996). Men, the rightful inhabitants of *public* spaces and public speaking roles in Bangladesh, can be heard reciting poetry and singing on occasion.

Recent research on North Indian song and lament genres (e.g. Raheja and Gold 1994) cannot be reviewed here. But one parallel from a region of India bordering Bangladesh is worth citing to contextualize my presentation. Tiwary (1978) ethnographically situates performances of wept speech, including "grievances," in Hindu villages of Bihar – just west of Bangladesh. The parallels with Latifa's situation are striking:

For such a weeping session there is even a term in Bhojpuri and Magahi; it is /bhēt/, which may be glossed as 'meeting (some one).' . . . every statement ends with a refrain which is made up of the term of address which the girl uses for her weeping partner . . . aunt . . . , father's sister . . . , sister . . . , grandmother . . . mother . . . " (1978: 25)

[W]omen comment on each other's ability to move people deeply by their weeping . . . (ibid: 26)

[Grievances are often aimed] at the menfolk. [The performer] may go on a kind of hunger strike, shun food and water, and weep at regular intervals until her grievances are fully met and she is satisfied . . . The topic is usually her grievance against the person with whom she has quarreled and the suffering that has been her lot since her entry into this family [here Tiwary presumes the accused to be her husband's family rather than her brothers as in Latifa's lament] . . . She may convey not only her complaints through the wept statements; she usually voices her threats too. The message is intended for all concerned to pay heed to her sad plight. It is quite effective, especially if she keeps it up for many days (ibid: 26).

Parallels between these Bihari laments and Latifa's performance include their duration over several days, the particular females addressed by kin term, the male targets, the admixture of complaints and threats, and the immediate on-site evaluation of the performance by the audience. Latifa's performance illustrates how people from Afghanistan to India and Bangladesh aestheticize suffering. The significance of parallels adduced here will become clearer after I have presented and commented on the transcript of Latifa's performance.

Latifa's texted weeping and the conversation surrounding it
The transcript below represents an event in March, 1992 – one nighttime lament in the series which Latifa performed during her visit to the Matlab family which adopted me. Interspersed with commentary, the transcribed lines are arranged in two ways.

1) The opening lines, relatively uncluttered by nonfocal talk,[13] are displayed in three columns. On the left is a line number and the speaker's initial. A transcription of the Bengali takes the center. On the right is a translation, with comments by audience and bystanders underlined and Latifa's discourse italicized. Typographical lines in Latifa's performance represent oral lines punctuated by the sobs (transcribed "●hh") that remind us that we deal here with her cries of grief and outrage.

2) In certain passages (e.g. lines 53f.) where "inside" and "outside" talk link or where the "side-play" is particularly useful in explicating Latifa's story, I have selectively represented bystanders' talk along with the lament. In such passages, the outsiders' talk is in the middle column and Latifa's words are on the right, with the translations of each found in the same column with the Bengali original. This arrangement helps me highlight the intricate ways that "reality" was interactively constructed during the focal

event.[14] (For transcription conventions and a description of participants, see Appendix 3.)

Seated on her "sister's" bed, Latifa sang to her while others outside the house participated in their own satellite conversations around Latifa's central performance. The "sister" listened, exhorted Latifa to keep faith in God, and begged her to *try* the magical remedies they had bought from a learned Muslim man. Off the bed but within the house, two of Latifa's male cousins laughed about how loudly and melodically she cried. Other cousins, aunts, Faisal, and I were standing outside in the courtyard; this position aptly represents my status as an outside observer, despite being in some sense "brother" ("uncle," etc.) to the others. Near us, several aunts and two female cousins quoted the increasingly scandalous gossip about Latifa's performances. They debated "is she sincere, is she truthful, is she sane?" (paraphrased from lines 91ff).

On that night Latifa moved from speech to texted weeping to unmarked speech. Latifa crafted her lament musically and poetically, making effective use of rhetorical devices such as reported speech, religious metaphor, and somatic imagery. Still, Latifa as "author" produced this "text" interactively – in close dialogue with her audience (Duranti and Brenneis 1986; Vološinov 1973: 86).

ID	Text	Translation
1L	ki asānti karlo go bun, bun go bun ●hh	*What havoc they wrecked, sister o sister!*
2L	āmāre ni deśe deśe [p]hirāygo bun ●hh bun go o o bun ●hh	*They took me from land to land, sister o sister.*

The opening lines of my recording of Latifa's lament (in progress when I turned on my tape recorder) introduce three parties to a conflict: (a) an unspecified third-person referent (known only through agreement marking on the verbs in lines 1 and 2) probably referring primarily to her brothers whom she held responsible for the havoc (literally, lack of peace) in her life, (b) the first-person *āmāre* ("me" in line 2, i.e. Latifa), and (c) her "sister."

Latifa bemoans the way "they" jerked her about, first arranging her marriage outside her village in another "land" (a reference to village exogamy), then forcibly retrieving her to her own "land." Line 2 is the first of many tokens of the first-person singular pronoun in this recording. This *āmāre* serves as an encompassing or chiastic marker for the wept speech, appearing in its first and last lines (compare lines 2, 106, 114). In line 2 we can also perceive a response to male criticism that she has done too much traveling of late outside her natal home; Latifa says, in so many words, "THEY moved me!"[15] When we hear this sort of dialogue within one utterance, we are listening as Vološinov or Bakhtin would.[16]

Latifa marshals other "voices" (Bakhtin 1981; cf. Vološinov 1973: pt. III), co-opting others' words for her own use, recontextualizing and thereby defusing a quoted accusation by responding immediately in her own terms (4):

3L	āmi ni "kāro bārit jāwnā mānuṣ" •hh	*"A person who goes to others' homes,"*
	āchilām bun •hh	*[they said] I was, sister,*
	bun go o o bun •hh	*sister o o sister.*
4L	kono mān[u]ṣe tay āmāre kono din de[k]he nāy •hh	*Yet no person ever saw me,*
	bun go o o bun •hh	*sister o o sister.*

The dialogization of Latifa's voice adds a layer of complexity to the individuation implicit in her remarkable use of pronouns.

Such use of quoted speech is even more obviously put to strategic use in the next instance, line 5. There Latifa symbolically expands her sympathetic audience by animating characters who look on her – seeing her suffering – with shock:

5L	man[u]ṣe dekhle nā i āmāre •hh	*If people [do] see me [now],*
	kae "āpner ki o go [h]ai[ye]che" •hh	*they ask "What on earth happened to you?"*
	bun go o o bun.	*sister o sister.*
6L	āmār sail dekhle man[u]ṣe [s]hirbā diyā •hh	*If they see my body, people shiver,*[17]
	uḍe •hh bun o o o go •hh	*sister o sister.*

The shock these newly introduced characters express adds to the on-the-ground interaction voices in solidarity with Latifa, a perception of her treatment at the hands of her brothers as a scandal. If her physically co-present audience held such perceptions, only one adolescent girl (Samabedanā) voiced them, saying, "Only the one feeling the sorrow can understand it . . . We only laugh!" (overlapping Latifa's line 34, not shown here). Latifa thereby projects (performatively constitutes) the sympathetic audience which is lacking on the ground – the flip-side of how her audience shapes her text and its "replays" (recontextualizations), construing her speech as "symptom."

Latifa uses body imagery to portray the depth of her grief. Her reference to bodily signs of misery does more than warrant treating this as a story that is somehow medical – it anchors her utterances in material reality.[18] Latifa alludes to her anorexic appearance in line 5. That emaciated appearance was due in part to protest fasting. In the everyday semiotics of the "popular medical sector" in South Asia, women (and to some extent men) experiencing *kaṣṭo* (hardship, stress) resort to a variety of idioms of distress such as the refusal of food (Nichter 1981).

A later line mentions (36) damage to Latifa's *kalejā* "liver" – an idiom which approximates "breaking her heart."[19] She holds her brothers responsible:

| 36L | /āmār kal[e]jāt/ kemte ghāi-o go dilo ●hh | *How they have hurt my liver,* |
| | bun go o o bun ●hh | *sister o sister!* |

Since on occasion they chained and beat her, "liver damage" might well be more than a figure of speech. Using somatic images is, at first glance, a "strategic retreat" to her brothers' medicalization of her anger; but Latifa's symbolic use of her body is powerful in its own right. It was a vision of Latifa's embodied grief that shocked the characters (teachers and others) she animated in line 5.[20]

7L	tārā-e kae bārā-e kae ●hh	*(Family and outsiders) say,*
	bun go a bun ●hh	*sister o sister,*
8L	i-*school*-er-o *sir*-erā kae ●hh	*The teachers at the school say,*
	bun go o o bun ●hh	*sister o sister,*
9L	"he māyāre[21] kemte heman k(h)uno go	*"How they have murdered that girl!",*
	karlo 'ɛhh bun go bun /o o. ●hh/	*sister /o o/.*
10B	/(erā) kaibo jāi ((gā OR bā)) (onerā)//	They will say ((whatever [they say]))./
11L	je [s]hunete hae hirbā diyā uḍe go ●hh	*Whoever hears of it, perhaps, shivers,*
	bun go o o[22] bun. ●hh	*sister o sister.*
12L	je [s]hunete hae to go ●hh	*Whoever hears, perhaps,*
	sailer pasam kāṛā kāṛā diyā go jāe gā ●hh	*their skins crawl with gooseflesh,*
	bun go bun. ●hh	*sister o sister.*

Latifa's invocation of the voice of secular education in lines 8–9 – the voice of her teachers saying they don't recognize her grief-stricken form – is telling, not only because she had been a high achiever in school (which is itself evidence that, long before her marriage, Latifa manifested a degree of self-assertion fairly unusual in Bangladeshi women). Schooling represents partial liberation from domesticity in rural South Asian villages. Relatively educated women in South Asian villages may try to "re-negotiate their roles as wives and mothers so as to perpetuate the greater autonomy experienced in school" (LeVine et al. 1993: 282). Latifa's excellence in school, however, and her animating the voices of her teachers, seem to have brought her more hostility than respect.

Since Latifa's animation of her teachers' voices is controversial, she shifts quickly to another idiom with echoes of Indo-Islamic piety (echoes which are louder in line 42f.):

13L	āmi e āgun kemte sahyo go karbo ●hh	*How can I bear this fire, sister o sister?*
	bun go a: a: bun. ●hh	
14L	dhum rānāe āmāre bujhāiba ●hh	*Tell me – will the smoke ((not sear)) me?*
	bun go o o bun. ●hh	*sister o sister.*

Lines 13f. introduce the image of "fire" to evoke the destruction, pain, and anger Latifa experiences. When Latifa returns to the theme of fire in 42f., she exploits the metaphor's theological and mystical histories-of-use:

42L	hāśarer-o māḍer matan kairā go ●hh	*The fire of judgment day*
	ānlo go bun ●hh	*they've brought down,*
	bun go bun ●hh	*sister–sister o sister.*
43L	hāśarero māḍer matan kairā go bun o go ●hh	*It's like the day of judgment, sister, oh.*

Lines 42f. compare her suffering with the fire of God's judgment. Perhaps Latifa intended this image to threaten her listeners, content as they were with their role in her undoing. But her use of the fire image for pain also evokes the theme of fiery pain associated with separation from the object of love, *'ishq,* which polysemously evokes human/divine love-in-painful-separation in Muslim *bāramāsya* or "calendrical laments" (Vaudeville 1986: 38).[23]

15–16L	āmāre nā khuno go kar[e]che ●hh	*They have murdered me,*[24]

In 15–16 we hear Latifa introduce what will be a refrain in the remainder of her performance – that "they have murdered me." This idiom led my Bangladeshi consultant in Arizona to ask me, "Had they beaten her?"; the "murder" idiom is conventionally used by smaller people when they are being beaten by larger people. Latifa resistantly insists on indexing her individuated experience of injustice: "They have murdered me." The very pronouns divide her from her brothers, her family. Frequent use of first-person singular pronouns pervades the lament, yet it characterizes neither Bangladeshi laments in general nor the conversational complaints of Latifa's female neighbors. In fact, the frequency of first-person pronouns in Latifa's lament markedly exceeds that of the other troubles-tellers in my corpus. The only close counterpart is the speech of a man, Suleyman, who, like Latifa, was labeled "mad." (See Appendix, Table 1.) Insistent indexing of self is a sign of madness to Latifa's community.

Latifa continues:

17–18L	bun go: o: o: bun. bun ●hh	*sister o o sister, sister*
19L	= āmāre nā khuno go kar[e]che ●hh	*Me they have murdered,*
20L	bun go o o bun ●hh	*sister o sister*
21L	āmāre nā khuno go kar[e]che ●hh	*Me they have murdered,*
22L	bun go bun ●hh	*sister o sister.*
23–24L	āmāre nā khun o go kar[e]che ●hh =	*Me they have murdered*
25B	= Āllā::h =	B – <u>God!</u> =
26L	= bun go o bun ●hh	= *sister o sister.*
27L	āmi to kato bhālo pāi[ye]chi go bun ●hh	*I – what a fine thing I had found,*
28L	bun go bun ●hh	*sister o sister!*
29L	āmāre nā khuno go kar[e]che ●hh	*They have murdered me,*
	bun go bun ●hh	*sister o sister.*
30–31L	āmāre nā khuno go kar[e]che ●hh	*They have murdered me,*
	bun go bun ●hh	*sister o sister.*

32L	āmāre nā khuno go kar[e]che ●hh	*They have murdered me,*
33?	((sharp sudden vocalization like a shout[25]))	
34L	bun go bun ●hh	*sister o sister*

Latifa repeats the theme of her "murder," portraying her days with her husband (line 27) as an interlude of peace in her otherwise miserable life. In the "side-play" conversation taking place outside – words simultaneous with her lines 19–34 – Faisal and I heard two divergent evaluations of Latifa. Musa, her male cousin, said "She has no shame, crying thus for her husband." Samabedanā, a female cousin, poignantly admitted, "Only she who feels the sorrow can understand it; we will never understand."

To suggest that performances of verbal art take place in a social vacuum in which only individual intent matters, that the audience plays no role in shaping such performance, entails a serious methodological error. Audiences are co-performers (Duranti and Brenneis 1986). Latifa's audience(s) spoke during her performance – sometimes timing their utterances to coincide with her sobbing inhalations but often overlapping her sung-wept speech. What was significant about this was the way Latifa, in the midst of performance, interacted with these other speakers, both inside and out. God's name was not far from Latifa's lips; she invoked Mabud (the Lord) in other performances which were less interactive (or interrupted, depending on one's perspective) than this one. On that particular night, however, Latifa seemed to take up God's name from her "sister," Buji (who urged her to do so in line 35) – echoing Buji's invocation, though with less optimism than the older woman projects.

35B?	<u>Āllāhi to /((bharasā))./</u>	<u>God is [one's only reliable] hope.</u>
36L	/āmār kal[e]jāt/ kemte ghāi-o go dilo ●hh	*How they have hurt my liver,*
	bun go o o o bun ●hh	*sister o sister!*
37L	Āllāh tae āmār laiggā nāi-o go ●hh	*God is not with me,*
	nāy o o o go ●hh	*no sister.*
38L	Āllāh tae āmār laiggā nāi-o go ●hh	*God is not with me,*
39–40L	nāy o o o go ●hh	*no sister.*
41L	āmāre nā kiyā karlo ●hh	*What they have done to me,*
	bun o go ●hh	*sister o sister!*

Latifa declares her "abjection" (Kristeva 1982) or abandonment by the divine. The extent to which this expression of abjection represents an angry resistance to her family's Panglossian response to her laments, resistance to the hegemony of a theology which leaves little room for laments and lamenters, is not clear. The fact that the old man Suleyman's similarly constructed lament (below) elicits rebuke motivates further investigation into the element of resistance in Bangladeshi laments. Suleyman, like Latifa, expresses abjection in a theological idiom; theirs is a theology formulated in resistance to another theology.[26]

Suleyman	āmār bhāgye	*In my fate . . .*
Relative	(sunen. ey rakam karen nā.)	Listen – don't do like that!
Suleyman	ey::::: nāy je Āllāh.	*. . . there is no God [for me].*[27]

Latifa goes on to complain about how her brothers forcibly removed her from her husband's home. (Lines 42–43 are reproduced earlier in the text).

44L	āyjā jadi erā diyā lāy to ●hh	*Today if they took me back,*
45L	bun o bun ●hh	*sister o sister.*
46–47L	tārā kę āmāre e jor kairā ānche ●hh	*Why have they forcibly brought me away,*
48L	bun o o o o go ●hh	*sister, o sister?*
49–50L	āmi to ey bār(i)t kām kairā khāile to go bun ●hh	*If I could earn my food in this home, o sister,*
51L	āmi śāntite thāktām ●hh	*I would be in peace*
52L	buyn o buyn ●hh	*sister o sister.*

Latifa projects her desire to live anywhere but with her brothers – either at her husband's home or that of her uncles.[28]

Still singing, she is addressed in line 54 by her female cousin Amina, one of those standing with me outside. Amina's theme (Latifa's need to come in and eat) was, in turn, taken up by her mother (C, my *cāci* or "father's brother's wife").

	Outside	**Inside Lament**
53	–	tārā āmāre āinnā
		By removing me,
	C – he Lātifā. (āybā nā?)	eṭā go kar[e]che ●hh
54	Hey Latifa! Aren't you coming [to eat?]?	*oh, how much*[29] *they have done*
55	C – bhāt khāe (nā bale).	buyn ā ā ā ●hh *sister o o!*
	(They say?) she hasn't eaten.	
56		*●hh*
57	C – he karbo (he karbo bhāt ānbe nāi)	*((coughs))* =
	She'll do this and that but she won't eat.	
58	C – tār ekṭu:: bhāt bale khāi[ye]che.	= tārāe āmāre ki ār *They have*
	They say she's only eaten a tiny bit.[30]	
59	C – kāillā ābār dekhlā he meye āyche.	●hh
	You saw again yesterday when this girl came.[31]	
60	āyjā kon bārit geche sārā din (byabasthā kare)	jabār go karlo ●hh *done violence to me,*[32]
	All day today to whose compound did she go (??and eat??)	
61–62		bun go o bun ●hh *sister o sister!*
63–67		tārāe āmāre ki āre (ānteo) jabār mārlo ●hh
		bun go bun ●hh
		They have done violence to me,
		sister o sister.

In lines 59f., and again in 63–67, Latifa evidently (see endnote 32) compares her treatment at the hands of her brothers with the sacrifice of animals. Speaking simultaneously with Latifa, Amina and her mother seem to express concern for her, hungry as she must be. Yet the undertone of moral disapproval and shame is evident. Like line 99 ("They say she moved around all day"), lines 59f must be interpreted in the light of local Muslim version of *pardā* rules prohibiting marriageable women from moving about freely, one of the behaviors serving (for Latifa's family) as an index of her madness.

Lines 68–82, less important to my argument, are in an endnote. What Latifa said after my transcript recommences is striking.[33] A more explicitly resistant piece of metacommunication – a questioning of the social order and communicative structure determining her existence (Wilce 1995) – could hardly be imagined:

83L āmāre diye[34] pāgal kaiyā kaite dilo nā go ●hh	*By calling me "mad" they prevented me from speaking!*
84L āmāre kemte khuno go kairā laiyā go nā ●hh bun go bun[35]	*Why have they taken and murdered me, sister o sister?*

Latifa objects not only to the physical coercion her brothers exercised in pulling her from her husband's home but also to the "order of discourse" (Foucault 1980: 133; Lindstrom 1992: 105) imposed on her and those who might speak for her. It is one thing to read Goffman, Bateson,[36] Laing, or Foucault describing the silencing of those labeled "mad," and quite another to hear Latifa herself challenging the label and the silencing it effects. Line 83 can be glossed as, "Me, *calling* '*mad*,' [or, "because they *label* me 'mad' "] they would not let speak." In the underlined phrase Latifa indexes the arbitrariness, the constructedness of her diagnosis. Her utterance, double-voiced in Bakhtin's sense, quotes their diagnosis while simultaneously and radically recontextualizing it. Latifa thereby renders the label just a label, not a fact. Compare Latifa's line 281 (uttered in the unmarked, conversational style which re-emerged after she stopped weeping):

281L kāhini (kai nāi) maraner abasthā kairā (he)lāise pāgal bānāiyā lāise,	*They have brought me to death's door, made me crazy.*

Latifa blames her family – particularly her brothers – for rendering her "mad." To the extent that she *is* upset, it "is" their fault. But she is not only upset; they have "brought her to death's door." Her misery is embodied and her very survival threatened.

I noted earlier that the way Latifa picked up the name of God from her interlocutor's lips exemplifies the interactivity of the lament. Now we see

the synchronous interconnection between the speech inside (Latifa) and
outside the house ("sideplay" between overhearers rather than validated
addressees) exemplified in the way Latifa's cousin Amina picks up her
mention of *pāgal* (line 83) and throws it back at her – without the verb of
speaking, *kaiyā*:

85A	he Latifa, cup karas nā?	●hh
	Hey Latifa, won't you shut up?	
86	A [to others outside with her] – cheḍir	
	māthā āro pāgal haybo beśi.	
	The girl's head will get even crazier.	
87	C3 – māthāy māthā (bipad āche)	āmāre kemne (x x x x) hailo o o o go ●hh
	(There is that danger) to her head.	*How has [it] happened to me, o o oh!*
88	C1 – māthāi to	āmāre kemne (x x x x)
	in her head	*How has [it] happened to me*
89		hailo o o o go, *o o oh!*

Whereas Latifa's double-voiced word hedges – holding the label *pāgal*
at arm's length – no such skeptical distancing is heard in Amina's affir-
mation that Latifa's crying makes her even crazier. In the space of one
line, thus, Amina shifted from a conversational voice engaging Latifa as a
person (a socially recognized and responsible actor) to what Bakhtin calls
the authoritative voice, here serving to objectify Latifa and her situation.
The folk-scientific authoritative voice in 86f. echoes the directive authority
of line 85, where Amina issues a command to "shut up."[37] Amina's state-
ment is neither conditional nor personal; rather, it claims authority imper-
sonally. Amina's voice imposed a diagnosis, locating Latifa's *pāgalāmi*,
"madness," in her "head." Crucially, the logic of lines 85–87 – blaming
her "madness" on her refusal to "shut up," her persistence in wept speech
– justifies attempts at silencing her. To silence Latifa is of a piece with
subjecting her to discipline[38] and the "treatment" her family wanted her to
receive at the hands of the imam of a nearby mosque – the treatment she
was evidently successfully avoiding by moving somewhat secretively dur-
ing the day. Amina's locating-objectification of the problem within Latifa's
"head" is echoed by Latifa's aunts after line 90 (summarized below; for a
complete transcript, see Appendix 2, p. 35).

During gaps in Latifa's keening (lines 90ff. in Appendix 2), my field
assistant Faisal (F) heard an account of the situation from those standing
outside with us. That account alternated between overtly evaluating the
legitimacy of Latifa's acts and retracing her story's narrative thread in
answer to Faisal's questions. Direct answers to Faisal's query in line 90 –
"What happened?" – at times gave way to debate over the legitimacy of
Latifa's "symptoms." Line 96 acts as a hinge; in declaring at least some
of the claims and counterclaims to be "true," one of the aunts seemed to

open up the talk for people to contribute whatever they "knew" as "truth" in regards to Latifa. This debate has complex implications for Latifa. On the one hand, Musa's mother[39] in line 91 ("[They] say, people say, 'You are joking.'") cast doubt on the authoritativeness of Amina's reference to Latifa's "head" problem. Yet it is not quite her own "voice" in which Musa's mother puts distances between herself and the certainty. Rather, she cites other's voices – "people say" – introducing these new voices into the discourse just as Latifa did in her lament. Her own stance toward this borrowed voice is not clear; line 91 is laced with ambiguity so that we are unsure whether it is the "people" whose words are empty or Latifa who is "empty" according to rumor. Likewise the aunt in line 96 ("What (she/they) say(s) is truly spoken.") never states *whose* claims she means to affirm.[40] The rumors cited by the three aunts (C2, C3, MM) cast doubt on Latifa's morality, since autonomous wandering violates *pardā*.[41] The upshot of this is that the aunts raise the possibility that Latifa, rather than being "mad," might in fact be a manipulator. That "status change" cuts both ways, ascribing more agency to the young woman while at the same time impugning her character.[42]

In line 106 we see that Latifa repeats the charge that they have hurt her liver; she is in pain! Perhaps precisely because hearing that pain is so discomfiting, Faisal continues to receive the aunts' account of just how Latifa continues to be so drawn to her former husband, rather than silently listening to her lament:

	Outside	**Inside Lament**
105	F – ke tābij utthān karche (eke)?	
	Who put magical charms in her courtyard?	
106		āmār kail[e]jāt kemne
		How [they have injured] my liver
107	C1 – jāmāi tābij kar[e]che ār ki.	
	Her ex-husband did the magic or whatever.	
108		gāi o go dilo
		They gave [me] pain!
109	bhālor janno kar[e]che ār ki.	
	He did it for good [motives] or whatever.	
110		dilo o o o go . . . *gave [pain] o o oh!*
111	A – pahelā pahelā or swāmire dekhte pāre nāi etā to ektā.	
	At the very start of their marriage she couldn't stand her husband; that's one [reason].	
112	A – takhan jāmāi anek kichu pānir madhye	
	Then the husband began putting lots of different things in water.	

113   A – rāikkhā-dāikkā meyere khāwāiche.
       Putting them there he fed it to the girl.

114   hāy hāy. āmāre ki karlo.
                                                       Woe, woe! What did they do to me!
                                                       [Unmarked speech; weeping has ceased]

Is the weeping, the ongoing attraction to her ex-husband, to be explained by love magic? Latifa's kin believe so; they are convinced that, while they were still married, he planted various charms in such a way that they would win Latifa's abiding affection.[43] Such charms are now seen by Latifa's natal family – to interpret their model in Kristeva's (1982) terms – as a polluting remainder of this man.

Latifa's lament was winding down by line 114 and returning to the first-person indexing of self-as-victim with which she began the taped portion of her lament. Lines prior to 114 foreshadow the shift from tuneful weeping into the unmarked speech style which finally emerges in that line. The icons of weeping (Urban 1988) which had so clearly punctuated her song/speech began to fall away in 110–113. They were replaced first by the onomatopoeic interjection, *hāy hāy* (114), which *represents* crying without performing it. Gradually, even this gave way to what Latifa's interlocutors regarded as rationality. There follows about two minutes of tape in which the recorder picked up only the speech of those outside and a few snippets of the post-lament conversation of those inside including Latifa, all speaking more quietly than they had during her lament. After the passing of much inaudible taped speech, we hear the elderly "sister" and addressee of the lament speak:

141B   (āmrā jes) ceṣā karbo (Āllā-e.)   (We will try, by God)

When Latifa's "sister" responded to the long indirect plea, she voiced the commitment I heard several times during Latifa's visit – to pay the dowry and other expenses of a new marriage. But this is no caving in to Latifa's demands to be reunited with her former husband; in fact, the "sister" also raised the issue of the *owśadh* ("medicines") they wished Latifa would try, the Islamically-sanctioned remedies which she had been throwing away or otherwise avoiding. To this Latifa responds in what appears to be anger:

143L   āmār ki asukh je āmi owśadh byabahār   *What is my illness that I should take*
        kartām?   *medicines?*
144L   āmār ki.   *What do I have?*
145L   āmāre xxx biye dibo. jā xx biye kartām.   *They'll give me in marriage [again].*
                                                     The marriage I would enter . . .
146 Female   (asukh nā)   (Not sick)
              (age?)–
147 Child   to owśadh phelāitāche:::!   She is discarding her
                                                     medicines/amulets!

The child in line 147 carries on a theme heard in the strip of talk extending from before 143 to beyond 147 – Latifa's "noncompliance." Latifa, however, does in *her practice* what Kuipers recommends (1989: 102) – she rejects compliance as the measure of the effectiveness of medical communication. To reject the compliance benchmark is to reject an ideology of language common to medicine and medical anthropology – that language is a neutral tool for accurate denotative reference. When language is used appropriately in the medical domain, according to this ideology, words adequately reflect nonlinguistic facts. In actuality neither Latifa nor her family takes discourse this way. Rather than reflecting facts about her inner state, Latifa's cousin Amina says her linguistic performance is responsible for creating or exacerbating the "danger" to her "head" (lines 86f). Latifa, on the other hand, implicitly calls for a recognition of her right to perform speech acts more commonly associated with male students in Dhaka than ex-wives in Matlab – making protests and demands.

Latifa complains of being shackled at home – *aṭkāiyā rākhā* – in lines 152–169 (not included in this paper). Rather than finding sympathy, she is told by one woman in the house that locking her up thus is "good." There is talk of arranging a new marriage. A male cousin says he will look for another *ālim* or Islamic teacher, and the girl Samabedanā – again in sympathy with Latifa, who had evidently objected early on to her former husband's facial hair – says she will look for a clean-shaven *ālim* (an oxymoron?). Several laugh at that. The next voice heard turns the humor on Latifa:

168M	<u>nā-kāndār sur balo dekhi to bādbār.</u>	<u>The tune of your weeping is (bad?)</u>
169M	<u>bākibār (svar) ekhan diben. (1)</u>	<u>Now set it to a (better?) tune.</u>
170 L	(hunde dibo e[khā]n dā ek) ṭiṭkāri māren.[44]	*You ridicule me [by saying] you will give [me a new husband?]*

Here (line 168) is on-the-ground performance criticism – Musa says he didn't like the tune of her crying. Here Musa is acknowledging the tunefulness or musicality of Latifa's performance, albeit critically. Though we might call this "art criticism," to Latifa it was *ṭiṭkāri mārā*, "teasing" or "ridicule."

The two sometimes intertwining conversations continue inside and outside of "Latifa's" house. Samabedanā hears Amina tell the story of another person who cried tunefully. Then, shifting the topic more explicitly back to Latifa, Samabedanā says the tune of her crying was *madhur*, "honeyed." Soon thereafter, Samabedanā herself begins to hum – evidently inspired and touched by her older cousin's melody, as one might be after watching a tragic opera performed on stage.

About five minutes later, Latifa – speaking now in unmarked intonation contours but using metaphor with marked rhetorical force – introduces the image of "defective seed" into the discourse. Soon it becomes clear that she is condemning her whole clan, which includes her hosts. At that point, paradoxically to us, they seem to praise Latifa's impolite attack:

264M	/ey ey daṣṭā kathār madhye ekṭā kai[ye]che	In all these "ten" words she [status equal] has [finally] said something.
265D?	ekṭā kathā kaili **re**	You [inferior] really said something there!
276L	e rakter nā? ḍāhāiter bun ḍāhāiter māyā.	*Doesn't it inhere in this "blood"? [I am] the sister of a robber, the daughter of a robber*
277Mu	**hæ**	Yes! [Touché!]
278L	ey banśer sab kichu.	*Everything in [everyone of] this lineage!*
280D	hæ. jñan to kae (x) Latifā pāgal (āche OR hai(ye)che) brains ṭhik āche ekhano *out* hae nā(i).	Yes, her conscious self-control (was missing?) but she is not chronically insane; her brains are OK, they haven't gone out.

Latifa's *jñan*, her "conscious self-control," had been only temporarily lacking – hence she had violated norms so as to "index" madness, moving about, singing her words, and perseverating in self-assertion, grief, and rage. Perhaps taking encouragement from their seeming praise for her direct critique, Latifa goes on to call her male kin a gang of thugs, but the male cousins standing nearby respond with the equivalent of *"touché!"* One of my Bangladeshi consultants in Arizona interpreted this by recourse to a story of his own. He remembered how often during his school days his friends would put him up to certain deviant behavior, only to withdraw and be entertained by the spectacle of his being caught and punished alone. As he became wise to this, he told them he would not serve their need to be entertained. To the extent that Latifa's experience is like that of my Arizona Bangladeshi consultant, the younger men in Latifa's audience were egging her on in order to set her up for the violent disciplinary treatment she was to receive within days of the transcribed event.

That violent suppression of lamentation and prevention of my witnessing that scene was foreshadowed in the remarks made by those standing outside during Latifa's performance.

"...She's crying for her husband, she has no shame ...no modesty ..." (line 27, Musa). Later, Amina spoke bluntly: "Hey Latifa, won't you shut up?" (line 85). Whereas in words like those we find naked coercion, at a later stage in the interaction between Latifa and her kin (lines 264–280) we see an ideological dimension working more subtly than does explicit coercion. We see that ideology at work when Latifa's critics seem to use praise (line 264) to reinforce the "return of sanity" indexed by conversational speech. When she shifted to a conversational speech style

(which they seemed to cast as a rational – as opposed to a tuneful, versified – rhetoric), they suddenly acknowledged her wit and praised her acerbic attacks on the patriline. One male cousin could then pronounce her sane – her brains had not left her after all (line 280). So, by direct and indirect verbal threats and through odd praise, Latifa's kin tried to shift her from tuneful weeping to a less impassioned genre. In this small incident, the pull exerted by Latifa's cousins in the direction of rationality points to much larger forces which would "disenchant" the world or "rationalize" it (Weber 1958), and which also have begun to split off madness from non-madness (Foucault 1973).

When tolerance of Latifa's weeping in her maternal uncles' home and in the neighborhood did finally give out, two or three men grabbed her hands and feet and dragged her out of their courtyard. They escorted her back to her natal home quite late at night. Another cousin ordered me away from this awful scene back into my room. As they left the courtyard, they dismissed her now more urgent wailing as *purāṇ kāndā-i* ("old crying"). Their use of the unmarked term *kāndā* for any unmarked form of crying coupled with "old" indicate the end of their patience with her expressions of grief. To dismiss Latifa's aesthetic and rhetorical achievement with her uncle's derogation of her tune exemplifies the principles of selectivity inherent in a particular ideology of language and gender, one which might even be said to breed the violence I half-witnessed.

When I last spoke with Latifa's brothers in April 1992, they confirmed that they had chained her inside the house when she returned, to keep her from wandering. I saw Latifa that May, too, and naively asked whether she felt better. She responded bitterly,

L – What sickness do I have? Am I sick?

J – I see you're smiling.

L – I smile for peoples' sake.[45]

She explained that she was afraid that if she wept they would beat her again, returning her to a kind of domestic incarceration. But her brothers could not have chained her with impunity without the ideological work done by their characterizations of her verbal art as inappropriate ranting which indexes (and is likely to exacerbate) her madness.

TOWARD LARGER CONCENTRIC CIRCLES OF CONTEXT

How can we arrive at a broader, situated understanding of the lament, the interaction, and the competing evaluations of both narrative event (the lament) and narrated events (the tragedy she bewails)? To answer that we

must look for cultural values (e.g. surrounding gender) commonly invoked in such matters and in discursive acts of resistance, for institutionalized forms of discourse production and reception as they are reflected in the politics of genres, and for the working of ideologies of language. These are not distinct entities but concentric circles of the context in which the event takes place and which the event also helps shape – aspects of that single process which Giddens (1984) calls "structuration."[46] This section interprets how interactive performances such as that which I have just presented reflect – and also contribute to the reproduction of – structures of knowledge and practice in Bangladesh. It was a performance not only of "lamenting" but also of "engaging in conflict over 'diagnosis' of passionate speech/a 'heated head,' 'differently positioned evaluations of events,' and 'norms of gender and marriage.' " The dialectic of control (Giddens 1984: 16; see endnote 46) made clearer by describing the event in those phrases appears throughout Latifa's interaction with her kin. The dialectic was not absolutely predetermined by one party's intentions or even its resources. Her brothers, not present on the night I recorded Latifa but effectively controlling resources at home such as locks and chains, have consistently met with enough resistance from Latifa that their designs for therapy (including arranging a new marriage) have been frustrated from 1990 until now (1996).

Gender and resistance

Resistance is gendered, and women have carved out their own spaces and discursive-actional strategies for resistance. In many societies women use lament performance to resist a variety of powers – those of shamans (Briggs 1992b) or other men who start wars (Caraveli 1986) which kill their kin; of religious authorities (Das 1996), particularly insofar as they monopolize death, its meanings, and its rituals (Caraveli 1986; Seremetakis 1991); or, generally, of those who control women's lives, sexuality, and economic security. Laments, in short, are frequently vehicles of social protest for women (Caraveli 1986). As such, they are perceived as threats to the social order, and have in various times and places been associated ("strategically," as it were, by male authorities) with madness. Yet such a metapragmatic characterization is not uncontested; "the poetic expression of grief is perceived by the lamenters themselves not only as an emotional outburst but as a means of mediating that emotion and thereby avoiding the excesses of madness that death might otherwise provoke" (Holst-Warhaft 1992: 28).

Particular discourses of value surround gender, sexuality, and marriage in Bangladesh and South Asia in general, discourses which are not

monologues but contestations. In 1992, Latifa's brothers portrayed their actions favorably, while her cousins betrayed only the slightest amount of self-doubt over their participation in returning her violently to them. In justifying their intervention to end her marriage, the brothers cite the reports Latifa sent that her husband's family was mistreating her. If she changed her mind again about her marital situation after they "rescued" her, that only supports men's claim that women such as Latifa make too much trouble. It might well appear to them that she is playing a cynical game with her benefactors, never being pleased with what they arrange for her, always looking for ways to make them look bad.[47] The divorce was recognized. No lamenting of a socially legitimated divorce (two years old by the time of the 1992 lament) could be countenanced within a local ideology of emotion, for in that ideology crying is idealized only when directed toward God, or performed for the men of one's house or as part of a validated collective ritual. Finally, the extended family's *marjādā* (respect) was being compromised by Latifa's flouting of gender restrictions, and her individual needs had to be subjugated to the greater needs of the kin group.[48]

Gender is mapped onto Bengali speech in nonobvious ways. Folk models cast women's speech as halting despite what seems to me the "objective" verbal excellence of Latifa vis-à-vis the men who ridiculed her. Latifa's live audience seemed unaware of how their laughter at the men's jibes empowered the men at her expense; in that environment counterdiscourses could only mount *indirect* challenges.[49] In a 1992 sociolinguistic interview, I asked one man about a few of the complaints which I had transcribed. Since I wanted his reaction to the *form* of the "complaint proper" and I was asking him to ascribe gender and status to anonymous speaker-authors of decontextualized utterances, I gave him as few nonlinguistic or "contextual" clues as possible. For better or worse, he played along with this odd language game. The first complaint I read aloud he ascribed to a woman – for an interesting reason. Although it was I who had decontextualized it, he said that a woman must have uttered it, because only a woman would speak out of the blue like that. He went on to explain himself, giving me a hypothetical counterexample of males making sense by speaking in a context. The essentialization of gender and of speech as a production of individuals as autonomous strategists go hand in hand in this ideology. An interactionist analysis of Latifa's "madness" helps to deconstruct both essentializations.

Interviews I conducted in 1996 made clear how men in Matlab appeal to Islamic prohibitions on women doing *anything* loudly. Yet, such prohibitions only indirectly motivated Latifa's cousins' violent efforts to stop

Latifa's performances, to finally remove her and her weeping from their compound. They were mediated by a concern on the part of the two men who physically dragged Latifa out of the compound over their sisters' impending marital negotiations. One of those two men was Latifa's cousin, the other a neighbor. Both arranged marriages for their sisters within months of Latifa's 1992 visit. Bangladeshi marital negotiations involve reciprocal judgments of family status or symbolic capital. That status is measured in large part by the degree to which the families succeed in keeping their women from wandering or otherwise violating *pardā*. Any evidence that a family was "harboring" or even encouraging "mad ravings" in violation of *pardā* would make it difficult for them to arrange marriages for their sisters/daughters even if those young women were not the ones accused of "mad" behavior.

Scott, in exploring the nature of resistance to power, addresses gender hierarchy in passing. "Public transcripts" spoken by the powerless are often submissive, if sometimes ironically so, while "hidden transcripts" often celebrate visions of rebellion. Yet "the frontier between the public and the hidden transcripts is a zone of constant struggle between dominant and subordinate – not a solid wall" (1990: 14). Songs and even grumblings which avoid open complaint (ibid: 154) are among the texts which press against the "frontier." Latifa's interaction with more powerful family members resulted in a breach of the wall. Scott asks why groups such as women (here, Latifa's female kin) would fail to join in solidarity with any act of resistance to male control over their sexuality (in marriage and divorce) and their free movement in space (which, to Bangladeshi men, indexes sexual freedom, the violation of *pardā*).[50] Yet, although he finds the notion of false consciousness extremely problematic, Scott (ibid: 82) also admits that a durable hegemony becomes possible when a large group, like women, have before them the possibility of achieving higher status (as mothers and mothers-in-law to daughters) at the end of a long road of submission (to men and mothers-in-law).[51] In the case of gender relations in Bangladesh, therefore, the prevailing virtue becomes one of patient acceptance. If Latifa's lifestory typifies the contemporary Bangladeshi rural scene, it teaches us that historic shifts in expectations nurtured in school have thus far resulted primarily in isolated cases of frustrated and tragic resistance.[52]

I have already discussed lament forms in Bihar as a means of contextualizing Bangladeshi performances. Other parallels which can frame the event at hand come from Veena Das's description of the Punjabi gendered division of labor in mourning the dead (a division of labor reversed when the occasion of mourning is violence against women).[53] This description of

gender and grieving helps us interpret many things – particularly the angry reaction to Latifa's performance. Latifa's experience of violence is analogous to Punjabi women's experience of the violence perpetrated by "their own" men; as such, it falls into a category of "reversed" experiences not normally inscribed in lament. Violence by men against daughters, sisters, and wives which was intended to uphold the family virtue and honor[54] is not memorialized in laments or *bilāp* as were the heroic deaths of their men in battles in both Vedic and colonial eras (Das 1996: 82f). Adapting the words of Das (1996: 68), it is not only women's voices which lamentation "makes public" but also, in Latifa's song, the violent deeds of her brothers. For a bride to weep when she *returns* to her natal family (rather than when she *leaves* home) is a particularly provocative reversal of cultural norms. True, Bangladeshi Muslim gender values do condemn the "publicizing" of the female voice in loud crying; but the norm reversal and publicizing of her brothers' deeds – in a season when her kin were concerned to make marital arrangements for yet other sisters – was in itself ample reason to suppress her songs.

Genre and language ideologies

Before taking Das's attractive interpretive lead in the analysis of gender and this particular genre, we must problematize the latter. How are events – instances of speech – categorized, and how, in turn, do those categories come to take on their own significance? As Hanks argues (1996), genres are a good place to start if we want to analyze the routinization and the ideologization of practices, including communication. If we aim to put Latifa's speech acts in larger context(s), linking them with similar communicative forms is a good first step. To do so, we must recognize the existence of marked and unmarked forms of troubles-telling.

My investigation of genre arose out of painful involvement with Latifa. Latifa's sorrows disturbed far more than the routine of my fieldwork – I cannot resolve the turmoil, concern, tension, self-doubt, and soul-searching which she touched off. As inadequate as these responses sometimes seem, the best Faisal and I have been able to do is to accept her request that he visit her ex-husband, and to understand and represent in writing what Latifa was doing. My interpretive journey has led me to speak with some four dozen people about this event and others with which it might be compared. Insights gleaned from these conversations are reflected throughout this paper. It was fairly early in those conversations that I first perceived a link between Latifa's performances and literary genres. That insight came from Professor Mansur Musa and others at Dhaka University in April, 1992. I have struggled, however, not to privilege the labels assigned by academics

and to continue to listen to Latifa's kin and other "ordinary people" in
Matlab. Keep in mind that at the time of her lamentations no one present
used any term but *kāndā*, the unmarked word for crying, to describe Latifa's
weeping, unless perhaps they added a descriptor to acknowledge that it was
sur diye "tuneful." In fact, no one present invoked *any* label for a marked
genre as did the seminar audience for whom I played the audiotapes of
Latifa and Suleyman.[55] After I had returned to Los Angeles, I played the
audio recording of Suleyman's tuneful weeping – "There is no God for
me!" (blasphemy in the ears of some?) – for a Bangladeshi immigrant
who served briefly as a research consultant in late 1992. Perhaps it was
the conventionalized association between women and *bilāp* which led him
to call Suleyman's taped song a *zārī gān* or religious dirge. At any rate,
my inquiries into genre and values have uncovered more discord than
consensus.

Marked and unmarked forms of troubles-telling
Less controversy surrounds the labeling of unmarked, conversational
troubles talk. Whether visiting practitioners, preparing to do so, or simply
inviting recognition of pain, what Bangladeshis say people do is "talk about
(or reveal, show) problems."[56] Children and adults may also *kānnākāṭi karā*
"do weeping," or simply *kāndā* "cry." These "speech genres" (Bakhtin
1986) are not only less controversial but are simply less noticed and
commented on than are other, more salient genres of verbal art.[57] Yet,
the fact that Latifa's audience was able to characterize her textual produc-
tion as *kāndā* "crying" shows that the boundaries between these marked
and unmarked genres are not only vague but ideologically constituted.[58]
In contrast with unmarked conversational complaints, laments are *marked*
speech forms which must be even more markedly socialized. Bengalis
recognize several genres of stylized crying including the *bāramāsya* or
calendrical laments discussed above, *marsiyā* or *zārī gān* "dirges" sung in
commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Husein, and *bilāp* and *āhāzārī*,
"[secular] laments" and "violent [secular] weeping."[59] More than every-
day forms of speech or crying, these lament genres are performances –
audiences will thus attend to the "how" as well as the "what." Whereas the
bāramāsya is, at least to Bengali scholars, a valued genre of written and
oral literature, everyday expressions from crying to griping are not. It is
the combination of speech, song, and tears which sets contemporary oral
laments apart. These marked performances are salient enough to become
objects of on-the-spot folk literary criticism, for laments are aesthetic
constructions, rendered so partly by their very tendency to be evaluated.

Whereas *bāramāsya* lyrics follow a specific formula, the term *bilāp*
more generically refers to stylized weeping or ritual crying. The sobbing

solo performer, often a woman, "sings" her sorrow. People perform *bilāp* at times of loss and bereavement. Rural people often perform *bilāp* when a close relative dies, and *bilāp* may also be performed by either a bride leaving her natal family for that of her husband or by the family members left behind. A woman who performs *bilāp* at those moments meets with approval and understanding, not scorn. But people draw on such genres on atypical occasions, too, including economic distress, or an unwanted divorce as in Latifa's case. Then they risk censure to evoke the genre's affective associations. Sometimes wept appeals "work." Latifa's performance should be understood in light of the potential of the *bilāp* to elicit a supportive response in the audience.[60]

Still, genres are not fixed, given, or neutral entities but "typifications" of practice (Schutz 1970), fluid because they are constantly re-negotiated and manipulated for ongoing sociopolitical purposes. Briggs and Bauman have demonstrated political dimensions of the act of genre-labeling (1992), stressing how such labels construe family resemblances between texts or performances rather than objectively reflecting essential textual structure. Local audiences such as Latifa's – regardless of the range of genre terms available to them – assign a label to her performances as it suits their purposes. Bengali lament genres correspond to Latifa's transcribed performance in complex ways – no performance simply reproduces a genre template. Also, labels for an oral text may be "thrown" or coolly chosen, either process being fraught with ideology. Bengali-speakers can play both with family resemblances and with gaps between old and new texts, between "genres" and "instantiations"/performances. Such gaps are intrinsic to performance as aesthetic process.

Given the "gappiness" and ideological exploitability of the genre-performance relationship, we return to our case. Bangladeshi ideologies of gendered speech, ideologies which shape lamentation in particular, have parallels, particularly, in what we know of Punjabi evaluations of laments and of silence. The point of my genre analysis is to remind readers that, despite the way Latifa's kin wish to use the evidence of prolonged weeping to label her as an individual, her performance is part of a cultural tradition.[61]

Language ideologies

This discussion of genre labels lays the groundwork for understanding a conflict fought with words and over words, but nonetheless concerned with action, power, and ideology. The rubric of "language ideologies" helps unite those concerns, and is particularly compatible with a theory of practice which emphasizes the role of reflexive action in the dialectic of structuration (see endnote 46). Language ideologies are "beliefs about

language articulated by the users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use" (Silverstein 1979: 193). Recent linguistic ideological analyses relate observable features of language use (including verbal art) to power relations, and emphasize local heterogeneity in both language and reflections on it. When we bring this approach to the study of folklore and performance we find the links between power and genre (traced by Briggs and Bauman 1992) to be mediated by ideologies of language. This approach helps us interpret Latifa's interactions by prompting us to take "genres" as ideological (not neutral) framing devices wielded as control gambits by people with differing interests and access to power. Latifa's cousins and at least one neighbor – via the particular ideological selectivity evident in their reflection upon her performance and the "madness"-frame they attempted to impose on it – were able thereby to accomplish her domestic incarceration. It is not that they had that as their goal or were malicious by nature; their interests simply lay in keeping her at home and saving their corporate reputation.

Language ideologies and attacks on genres

In my 1996 fieldwork I asked dozens of men around Matlab about what people do at times of loss, eliciting descriptions of and labels for various kinds of weeping as well as evaluations of tuneful discourse.[62] Those men typically identified *bilāp* with the tuneful, texted weeping which typically accompanies death and some points in wedding ceremonies. When I asked where the tunes come from, people agreed that they "come from the heart." And, although I heard echoes of other voices and opinions between the lines, people told me that to weep loudly and tunefully is "bad." Almost all mentioned at least one "Islamic" reason to condemn loud weeping (though one man in particular said that he hopes his children – especially his daughters – *will* weep loudly when he dies). Islam, they say, prohibits loud wailing at the death of one of God's servants. Other Islamic teaching is said to prohibit women from making their voices heard beyond the limits of their family circle, and certainly *bilāp* violates that restriction. But I finally perceived a connection between *bilāp* and Bengali tradition on the one hand, and modernity, Islam, and Weberian rationalization when people told me that weeping among *urbanized* Bangladeshis is silent (interiorized, privatized, and demystified – in contrast with its aestheticization in rural tradition). Another reason for stifling *bilāp* was often cited – in the context of mourning the dead, the corpse itself will suffer if its relatives *bilāp*.[63]

Some voices in Matlab find in the very tunefulness of *bilāp* and related acts the sin of drawing attention to oneself (perhaps in the guise of "praying").[64] This tendency to draw attention to the self was identified

by another consultant as characteristic of madness as a game. One middle-class woman told a Bangladeshi psychiatrist friend of mine, upon hearing her occupation, that she believes the behavior associated with "madness" and with getting treatment is a kind of *bilāsitā* (a luxurious pastime, self-indulgence, self-gratification) (Ali, Muniruzzaman, and Tareq 1994: 561; Rezwana Quaderi, personal communication).[65] It is no accident that many vehicles through which *women's* voices were once more freely expressed are now under attack.[66] When folk models of language and gender ascribe anonymous samples of ungrammatical, confusing, or faltering speech to women – and such models must have influenced the hearing given Latifa's performance, indeed prevented it from getting a full hearing – they reproduce gender hierarchy.[67]

Linguistic-ideological filters in Matlab and Dhaka
Our analysis does not end with the last critical words of the first audience. This is a tale of *several* audiences, *several* receptions. Two months after Latifa sang-wept in "my" compound, I played the audio recording to a seminar at the Institute of Modern Languages, Dhaka University. The academic audience readily labeled it *bilāp*; they linked Latifa's bewailing her beloved with the pining of Radha for Krishna inscribed in Bengali literary tradition. Why was their approach so very different from that of Latifa's kin? Apart from the gap between confronting Latifa and hearing her on tape, Dhaka academics nurture a secular vision of Bengal (poles apart from reformist Islam) which romanticizes folklore. Although my readers might well sympathize with the Dhaka academics' response – invoking genre labels that add dignity to Latifa's and Suleyman's verbal actions – we must see both responses to Latifa's performance as ideological. Both rural and academic ideologies of gender reflect the disempowerment of women – reflect it and simultaneously *mask* how it is socially and linguistically accomplished. Latifa framed her performance as a plea for justice, constructed with a view to aesthetic and rhetorical "punch"; her cousins represented it as just another example of the dangerous sort of behavior which maintains a prolonged cycle of madness; the seminar framed the recording as a rustic but nonetheless romanticized offshoot of a valued literary tradition, and an example of the sort of direct "expression of emotion" associated with women.

It is significant that a major objection of Latifa's kin to her weeping performances was that she did not restrict herself to the approved setting – her household (broadly, including that of her mother's brothers) – or to the behavioral component of domesticity metonymically associated with it. Thus, the response of Latifa's kin exemplifies something Silverstein writes about language ideologies. He points to "the special position of certain

institutional sites of social practice as both object and modality of ideol-
ogization" (1992: 320) – "sites" which serve both as "ideal objects" and
as channels of ideologizing. Silversteinian "sites" are tropes, metonyms
transcending topography to include the events and speech styles associated
with social spaces like the kiva (Kroskrity 1992).[68] I argue that the *bāri*
(home) is just such a metonymic site for the actors in Latifa's drama.

Sites are linked with ideological positions and with positions in struc-
tures of power. Performances and critiques flow out of such positions. If it
is easy to demonstrate the positionedness of the live criticism of Latifa, it is
also easy to position the response of those Bangladeshis for whom I played
the tapes in Dhaka and the U.S.; these cosmopolitan evaluations are also
ideological. We recognize with the Dhaka academics Latifa's artistry and
thus illumine the ideologizing activity of the live domestic audience. It was
my playing the tape-recorded performance of Suleyman, *a man* (the same
tape which my Los Angeles consultant called a *zārī gān*) which elicited the
label *bilāp* from participants in my Dhaka seminar. Yet, despite the speed
with which the seminar labeled a man's taped performance a *bilāp*, one
of the professors who so labeled the man's song makes laments out to be
exclusively woman's work in his writing about *bilāp.* His sociolinguistic
monograph, which only touches on laments, betrays the selectivity typify-
ing ideology in failing to note that men like Suleyman as well as women
lament. His description of women "dragging the words [of *bilāp*] almost
like songs"[69] fails to do justice to their poetic, rhetorical, and musical
structure. Moreover, to claim as he does that these songs reveal "immedi-
ate feelings" reproduces an association of women with emotion. Like the
rural claim that *bilāp* tunes come "straight from the heart," it denies the
social context, literary tradition, and rational (if interactive) agency which
produce laments.[70]

CONCLUSION

The framing of speech, like the labeling of illness and disease, affects illness
careers. To frame is to exercise power, mediated by linguistic ideologies;
such exercises of power are, however, never unilateral. Latifa and others in
Bangladesh do not passively accept labels like "mad," but rather actively
participate in the discourses within the popular medical sector in which
labels are negotiated. What this article has documented, therefore, are
manifestations of "performativity" as discursive power ascribable to
Latifa in her resistance but particularly to more dominant "authors" of
her lifestory.

It is a struggle for those who write about women in South Asia to adequately represent their agency – especially when women's agency may be manifested in the way they take pain inside themselves and *actively* hide it. It is equally challenging to represent both the violence some of them have experienced (Das 1996) and the cultural and ideological contexts in which they and their men understand it. Without romanticizing their lives or writing them out of the silence which might be their chosen mode of communication, we owe those Bangladeshi women who do voice their sorrows a good listening. It is right to recognize in many of women's speech genres – and particularly in laments – transcripts of resistance, some of them not so hidden (Scott 1990). At the same time, the particular lament I have presented also resists us, resists any efforts to coopt it for any one theoretical project, be it "critical" or "hermeneutic." Also, the experience inscribed in Latifa's body and transcribed in her laments continues to resist resolution, and – like other examples of troubles narratives – it thus bears strong affinity with other sorts of aesthetic objects (Desjarlais 1992; Good 1994).[71] The very duration of Latifa's grieving – extending at least into my most recent period of fieldwork in 1996 – exemplifies the way life itself seems to resist Latifa, and the way Latifa's story parallels complex and multivocal[72] fiction. That is, Latifa's story neither resolves conflict without complication nor presents itself univocally any more than would a Dostoevsky or Faulkner novel. Latifa's experience resists *my* desire to see closure. My discomfort in this story which resists resolution arises particularly out of my sense that, even in local terms, Latifa suffered an injustice, and that her grievance has not – and perhaps never can be – redressed. It also arises from my sense of the moral ambiguity of my being involved yet failing to help. Her story has thus become a key symbol for me of the complexity of my field relationships. Latifa, I sense, feels that my field assistant and I resist *her* hopes that any words we speak with her ex-husband's family will result in a reconciliation. The resistance of Latifa's narratized life to reduction, resolution, and closure; the acoustic, musical, poetic, and rhetorical codes informing her tuneful, texted weeping; and the dance-like intricacies of interactivity in the production of each performance all point to their simultaneous existence as social actions and aesthetic objects. If their aesthetic quality contains something of the nightmarish and much of the controversial, that is exceptional in neither troubles narratives nor the broader range of aesthetic production.[73]

Speech-in-use functions at many levels; "transferring information" about language-external realities is only one of these, but is the most hypercognized for many Westerners. Yet, speaking, singing, or silence can *create* realities – particularly social, affective and conceptual realities. At

times, the attempt to create new conceptual and political realities through speech is rather explicit. Latifa's 1992 performances enacted her resistance to her brothers' power, to their label, and to magicoreligious treatment. They constituted her attempt to alter her relationships, to escape from that treatment, and to persuade her more distant kin to try to reunite her with her ex-husband. At least to those whose understanding of persons transcends the utilitarian and mechanical – illness, healing, and the discourses which surround them are painful but nonetheless aesthetic realities in which persons and groups have much at stake (Good 1994).[74]

To affirm that Latifa is subjected to universal forms of male domination[75] does not excuse us from interrogating the particular Bangladeshi diagnostic processes which reproduce male dominance. To do so requires us to examine performances and performativity in the light of linguistic ideologies. The audience's evaluation of the tune and structure of Latifa's lament helped constitute the performance as verbal art, albeit in a backhanded way. Latifa contributed to this constitutive process by regimenting her production according to recognizable norms and thereby framing her production as something whose form as well as content invited comment. But those very interactive processes by which Latifa's performance is anchored to a social and historical genre context render the performance susceptible to decontextualization and objectification. "Performance puts the act of speaking on display – objectifies it . . . By its very nature, then, performance potentiates decontextualization" (Bauman and Briggs 1990: 73). That is, the "indexes of performance" which draw attention to Latifa's very signs (words, versification, tune, tears whose aesthetic function semioticians describe as self-indexing), lend themselves to becoming *objects* of commentary. In a paradoxical and tragic way, then, Latifa's very achievement, her dialogical performance, renders her words and her life more vulnerable to the objectification entailed in labeling – she is "mad." The more she must resort to the only form of protest available to her, the more easily others can point to such performances as "self-indulgent" or somehow defective in form, and marginalize the performer. This effect only appears to be a natural diagnostic inference derived directively from her text when viewed from a vantage point like that of her maternal cousins; it is, however, a culturally-specific typification reflecting ideologies of gendered language.

Ideologies filter every reception of linguistic performance. They limit our perception and that of audiences which heard Latifa or tape-recordings of her voice; we all attend selectively to features of her discourse. The aesthetic criteria informing her family's criticism of her performance include norms of setting, occasion, emotion, music, and rhetoric. Kin held

Latifa guilty of violating those norms by prolonging her grief, immodestly displaying passion, performing for neighbors, singing *per se*, and favoring a poetic rhetoric over cool rationality.[76] A language-ideological perspective on the event in the village (as well as the seminar) highlights tensions between performance and models, e.g. models of men's and women's language. So mystifying are the ideological links between women and home (and between male bards and public audiences) – and so powerful is their anger at Latifa's inversion of lament norms – that Latifa's kin could not *hear* her art. The case highlights how parties in ethnomedical encounters invoke shared ideological representations for purposes such as preserving family reputation at the expense of one suffering member. And as little as the academic seminar might have in common with the rural response to Latifa's *bilāp*, they both helped construct women as weak, inarticulate, and emotional.

And yes, my own embrace of the Dhaka label *bilāp* betrays my partiality, my readiness to consider even Latifa's so-called transgressions (acts which shocked some) a sort of aesthetic achievement as acts constituting the surprises, problematizations, or complications without which narrative fails to be compelling.[77] Latifa "transgressed" cultural spaces, times, and generic forms. Ultimately, it was her movement and her verbalizations outside domestic boundaries which her brothers cited as the reason for her punishment. Even this "violation," however, can be seen as a ludic act. Latifa's performances in outlawed places reflect on a topographic level a violation of norms analogous to that entailed in the content of her text. At the levels of "site" and of what is utterable, she defies the boundaries of performance. Her melodic text maintains just enough contact with tradition to move listeners (Feld 1990) like Samabedanā. And, finally, Latifa's song achieves an aesthetic level in its multivocality (Bakhtin 1981; Good 1994), juxtaposing two sets of symbols and two uses of the same set – Islamic symbols commonly invoked in Matlab to support the repression of such women, which, along with a second set of symbols (surrounding education), Latifa uses to justify her discursive self-assertions.[78]

Treating Latifa's so-called illness as essentially performative helps us grasp a complex story. A case study such as this, dwelling on the dialogical production of Latifa's status as "*pāgal*" through her performance (which was itself thoroughly dialogical at levels of synchrony and diachrony, in form as well as outcome), maps out some of the territory that medical anthropology might pursue. The argument that labels influence illness careers is not new; still, few studies have explored *how* labels are produced or how conflicts arise in making them stick. What is quite new is my call for research in "psychiatric discourse" to link two sorts of labeling

practice; I argue that characterizations of and labels for *persons/conditions* are often linked with characterizations of and labels for *speech genres*, ways of speaking.[79] Without blaming the victim – an apparent risk in this performance-centered approach blocked by the uncovering of multiple layers of interactivity – I have shown how the very performance by which Latifa sought to resist the label "mad" was used to reinforce that label. Throughout, I have argued that the dialogical nature of the performance itself and its various entextualizations (Bauman and Briggs 1990) – the echoes, replayings, and evaluations of "Latifa's" performance by a series of voices including our own – is crucial to an adequate portrayal of labeling performances, genres, persons, and "psychiatric conditions."

A critical ethnopoetics of power, linguistic form, and metadiscursive characterizations with their links to gender and ritual helps to undercut our *own* limiting ideology of language – referentialism. As we do fine-grained analyses of domestic discourses leading up to and out of the diagnostic process, we uncover tensions, conflict, negotiation, interactivity, *and a linkage of "egocentric" oratorical elaboration with madness* (see Boddy 1994: 422f.; Abu-Lughod 1986: 257).[80] The fact that this last link is now being made in Matlab might bear witness to the encroachment of what Foucault (1973) calls "civilization" on Bangladesh – might bear witness, that is, to the point in Bangladeshi history when "madness" is excluded from legitimate discourse. To exclude from psychiatric anthropology such transcripts of discourse entails the risk that we shall overlook the moments at which South Asian inclusivism (Dumont 1970; Tambiah 1990) is displaced, though *Homo hierarchicus* might well live on, in new form, to the extent that self-assertion continues to be labeled "self-indulgent luxury" or "madness." In any case, such historically decisive moments are heavily laden with linguistic performativity and ideologies – not innocent reference to innocent facts.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

APPENDIX 1: FIRST-PERSON PRONOUNS PER POTENTIAL OCCURRENCE

Gender	Name	Type	Poss. 1st pr by pat	Actual	Actual/ possible
F	Manuza (female patient)	Med	10	1	0
F	Fatima 1	Med	31	2	0.06
F	Selina	Med	6	1	0.17
F	Yasmin	Med	73	15	0.21
F	Irani (female patient)	Med	11	3	0.27
F	Mumtaz (female patient)	Med	10	3	0.30
M	Cha (anon. man talking at teashop)	Convers	20	3	0.15
F	Bonhi	Convers	18	5	0.27
M	Ahmed Eid	invw/conv	14	3	0.21
M	Suleyman	invw/conv	33	23	0.69
M	Suleyman	lament	8	6	0.75
F	Latifa	lament	37	33	0.89

Note: Cases are rank-ordered by frequency of possessives *within a given speech genre*.

APPENDIX 2

90   F – ki hai(ye)che cāci?   ●hh
     What happened?
91   MM – kae mān[u]ṣe kae śaṇ karo.   āmāre kemte
     [They] say, people say, "You are joking."

92	MM – kae śaṇ karo ḍaṇ karo	khun-o o go kairā
	They say, "You're joking."	*How they murdered me!*
93	MM – eḍi kae hudāe.[81]	() nāi-o go ●hh
	They/she thus speak(s) emptily.	
94	MM – tabuo māthā to eḍi kae hudā, nā eḍikḍā-o.	o o o o go ●hh
	Still, (the head . . . people/Latifa speak emptily)	
95		(x x x) bujhi nā go bun
		I don't understand, sister . . .
96	C2 – jeḍi kae, ṭhiki kae.	
	What (she/they) say(s) is truly spoken.	
97	C3 – tārā je (āche, kemne āche kemne je eṭi kae-i)	
	(That [her brothers] brought her home, how they brought her . . . all that	
98		āmāre *me . . .*
99	MM – emni śārā din-i kae ghur[e]che	
	They say she moved around all day.	
100	(xxxx jāmāi et dure)	
	Her ex-husband's place is so far.	
101		(buji) go o o o
		Grandmother-sister, o o o.
102	C2 – jāmāi (rākhbo eṭā ṭānsiyāre xxx)	
	Her ex-husband (might take her back – that is what draws her so).	
103	C3 – māre dare	
	[Someone] beats [her].	
104		(xxx) buji (xx).
		Grandmother-sister . . .

APPENDIX 3: PARTICIPANTS AND TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

Participants

· L = Latifā
· B = Bun/Buji, Latifa's "sister" to whom she addressed the lament. The term is used here, and commonly, to address (but never refer to) Latifa's "grandmother," the wife of her mother's uncle (MFBW).
· A = Amina, Latifa's slightly older married female cousin
· S = Samabedanā,[82] Latifa's female adolescent cousin, fourteen years old at the time
· D = M's brother Dulal, Latifa's same-age cousin
· F = Faisal, my field assistant

· Caci = Latifa's mother's cousin, ethnographer's prime hostess/fictive father's brother's wife; Amina's mother
· MM = Musa's mother, an aunt with an identifiable voice
· Other numbered C's are other aunts standing outside
· M = Musa, Latifa's older male cousin
· J = Jim Wilce
· x = Unidentified speaker

/xxx/ Overlapping speech segments are shown between slashes on both of the lines which overlap.

((??)) represents inaudible words.

( ) Words within parentheses are alternative or problematic/uncertain hearings of the taped words.

[ ] Phonological segments within brackets are not realized in the pronunciation on tape but included for ease of recognition by Bengali speakers and Indologists.

(1.5) Length of pauses is shown in seconds and tenths of seconds.

((xx)) Double parentheses surround notes on the paralinguistic features of utterances.

= indicates latching of utterances, the near overlap of two utterances by the same or different speakers.

: Colon indicates lengthening; in the Matlab dialect of Bengali this is stylistic, not phonemic.

[. . . lines omitted] Omitted lines noted in brackets are not necessarily part of the interactions in focus here. They sometimes involve nonfocal participants or even bystanders.

<u>speech</u> I have underlined transcriptions of the speech of Latifa's interlocutors, as well as a few words to which I draw special attention in my comments.

speech Latifa's speech is italicized, as are instances of code-switching (especially, English words embedded in Bengali discourse).

bold Bold text in the Bengali transcript is markedly stressed by speakers.

NOTES

1. I am re-metaphorizing Goffman's (1981) trope. By "footing," Goffman meant "participants' alignment, or set, or stance, or posture, or projected self."
2. Hanks stresses that performativity itself is locally perceived and constituted, and that for the speaker of a "performative verb" to whom "the words appear to have the 'magical' effect of creating as a socially binding reality the event that they literally

describe . . . the speaker is simultaneously defining himself or his current situation and being defined by it" (Hanks 1996: 206). Das follows Wittgensteinian in promulgating what I view as a performative interpretation of pain-tellings: "Pain, in this rendering, is not that inexpressible something that destroys communication or marks an exit from one's existence in language. Instead, it makes a claim asking for acknowledgment, which may be given or denied. In either case, it is not a referential statement that is simply pointing to an inner object" (Das 1996: 70).

3. The concept of "performativity" has evolved in recent linguistic anthropology – from Austin's (1962) notion that we "do things with words." Austin coined the term "performatives" for certain verbs of speaking like "I christen . . . " that appear to bring about the realities they describe. Recent critiques of "speech act" theory stress that personal intentions may not decide which acts are being performed or which realities are "officially" brought into existence in speech-interaction. Individuals do not necessarily "do things with words"; often, words themselves are taken by agents-in-interaction as doing things.

4. I find Vološinov 's (1973) vision of the intrinsic dialogicality of "the word" and his insistence that these words are ideological formations a useful starting point in the analysis of Latifa's interaction with her kin. The object of "ideologies" is often language itself; Latifa, her kin, those who later listen to her taped lament, and medical anthropologists each work from within distinctive, limiting, and (in this Foucauldian sense) productive ideologies of language.

5. Good (1994) and Desjarlais (1996) are relevant attempts to map out this ground.

6. I learned this only in 1996. Dowry murders – faked "suicides" of women killed by in-laws in retaliation for failure to provide a promised dowry – have become all too common in South Asian countries.

7. Mental illness in Bangladesh is not described outside of Bangladeshi psychiatric journals, nor is there any sort of psychiatric morbidity study of Bangladesh known to me. Nor is the phenomenon of *pāglāmi* precisely glossed in terms of mental illness, since at least some of my 1996 interviewees deny that it is an illness. The prevalence issue is relevant to Latifa's maternal uncles in a very particular sense, since some members of their compound quite openly speak of an inherited tendency toward what they variously describe as "head problems," "heart problems," and "insanity."

8. My adopted family cited this proverb to characterize the uncontrolled speech of the mad – *chāgale ki nā khāe, pāgale ki nā kae?* "What wouldn't a goat eat; and what wouldn't the mad say!" Both ignore humanly accepted limits.

9. South Asianists will recognize in some of this inverted echoes of *Homo Hierarchicus* (Dumont 1970), the self as radically embedded in a hierarchical structure encompassing family and caste and relegating the individual to the cultural sidelines. While there is validity in seeing structural-functionalist cultural reasons to label the assertive or "self-indulgent" mad in Bangladesh or India, and there is nothing inherently less humane about such a diagnostic criterion, more recent examinations of healing (Steedly 1988) persuade me to notice "healing" events which actually deepen division and distress. At any rate, I concur with the following statement: "It is simply unacceptable that, in the closing days of the twentieth century, in so many countries the chronically mentally ill [let alone persons like Latifa whose "diagnosis" is disputable] are still abandoned in conditions of . . . brutality" (Department of Social Medicine 1995: 4) in which I have to include chaining and beating.

10. In comparison with the societies which Foucault describes (1973), the process of medicalizing madness is not as persuasive in Bangladesh.

11. I provide evidence later in the article illustrating Kroskrity's characterization of linguistic ideologies as 1) embodying diverse situated perspectives, 2) reflecting the positioned interests of those invoking them, 3) being expressed at varying levels of awareness (dominant ideologies are the most implicit and assumed), 4) playing a role in identity formation – in the effacing of differences of power and status and in the imagining of solidarities, and 5) filtering perceptions of communicative and social practice (Paul Kroskrity: personal communication reflecting School of American Research Seminar on Language Ideologies, April 1994).

12. Studies by ICDDR,B of Matlab have been published by Fauveau (1994) and others (annotated by Habte 1990). As far as I know, however, no discourse-oriented studies of Matlab Bengali have been published apart from Wilce 1995.

13. By nonfocal talk, I mean "sideplay" by nonratified participants and "by-play" between ratified and nonratified participants, in Goffman's [1981] terms.

14. In those passages, the juxtaposition of the columns represents the simultaneity of the outside and inside discourse. Any overlap (marked within //) or latching (marked with =) is between speakers in a single column, left or right.

15. This interpretive insight derives from John Runnion and the 1995 seminar in Verbal Art.

16. "In point of fact, *word* [sic – every word?] *is a two-sided act*. It is determined equally by *whose* word it is and *for whom* it is meant. As word, it is precisely *the product of the reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener, addresser and addressee*" (Vološinov 1973: 86).

17. Latifa's reference to *āmār sail* "my body" makes it a sign and does so more explicitly than a pronoun (me) would. One of my male consultants in Matlab used the English "body" rather than Bengali *sarir, saril, sail* when speaking of his mother's strict observance of *pardā* – "She kept her '*body*' covered."

18. Even this is a reality she might *try* to shape discursively, but one which, like the chains her brothers placed on her, resists her.

19. *kalejā* "liver" figures largely in a Bangladeshi discourse with which I began to be acquainted in 1996, one referred to as *deho tattva*, "body theory." Further investigation of this discursive tradition ought to pursue what Good (1994) calls a "civilizational" level of inquiry, linking contemporary Bangladeshi invocations of the "liver" with major documents in the Islamic medical traditions, such as Ibn Sina's writings. Good (1977) traces the understandings of "heart" and "liver" in a contemporary Iranian community to Ibn Sina; the liver, in this tradition, is "the seat of the natural faculty and the baser human appetites . . . " (Good 1977: 36). Younger social scientists working for the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B) – particularly Md. Habibur Rahman – alerted me to *deho tattva* as a Sufi-influenced model of the body. Habibur affirmed that, in that discourse, the liver (rather than the heart) is the seat of the emotions (personal communication, 1996).

20. For Goffman's notion of footings, participant frames, and particularly "figures" animated by a narrator (what I have called "characters") – including the animation of a self constituted in the narration – see Goffman 1974: 518–529.

21. *māyā* in "nonstandard" Bengali is homophonous with the Sanskrit term *māyā* but is semantically distinguished.

22. Pharyngealized phonation; that is, as an icon of crying (Urban 1988), the voice here tightens up.

23. Unfortunately, I have not been able to ask Latifa directly about literary sources on which she might have consciously drawn.

The *bāramāsya* is a recognized genre of oral and written literature in most of the Indo-Aryan languages (Vaudeville 1986; cf. Wadley 1983), with several centuries of written history. In these calendrical laments the narrator bewails an absent beloved, prototypically a husband, drawing on the "Hindu" philosophical/devotional category *viraha*, "separation-longing." In classical examples, *rain* stood for the object of longing not only because rain is seasonal and brings relief (or leaky roofs!) but also because rain served as a metaphor for sexual fluids (themselves a metonym for love and for vitality). In its origins, therefore, the *bāramāsya* was an avenue for women to give assertive expression to desire. Some *bāramāsya* were also penned by Muslim men. Squeamish about both the affirmation of sex and the assertiveness of the woman's voice in conventional *bāramāsya* and their "rain" imagery, Indo-Muslim poets drew on Persian Sufi traditions to portray image of love as *fire*. Fire, in turn, represented the pain entailed by love-in-separation. In Sufi Muslim literature, love-as-fire points to the mystic's desire for union with God through ascetic practice and Qur'anic recitation. Thus the very history of this genre in South Asia, with its "Hindu" and "Muslim" variants, testifies to the conflict which laments can represent and engender.

A contemporary Western woman who testifies of finding liberation through the teachings of a South Asian Sufi master quotes this proverb: "The path of love is like a bridge of hair across a chasm of fire" (Tweedie 1979). Vaudeville describes the Sufi poets' representation of *'ishq* (literally, "love") as "an inextinguishable fire, a mortal torment consuming those whom it possesses, bearing them inexorably towards death" (1986: 38).

24. *khun*, the noun "murder, kill," often found in combination with the auxiliary *karā*, "do," "do murder/commit murder."

25. This might have been a shout of rebuke – or possibly a dog's bark.

26. This theology verges on "blasphemy," though it is not quite as explicitly blasphemous as Punjabi laments can become (Das 1996: 80). Yet, it has strong religious precedents. As Scarry claims of the Hebrew experience of God (1985), Latifa's experience of Allah is juxtaposed with – or perhaps constituted within – the experience of bodily pain, as a sign of the presence (in the Hebrew case) or absence (as Latifa claims) of God inscribed on her body.

27. Or, "God is not fated to be on my side."

28. Simultaneously but not represented here, one of Latifa's aunts standing outside told Faisal, in answer to a polite query, about her own flu-like symptoms.

29. how much [damage].

30. i.e. ever since she arrived a week ago?

31. i.e. back from her wanderings.

32. Phonetically, Latifa seems clearly to produce jabār, but this leaves my Bengali-speaking consultants confused – there is no such Bengali word. Latifa evidently "meant" to produce one of the following – jabar (Arabic jabr) "violence," jabar (Persian zabar, "above") "be strong, overpower", jabāi or jabeho (Arabic ḍabḥ, Persian zabḥ) "[ritual animal] sacrifice." What seems clear is her intent to evoke an image of violence and also male domination (only men are allowed to be present and officiate in Muslim sacrifices, if jabāi is the intended form).

33.

68–71	āmāre ni gharer bāhir karlo go bun o o ●hh	*They have cast me from the house, sister*
72–73	bun go a a ●hh	*sister–sister, o.*
72–75	āmāre ni gharer bāhir karlo bun ●hh	*They have cast me from the house,*

76–78	bun go o o ●hh *((long sob))* o o	*sister–sister, o ((long sob)) o o*
79–80	āmi khadār kāche jā cāy[e]chilām go (bā) ●hh	*What I had asked of God [in prayer] –*
81–82	jā [h]aito go pāi[ye]chilām o o a go ●hh	*I did receive.*

Precisely who cast Latifa out is not clear from either the lines above or other conversations with her; she never mentioned it beyond lines 68–71. In lines 79ff., Latifa portrays her marriage as an answer to prayer, the blessing of God. It is noteworthy, though, that she uses Persian *khodā* rather than the Arabic form for the divine *Āllāh*, preferred (and sometimes imposed) by contemporary Islamists in Bangladesh.

34. She does not seem to finish the thought she starts at the beginning of this line ("with me . . . "), but goes on to the new thought in the latter half, according to my Arizona Bangladeshi consultant. He feels as if this tendency is frequent throughout Latifa's speech.

35. The sob marking the end of this line is transcribed below, since it is overlapped by the speech of Amina represented there.

36. Note here that, by questioning the fairness of the communicative system in which she is embedded (Wilce 1995), Latifa breaks out of the taboo on metacommentary which Bateson (1956) considered the third element of a schizophrenogenic double-bind.

37. In Bakhtin's formulation, authoritative discourse "demands that we acknowledge it . . . we encounter it with its authority already fused to it. The authoritative word is located in a distanced zone . . . " (1981: 342).
    Amina's location of the "danger" "in [or to] her head" bears comment. Local discourse describes the head of the "mad" as "heated," evoking humoral concepts of hot and cold and a notion that strong passion creates "heat" which disturbs the balance of the embodied heart-mind (*man*) or head.

38. My use of the term "discipline" above intentionally evokes a Foucauldian theme (1977). Latifa's brother (D) visited "our" home some time after she had been dragged away and returned to his surveillance. When I asked about her, he brought up the subject of keeping her chained up "that her body might get well . . . that the *utsrinkal kāj* (undisciplined, indiscreet works) which she now does might return to normal."
    J – "Uh, what falls under *utsrinkal*?"
    D – "*utsrinkal*, that is, that she [does not] stay in our limited situation, [nor] stay in our house, that is [she should] not go out."

39. I follow the local practice of teknonymy, especially used in referencing and addressing women. The practice sometimes extends to men; some Bangladeshis who know my older daughter refer to me as "Rebekah's father."

40. As Clancy (1986) notes for Japanese, Bengali speakers are able to exploit the systematic potential for ambiguity inherent in the ("pro-drop") language's lack of insistence that a subject be overtly present in a given utterance. The fact that verbs in this pro-drop language mark agreement with person but neither gender nor number leaves ample room for ambiguity in the verbal "marking" of subjects. The women outside "Latifa's" house could therefore have intentionally exploited this ambiguity rather than commit themselves on the "politically" difficult issue of whose word to affirm.

41. After her lament, Latifa directly challenged those norms as a hypocritical attempt to equate covering with morality, asking, "If I did anything wrong, wouldn't it be found out? What difference does it make if I move about from 'land' to 'land'?"

42. I was struck in 1996 by the tendency of Matlab residents to ascribe strange behavior to *willful* deviance, sometimes doubting the person in question was mad at all. There appears to be less distance between this position and that which uses the label "mad,"

if we keep two things in mind: 1) "Madness" may be *treated* with folk medicine but is not regarded as an illness like others, i.e. not medicalized to the extent that insanity is in the West. 2) Both forms of attribution – "madness" and "willful deviance" – can, in contemporary Bangladeshi discourse, index an underlying ascription of an excess or deformation of self or ego.

43. In 1996, Faisal interviewed a diviner/spirit-medium whose divinatory proclamations typically center on charms planted by the client's nearby enemies – neighbors who were otherwise frustrated in their schemes to gain love or wealth and who thus had resort to sorcery against the client. In treating these problems, if he cannot find those charms himself, he sends a *jinn*, who unearths them and brings them to his desk. The man told Faisal he actually keeps a set of charms in a muddy state so that he can display them as the result of such searches underneath people's courtyards.

44. Latifa seems to react to the teasing not of her voice but of her marriage. She seems to be objecting to their proposal that she marry another *ālim*. Her meaning seems to be that they are "khāte gāy nune chitā," "rubbing salt into one's wounds."

45. *mānuṣer janne hāsi*.

46. Structuration, in Giddens's own words, is "what I call the recursive nature of social life. By its recursive nature I mean that the structured properties of social activity – via the duality of structure – are constantly recreated out of the very resources which constitute them" (1984: xxiii).

   "[What potentiates this duality of structure] is the specifically reflexive form of the knowledgeability of human agents that is most deeply involved in the recursive ordering of social practices . . . " (ibid: 1). Reflexive language and the language ideologies discussed in this section are excellent examples of reflexivity, and Giddens effectively models their role in the ongoing production of social order.

   Giddens writes, "Power within social systems which enjoy some continuity over time and space presumes regularized relations of autonomy and dependence between actors or collectivities in contexts of social interaction. But all forms of dependence offer some resources whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of their superiors. This is what I call the *dialectic of control* in social systems" (ibid: 16).

47. This represents an amalgamation of the words of several men including two local "doctors" not personally acquainted with Latifa but speaking generally about "educated women" and one psychoanalytically trained American anthropologist. But it is also my attempt to sympathetically present Latifa's brothers' perspective.

48. Still, we ought not take such "cultural values" as unproblematically accepted by all Bangladeshis as relevant to these events. If only because of the way I narrated it, this story has elicited from a number of persons across a range of social classes in Matlab and Dhaka strong disapproval of her family's handling of the situation.

49. Analyses of domestic violence in North America invite comparison. One of the battered women Blackman interviewed said that her husband "knew verbally he could never win an argument. So he had to use his strength over me and his power to prevent me from getting out in the world. He wanted to protect his relationship with me" (1993: 143). Shupe (1987: 39–40) and Hilton (1993: 14) argue that some men who batter women suffer from communicative disorders. The comparatively inarticulate but amply empowered and socially supported male voices in the unfriendly audience for Latifa's performances could hide their inarticulacy behind the supportive laughter of *their* audience. Had Latifa's verbal skills not made theirs look bad, her male kinsmen's response to her laments might not have been so violently repressive.

50. Why did Latifa's aunts and even same-age female cousins seem to take the side of their fathers and brothers against her? The question is naive, given the broad dependence of these women on men. Still, given the historic changes which Latifa, her school successes, and her more direct complaint actually exemplify, we should ask whether and where women might nurture a consciousness of injustice and solidarity in resistance to it. Social spaces in which hidden transcripts are shared, including women's space within *pardā*, are themselves "an achievement of resistance. They are won and defended in the teeth of power" (Scott 1990: 119).

51. Jeffery (1979: 172–5) describes another impediment to solidary resistance – women in families whose economic status makes *pardā* and submissiveness affordable would lose much in a revolution which would place them on a par with destitute women who currently show much less submissiveness.

52. This historical moment is thus comparable to the late nineteenth century in Europe, when assertive women who found increasing opportunity for education without corresponding career opportunities were labeled "abnormal," "hysterical," or "mad," and modalities of "treatment" most often reproduced the structures of their oppression (Showalter 1985: ch. 6).

53. "The experience of loss in the flow of everyday life makes the voices of women 'public' in the process of [funerary] mourning. In the genre of lamentation, women have control both through their bodies and through their language – grief is articulated through the body, for instance, by infliction of grievous hurt on oneself, 'objectifying' and making present the inner state, and is finally given a home in language" (Das 1996: 68).

    "The excess of speech in the [funerary] mourning laments and the theatrical infliction of harm on the body by the women stands in stark contrast to the behavior of men. In the course of everyday life men dominate the public domain in terms of the control over speech, but in the case of death they become mute . . . Thus, if women perform the task of bearing witness to the grief and the loss that [D]eath [*not* some culpable person] has inflicted (otherwise people will say was it a dog or cat that died, one woman told me), it is men who must ritually create all the conditions so that the [wandering spirit of the] dead can find a home . . . All this [discursive ordering of grieving] is reversed when the normal flow of life is seen as disrupted by the violence of men" (ibid: 81f.) [In those "reversed" situations the order of discourse is best described as] "men moulding the silences of the women with their words" (ibid: 88).

    Das's account indicates, among other things, that the attitudes toward *bilāp* as funerary mourning are informed by concepts whose scope includes much of South Asia, regardless of religion.

54. Das knows ". . . hundreds of accounts purporting to be based on direct experience in which the archetypal motif was of a girl finding her way to her parents' home after having been subjected to rape and plunder, and being told, 'why are you here – it would have been better if you were dead.' As I have argued elsewhere, such rejections may not have occurred as often as they were alleged to have happened in narratives. But the widespread belief in such narrative truths of sacrificing the daughter to maintain the unsullied purity and honor of the family attests to the power of this myth. To be masculine when death was all around was to be able to hand death to your violated daughter without flinching – to obliterate any desire for the concreteness and uniqueness of this human being who once played in your family yard" (Das 1996: 77).

55. Nor did Latifa's kin justify their ridicule as a compassionate therapy (as do Balinese, Wikan 1990). Can we attribute their ridicule to defensive anxiety? Psychoanalytic treatments of self-structures in India (Kakar 1978: 33, which describes laments in

terms of anxiety over loss of maternal affection) have been problematized by Stanley Kurtz (1992).

　　Personal anxiety here is a microcosm of ideological defensiveness (Eagleton 1991), in this case overdetermining denial of Latifa's message and craft. At least in this case academic-literary metalanguage is highly elaborated and specific, while rural metalanguage is condensed and diffuse. Yet my sense is that, if asked, even rural speakers would agree that Latifa's crying should be classed as a *bilāp*.

56. That is, they engage in speech acts called *asubidhā[r kathā] balā/kawā* ("speaking words of trouble") or *asubidhā prakāś karā* ("giving expression to trouble").

57. Verbal art genres in Bengali are "marked" in at least two senses – they are lexicalized (given single-word lexical labels and thus recognized and subjected to evaluative scrutiny) and relatively objectified. This objectification entails 1) an exaggeration of certain "poetic" tendencies in all speech, and 2) an exaggerated reflexivity. That is, verbal art by definition (Bauman and Briggs 1990) puts speaking itself on display and thus is self-indexing; it points to itself.

58. In every society, culturally specific ranges of crying forms are learned; this pertains to seemingly unmarked and "natural" crying as well as marked forms. Teasing (see transcript line 170) which provokes children and adolescents to tears, followed by a rebuke such as "have you become angry?" is just one fairly common scenario in a Bangladeshi version of "emotion work," a process by which the occasion, form, and experience of crying are socialized (Wilce 1994: ch. 5; cf. Wikan 1990).

59. *āhāzārī* is the violent self-abusive wailing which Matlab consultants tell me is even "more pathetic, heart-wrenching, and heart-felt" than *bilāp*. The term seems to be derived from its parts – *āhā* "the sound actually made in grief," and *zāri* "lament, dirge." Another, less likely, possible derivation is āzārdāri, "doing grief."

60. See Tiwary 1978: 26. Bangladeshi evidence of their efficacy comes from Doreen Indra, who describes how a weeping destitute woman sometimes plants herself outside the home of a prosperous kinsman and laments until he allows her a place on his land (personal communication: 1992).

61. The lament, that is, is part of a communicative practice which, though it must be conceived as flexible and dynamic, is a tradition which speakers recognize and work and play with.

　　One thing I needed to know in 1996 was whether the anger of Latifa's kin explained not only their overall desire to stop the weeping but also, specifically, their "generic characterization" of it and the label they had assigned it. For Latifa's kin to have highlighted the performance per se and its links with traditions (traditions not only valued as literature but also indexing the relatively open gender relations of another era) by using labels like *bāramāsya* or *bilāp* would have placed Latifa's kin in a relationship with Latifa and with expressivity very different than that which they actually occupy. I confirmed in 1996 that Latifa's uncles recognize the word *bilāp*; still, the fact that they spontaneously used only *kāndā* "crying" during our 1996 conversation about Latifa and tuneful weeping in general indicate that the label *kāndā* was not intended as a spiteful denial of the "classier" label, *bilāp*. Thus, although they did reject Latifa's 1992 "art," that rejection was expressed not as much through the label they gave it as by larger orders of discourse in which they framed it (Lindstrom 1992). At the same time, Latifa's family *treated* her performance as quite distinct, as if, without invoking one of the marked genres by name, they still recognized the family resemblance between her performance and those genres which are markedly distinct from unmarked crying or talking. Lexical labels are not the only cues actors use to engage in metalinguistic

characterization. What I had most wanted to do was to speak with Latifa herself, tell her what I had learned from her, and reflect with her on the events of 1992 to the present. That was not possible, however, since she would not talk with us while her family was present. Latifa finally decided to speak with us only after we had left her brothers' and mother's house; she caught up with us on the path back to the boat we had rented that day. Yet, when she was actually close enough to speak with us, she seemed to play hide-and-seek with us. Faisal feels that she wanted very much to ask us to pay another visit to her husband, but was so uncomfortable speaking with men outside her home (having missed the chance to speak with us while we were there in her home) that she could not do so. She and her mother did not come, as promised, to meet us the following day at my old field home, and thus we had to content ourselves there with simply asking Latifa's uncles about the events and the categories in which they understood her performance.

62. Whereas I had enough time in 1991–2 to facilitate informal conversations with women, my efforts to speak with *women* in 1996 were frustrated by their male "guardians" in the homes I visited and their general absence from public domains.

63. Given the fact that this anxiety is felt in other South and Southeast Asian societies (Das 1996; Wikan 1990), I attribute it to civilizational traditions apart from Islam.

64. To help Western readers cross the *verstehen* gap, I might mention that even St. Augustine had profound misgivings about church music (or, at least, certain forms of it), for similar reasons.

    By the time I revisited him in 1996, Suleyman – the lamenting old man mentioned earlier in the text – had recovered from his earlier "head troubles," and now agreed with his wife that his earlier tuneful protests against his treatment (for which no one had a genre label) were "wrong." His abjection, they agree, was part of the general illness which he now defines as an inability to tell right from wrong (and, I gather, to trust the ideologized order of things).

    Despite his change of perspective on those matters, Suleyman in 1996 denies it was right, good, or therapeutic for anyone to chain or beat him or others they call "mad."

65. This is only one explanation of madness, of course. It has, however, something in common with another common causal explanation – possession by spirits called *bhut* or *jinn* – both involve stretching, changing, or violating accepted forms of selfhood. For an excellent discussion of a range of explanations for madness in West Bengal, India, see Bhattacharyya 1986.

66. 1996 fieldwork also confirmed the impression gained in earlier fieldwork that a wide range of expressive genres – from possession-mediumship and women's noncommercial healing practices to the performance of ballads, women's "teasing" (*ṭhāṭṭā-tāmāśā*) songs, and *bilāp* – is in danger of "becoming extinct" (*bilupto haiye jācche*, in the words of my interviewees). Many of these rural folkloric traditions were, like *bilāp*, tuneful. Teasing songs, once commonly performed in cities and villages all over the Bengal region by women during prenuptial *gāye-halud* ceremonies (cf. Raheja and Gold 1994), have almost vanished from elite weddings in Dhaka and are somewhat less common in villages today (Professor H.K. Arefeen, personal communication). Likewise, song genres like *sāhir* (often bawdy songs, associated with boatmen and laborers) are heavily critiqued and rarely performed. Also, there was once a tradition of tuneful narrative (the singing of tales or ballads for which some use the label *sāhir*) which is almost dead, according to Abdul Malik of Nandikhala, Matlab.

    These gendered "genre wars" reminds us that in contemporary rural Bangladesh, women's health complaints are often ignored, cut off, or construed as malingering

(Hashemi and Schuler 1992; Wilce 1995), and the legal testimony of two women is needed to counterbalance that of one man, say in a rape case.

These contemporary facts bear some relation to nineteenth century reformists' campaigns – a relation which bears further investigation precisely because it forms part of the local interpretive context for performances like Latifa's. Modernist/Islamic reformism began to influence the Bengal region profoundly in the nineteenth century, condemning as local impurities such practices as the "riotous reading of marsiy – a poems on the death of the martyrs" on the day of Ashura (Mannan 1966: 171), as well as a Muslim cult of *Manasā* and *Sitalā* "(Hindu snake and smallpox goddesses) to whom they pray for relief from disease or other misfortune and for the fulfillment of their desires" (ibid: 168). If this cult of emotion (riotousness) and of goddesses among Muslims represented a substrate of resistance to Islam insofar as it was once perceived as a religion foreign to Bengal and its values, its elimination was and is understandably a high priority for Middle East-inspired Islamists. Women's status in general is impacted by histories of ideological struggle beginning in the 19th century and lasting into the present.

67. I am not arguing that Latifa's was an exemplary or beautiful *bilāp* but that contemporary ideologies of language and gender, influenced by models from both the Middle East and First World media, cannot valorize women's troubles talk, nor can they perceive therein even the level of "aesthetics" which Good (1994) sees in illness narratives in general and which I have pointed to in Latifa's even more marked (tuneful, poetic) production.

68. Language ideologies are typically metadiscourses – reflections *about* social uses of language. Regarding "sites," Silverstein writes: "Sometimes, the metadiscourse emerges in descriptive images of linguistic . . . usage in particular contexts, genred, eventively-situated stereotypes of usage that form a kind of canon of ideological values" (Silverstein 1992: 320f). Paul Kroskrity's (1992) description of kiva speech in Tewa village is an example of how one "site"-specific sort of discourse becomes a model for good speech in a whole community.

69. The passage deserves to be quoted as a whole: "There is a style of lamentation called /bilap/, among women. In /bilap/ women *drag* the words almost like songs. They express their *immediate feelings* either in prose or in rhymed words. The tune is fixed. Bilaps are made on two occasions: (i) when a woman leaves her father's house after marriage and (ii) after somebody's death" (Humayun 1985: 40 italics added). "Dragging the words" is an unfortunate calque (excessively literal translation) of the Bengali verb *ṭānā* which is used to describe not true song but sing-song, accented, drawled, or otherwise marked speech. Also problematic is the attribution of fixity to the tunes used by Latifa and other lament performers, which are clearly more a product of jazz-like improvisation than rote reproduction.

70. The language of one unidentified seminar participant stresses a particular "immediate feeling" – the "sense of helplessness." That focus on feelings further problematizes the unilateral association of laments with women. Excerpt from transcript of Institute of Modern Languages/Dhaka University Seminar

takhan *ego defense mechanism* tayri kare.	*Ego defense mechanisms form.*
māne eṭā geche (ār) mānasik je ekṭā asahāyatā	*[In crises] they vanish. A sense of helplessness*
bodh se gāner mādhyame prakāś pāe.	*is felt. It finds expression through melody.*
(sutā galāe)	

je bhābe tā- ābeg-guli pra –	*The tone in which* ābeg *[normally] find express –*
emotion guli prakāś karto-	emotions *find expression,*
seṭā-i (baiśeś) prakāś kare ār ki.	*[the tunefulness] expresses them uniquely.*
eṭāke *regression* bale. . . .	*That's called regression. . . .*

What the Bangladeshi Freudian said (above) makes sense in some categories of our own academic discourse. But that in itself is part of what we must consider problematic. The ideology of language (more broadly, of semiosis) reflected by the Dhaka academics (in their publications as well as the seminar) is one, influenced by Western folk and academic models, which objectifies emotion and treats expressive modalities as conduits or containers (Reddy 1979) which carry emotion-objects to the outside world in an unproblematic way.

71. Indeed, Desjarlais 1992 argues that the aesthetic sense pervades experiences of illness and healing and not only their narrative representation.

72. Briefly, Bakhtin's (1981) notion of language as intrinsically multivocal affirms that no one can own their own words because each word and utterance is not only formed with an audience in mind but bears the marks of all of its previous uses, all of which are, of course, social uses. Whether in written fiction or in everyday speech one hears many "voices" animated by a given "author."

73. Paintings like "The Scream" and controversial displays of graphic art such as that of Mapplethorpe remind us that neither pain nor religiously-motivated suppression of certain forms of expression is foreign to Euro-American scenes.

   A growing body of research demonstrates the fruitfulness of the analytic category of "laments" or "stylized/tuneful/ritual weeping" in stimulating cross-cultural inquiry. In nearly all societies people weep and perform activities iconic of weeping – musical, texted forms of ritual crying. Genres such as laments deserve investigation for their role in the construction of aesthetics, person, power, and emotion (Abu-Lughod 1986; Boesen 1983; Briggs 1992a, 1992b, 1993; Desjarlais 1992; Feld 1990; Feld and Fox 1994; Good 1977, 1994; Good and Good 1988; Grima 1991, 1992; Kaeppler 1993; Kuipers 1986; Seremetakis 1991; Urban 1988). While I do argue elsewhere that complaints in everyday conversation deserve attention on their own, this article describes a marked performance of troubles telling, a lament. I use that performance and the responses it evoked to explore how recent theorization in linguistic ideologies (Silverstein 1979; Kroskrity, Schieffelin, and Woolard 1991; Woolard and Schieffelin 1994) can be put to service in medical anthropology and transcultural psychiatry.

74. Although the romanticization of illnesses such as tuberculosis might have been more common in nineteenth century Europe than in our era (Sontag 1977–78), symbolic expressions of pain and suffering can appear even to modern observers as supreme human achievements (Scarry 1985).

75. Latifa is not alone in being subjected to regimes of discipline and treatment from which she finds no escape. We can turn to Western accounts (e.g. Showalter 1985) to find hegemonic cultural links between conceptions of madness and of women, or to Bengali cultural themes. Despite the fact that madness maintains a religious respectability for some in greater Bengal, cults of ecstasy are clearly "countercultural" even there (McDaniel 1989). The association of even this "respectable" madness – let alone the stigmatizing "secular" forms of madness – with counterdiscourses on gender and the social order, folk associations between rationality and male speech indicate that in Bengal (at least in this postcolonial era) as well as the West "madness" is tinged with the feminine.

76. We hear in their derision echoes of broader discourses of "reformism" which reject most Bengali folk practices, especially those which are somehow female-centered (Mannan 1966: 171; see note 66).

77. In fact, to do so is common within several theoretical frameworks, from Brooks and Warren (especially their acknowledgment of the central place of "complication" in the aesthetics of narrative structure, 1949: 312; cf. Good 1994: ch. 7 on the hetero-glossia and internal conflicts characterizing narrative), through the performance theory reviewed above in which gaps between "genre norms" and performances are intrinsic to aesthetic achievement, to queer theory's assertion that queer dress is a counter-cultural aestheticization of politics (Wilson 1993).

78. Extending Bateson's (1972) arguments regarding art, play, and fantasy provides a theoretical warrant for a general if not universal connection between verbal play/art and reflexive toying with (if not always breaking) conventions. There is no play without paradox, which always strains norms of interpretation even if it reproduces them at some level.

79. This linkage is carried out in practice but has not always informed the metatheories of medicine, psychiatry, or medical anthropology. I acknowledge, however, that my argument echoes Crapanzano's in regard to metapragmatic ascription and "the self" (1990).

80. The problem with Abu-Lughod's otherwise persuasive argument that "idiosyncratic," non-socialized and unconventional expressions of sentiment are labeled mad and deprived of honor among Bedouins is that it fails to problematize genres and evalu-ative norms as processes. When she writes, "Those who express strong sentiments of attachment and vulnerability in the culturally approved way can still claim to embody the cultural ideals" (1986: 257), she objectifies "the culturally approved way" as if it were neutral. See Lindstrom 1992 for an argument that framing is anything but power-neutral.

81. Either continuing to report others' speech – "They [gossips] make empty claims against Latifa's sanity" – or the aunt's own opinion of Latifa's speech – "She [Latifa] speaks incoherently." The difference turns partly on the meaning of *hudā*, "empty/emptily."

82. This pseudonym means "sympathy."

REFERENCES

Abu-Lughod, Lila
  1986   *Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ali, Mohammad, Mohammad Moniruzzaman, and Jahangir Tareq, eds.
  1994   *Bangla Academy Bengali-English Dictionary*. Dhaka: Bangla Academy.
Appadurai, Arjun
  1990   Topographies of the self: Praise and emotion in Hindu India. In Abu-Lughod and Lutz, eds., *Language and the Politics of Emotion*, pp. 92–112. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Austin, J. L.
  1975   *How to do Things with Words* (2nd edn). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1st edn 1962).

Bakhtin, Mikhail
1981   *The Dialogic Imagination*. Ed. M. Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press.
1986   *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Bateson, Gregory
1958   *Naven* (2nd edn). Stanford: Stanford University Press (1st edn 1936).
1972   Toward a theory of schizophrenia. In *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*, pp. 201–227. Scranton, Pa: Chandler. Reproduced from *Behavioral Science* 1/4 (1956).
Bauman, Richard
1975   Verbal art as performance. *American Anthropologist* 77: 290–311.
Bauman, Richard and Charles Briggs
1990   Poetics and performance as critical perspectives on language and social life. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 19: 59–88.
Bhattacharyya, Deborah
1986   *Pāgalāmi: Ethnopsychiatric Knowledge in Bengal*. Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs (Foreign and Comparative Studies/South Asian Series, No. 11).
Blackman, Julie
1989   *Intimate Violence*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Boddy, Janice
1994   Spirit possession revisited. *Annual Reviews of Anthropology* 23: 407–434.
Boesen, Inger W.
1983   Conflicts of solidarity in Pakhtun women's lives. In Bo Utas, ed., *Women in Islamic Societies: Social Attitudes and Historical Perspectives*, pp. 104–127. London: Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies/Curzon Press.
Brenneis, Donald
1990   Shared and solitary sentiments: The discourse of friendship, play and anger in Bhatgaon. In L. Abu-Lughod and C. Lutz, eds., *Language and the Politics of Emotion*, pp. 113–126. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Briggs, Charles
1984   Learning how to ask: Native metacommunicative competence and the incompetence of field workers. *Language in Society* 13: 1–28.
1986   *Learning How to Ask: A Sociolinguistic Appraisal of the Role of the Interview in Social Science Research*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1992a   "Since I am a Woman, I Will Chastise My Relatives": Gender, reported speech, and the (re)production of social relations in Warao ritual wailing. *American Ethnologist* 19/2: 337–361.
1992b   Linguistic ideologies and the naturalization of power in Warao discourse. In P. Kroskrity, Paul, B. Schieffelin, and K. Woolard, eds., *Language Ideologies* special issue of *Pragmatics* (2), pp. 387–404.
1993   Personal sentiments and polyphonic voices in Warao women's ritual wailing: Music and poetics in a critical and collective discourse. *American Anthropologist* 95/4: 929–957.
Briggs, Charles and Richard Bauman
1992   Genre, intertextuality, and social power. *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 2/2: 131–172.
Brooks, Cleanth and Robert Penn Warren
1949   *Modern Rhetoric* (4th edn). New York: Harcourt, Brace.
Caraveli, Ana
1986   The bitter wounding: The lament as social protest in rural Greece. In Jill Dubisch, ed., *Gender and Power in Rural Greece*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Clancy, Patricia
  1986   The acquisition of communicative style in Japanese. In Bambi B. Schieffelin
           and Elinor Ochs, eds., *Language Socialization Across Cultures*, pp. 213–250.
           London: Cambridge University Press.
Crapanzano, Vincent
  1990   On self characterization. In J. W. Stigler, R. A. Shweder, and G. Herdt, eds.,
           Cultural Psychology: Essays on Comparative Human Development, pp. 401–
           426. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Das, Veena
  1996   Language and the body: Transactions in the construction of pain. *Daedalus* 125/1:
           67–91.
Department of Social Medicine, Harvard Medical School
  1995   World Mental Health: Problems and Priorities in Low-Income Countries: Execu-
           tive Summary.
Desjarlais, Robert R.
  1992   *Body and Emotion: The Aesthetics of Illness and Healing in the Nepal Himalayas*.
           Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
  1996   Stepping into the office of reason: The pragmatics of agency in a "homeless"
           shelter. *American Ethnologist* 23: 886–900.
Dumont, Louis
  1970   *Homo Hierarchicus*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Duranti, Alessandro, and Donald Brenneis, eds.
  1986   *The Audience as Co-Author* (special issue of *Text*).
Duranti, Alessandro and Charles Goodwin, eds.
  1992   *Rethinking Context: Language as an Interactive Phenomenon* (Studies in the
           Social and Cultural Foundations of Language, No. 11). Cambridge: Cambridge
           University Press.
Eagleton, Terry
  1991   *Ideology: An Introduction*. London/New York: Verso.
Fauveau, Vincent, ed.
  1994   *Matlab: Women, Children, and Health*. Dhaka: International Centre for Diar-
           rhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh.
Feld, Steven
  1990   *Sound and Sentiment: Birds, Weeping, Poetics, and Song in Kaluli Expression*
           (2nd edn). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Feld, Steve and Aaron Fox
  1994   Music and language. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 23: 25–53.
Foucault, Michel
  1965   *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaelogy of Medical Perception*. New York: Vintage
           (1st edn 1961).
  1973   *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*. New York:
           Vintage.
  1977   *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Tr. Alan Sheridan. New York:
           Vintage Books (1st edn 1975).
  1980   *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*. Ed. Colin Gordon.
           New York: Pantheon.
  1990   *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, Vol. 1. Tr. Robert Hurley. New York:
           Vintage (1st edn 1978).

Gal, Susan
  1989   Between speech and silence: The problematics of research on language and
          gender. *Papers in Pragmatics* 3(1): 1–38.
Giddens, Anthony
  1984   *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Cambridge:
          Polity/Basil Blackwell.
Goffman, Erving
  1974   *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Cambridge, MA:
          Harvard University Press.
  1981   *Forms of Talk*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Good, Byron
  1977   The heart of what's the matter: The semantics of illness in Iran. *Culture, Medicine,
          and Psychiatry* 1: 25–58.
  1994   *Medicine, Rationality, and Experience: An Anthropological Perspective* (The
          Lewis Henry Morgan Lectures 1990). Cambridge/New York: Cambridge Univer-
          sity Press.
Good, Mary-Jo DelVecchio and Byron Good
  1988   Ritual, the state, and the transformation of emotional discourse in Iranian society.
          Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry 12: 48–63.
Grima, Benedict
  1991   The role of suffering in women's performances of *Paxto*. In A. Appadurai, F.
          Korom, and M. Mills. eds., *Gender, Genre, and Power in South Asian Expressive
          Traditions*, pp. 81–101. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
  1992   *The Performance of Emotion Among Paxtun Women* (Modern Middle East Series,
          No. 17). Austin: University of Texas Press.
Habte, D., ed.
  1990   *Annotated Bibliography of ICDDR,B Studies in Matlab, Bangladesh*. Dhaka:
          International Centre for Diarrheal Disease Research, Bangladesh.
Hanks, William F.
  1996   *Language and Communicative Practices* (Critical Essays in Anthropology
          No. 1). Boulder, CO: Westview.
Hashemi, Syed M. and Sidney R. Schuler
  1992   Disparate responses to men's and women's health: Evidence from rural
          Bangladesh. Unpublished paper presented at the 91st annual meeting of the
          American Anthropological Association, San Francisco.
Hilton, Zoe, ed.
  1993   *Legal Responses to Wife Assault: Current Trends and Evaluation*. Newbury Park,
          CA: Sage.
Holst-Warhaft, Gail
  1992   *Dangerous Voices: Women's Laments and Greek Literature*. London/New York:
          Routledge.
Humayun, Rajib
  1985   *Sociolinguistic and Descriptive Study of Sandvipi: A Bangla Dialect*. Dhaka:
          University Press.
Jeffery, Patricia
  1979   *Frogs in a Well: Indian Women in Purdah*. London: Zed Press.
Jefferson, Gail
  1981   The rejection of advice: Managing the problematic convergence of a "troubles-
          telling" and a "service encounter." *Journal of Pragmatics* 5: 399–422.

Kaeppler, Adrienne
  1993   Poetics and politics of Tongan laments and eulogies. *American Ethnologist* 20/3:
          474–501.
Kakar, Sudhir
  1978   *The Inner World: A Psychoanalytic Study of Childhood and Society in India.*
          Oxford/New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Kapferer, Bruce
  1991   *A Celebration of Demons: Exorcism and the Aesthetics of Healing in Sri Lanka*
          (2nd edn). Oxford/Washington, D.C.: Berg/ Smithsonian Institution.
Kleinman, Arthur, Veena Das, and Margaret Lock, eds.
  1996   *Social Suffering*, special issue of *Daedalus*.
Kristeva, Julia
  1982   *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*. Tr. Leon S. Roudiez. New York:
          Columbia University Press (1st edn 1980).
Kroskrity, Paul V.
  1992   Arizona Tewa Kiva speech as a manifestation of linguistic ideology. *Pragmatics*
          2/3: 297–309.
Kroskrity, Paul, Bambi Schieffelin, and Kathryn Woolard, eds.
  1992   *Language Ideologies*, special issue of *Pragmatics* (Vol. 2, No. 3).
Kuipers, Joel C.
  1986   Talking about troubles: Gender differences in Weyéwa speech use. *American
          Ethnologist* 13: 448–462.
  1989   "Medical discourse" in anthropological context: Views of language and power.
          Medical Anthropology Quarterly 3/2: 99–123.
Kurtz, Stanley N.
  1992   *All the Mothers are One: Hindu India and the Cultural Reshaping of Psycho-
          analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.
LeVine, Robert A., Sarah E. LeVine, Amy Richman, F. Medardo Tapia Uribe, and
Clara Sunderland Correa
  1993   Schooling and survival: The impact of maternal education on health and repro-
          duction in the Third World. In Lincoln Chen, Arthur Kleinman, Norma Ware,
          eds., *Health and social change*, pp. 257–284. Boston: Department of Population
          and International Health, Harvard School of Public Health/Harvard University
          Press.
Lindstrom, Lamont
  1992   Context contests: Debatable truth statements on Tanna (Vanuatu). In A. Duranti
          and C. Goodwin, eds., *Rethinking Context: Language as an Interactive Phenom-
          enon*, pp. 101–124 (Studies in the Social and Cultural Foundations of Language,
          No. 11). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mannan, Qazi Abdul
  1966   *The Emergence and Development of dobhāṣi Literature in Bengal* (*up to 1855
          A.D.*). Dacca: Department of Bengali and Sanskrit, University of Dacca.
McDaniel, June
  1989   *The Madness of the Saints: Ecstatic Religion in Bengal*. Chicago: University of
          Chicago Press.
Nichter, Mark
  1981   Idioms of distress: Alternatives in the expression of psychosocial distress: A case
          study from South India. *Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry* 5: 379–408.

Papanek, Hanna
  1990   To each less than she needs, from each more than she can do: Allocations, entitlements and value. In Irene Tinker, ed., *Persistent Inequalities: Women and World Development*, pp. 162–184. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Raheja, Gloria Goodwin and Ann Grodzins Gold
  1994   *Listen to the Heron's Words: Reimagining Gender and Kinship in North India*. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press.
Reddy, Michael
  1993   The conduit metaphor: A case of frame conflict in our language about language. In Andrew Ortony, ed., *Metaphor and Thought*, pp. 164–201. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1st edn 1979).
Rhodes, Lorna Amarasingham
  1990   Studying biomedicine as a cultural system. In Thomas M. Johnson and Carolyn F. Sargent, eds., *Medical Anthropology: Contemporary Theory and Method*, pp. 159–173. New York: Praeger.
Rumsey, Alan
  1990   Word, meaning, and linguistic ideology. *American Anthropologist* 92: 346–361.
Scarry, Elaine
  1985   *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schutz, Alfred
  1970   *On Phenomenology and Social Relations*. Ed./Tr. Helmut Wagner. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press.
Scott, James C.
  1990   *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven/London: Yale University Press.
Seremetakis, C. Nadia
  1991   *The Last Word: Women, Death, and Divination in Inner Mani*. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press.
Showalter, Elaine
  1985   *The Female Malady: Women, Madness, and English Culture, 1830–1980*. New York: Pantheon.
Shupe, Anson, William A. Stacey, and Lonnie R. Hazlewood
  1987   *Violent Men, Violent Couples: The Dynamics of Domestic Violence*. Lexington, MA: Lexington University Press.
Silverstein, Michael
  1979   Language structure and linguistic ideology. In R. Cline, W. Hanks and C. Hofbauer, eds., *The Elements: A Parasession on Linguistic Units and Levels*, pp. 193–247. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.
  1992   The uses and utility of ideology: Some reflections. In P. Kroskrity, Paul, B. Schieffelin, and K. Woolard, eds., *Language Ideologies*, special issue of *Pragmatics* (2), Antwerp: International Pragmatics Association. pp. 387–404.
  To appear: Whorfianism and the Linguistic Imagination of Nationality. In Paul Kroskrity, ed., *Language Ideologies*, Santa Fe: School of American Research.
Sontag, Susan
  1977   *Illness as Metaphor*. New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux.
Steedly, Mary Margaret
  1988   Severing the bonds of love: A case study in soul loss. *Social Science and Medicine* 27/8: 841–856.

Tambiah, Stanley
  1990   Lecture and discussion at UCLA, Department of Anthropology (Spring 1990).
Tiwary, K.M.
  1978   Tuneful weeping: A mode of communication. *Frontiers* 3/3: 24–27.
Tweedie, Irina
  1979   *Chasm of Fire: A Woman's Experience of Liberation Through the Teachings of a
          Sufi Master*. Tisbury, Wiltshire, UK: Element Books.
Urban, Greg
  1988   Ritual wailing in Amerindian Brazil. *American Anthropologist* 90: 385–400.
Vaudeville, Charlotte
  1986   *Bārahmāsā in Indian Literatures: Songs of the Twelve Months in Indo-Aryan
          Literatures*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Vološinov, V.N.
  1973   *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*. Tr. L. Mtejka and I.R. Titunik. Cam-
          bridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1st edn 1929).
Wadley, Susan S.
  1983   The rains of estrangement: Understanding the Hindu yearly cycle. *Contributions
          to Indian Sociology* 17/1: 51–85.
Weber, Max
  1958   *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Tr. Talcott Parsons. New York:
          Charles Scribners' Sons (1st edn 1920).
Wikan, Unni
  1990   *Managing Turbulent Hearts: A Balinese Formula for Living*. Chicago: University
          of Chicago Press.
Wilce, James M.
  1994   *Repressed Eloquence: Health Communication in Matlab, Bangladesh*. UCLA,
          Ph.D. dissertation.
  1995   "I Can't Tell You all My Troubles": Conflict, Resistance, and Metacommunication
          in Bangladeshi Illness Interactions. *American Ethnologist* 22(4): 927–952.
  1996   Reduplication and reciprocity in imagining community: The play of tropes in a
          rural Bangladeshi Moot. *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology* 6: 188–222.
 In press: *Fragments of Eloquence: Conflict, Resistance and Metacommunication in
          Bangladeshi Troubles Talk*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wilson, Elizabeth
  1993   Is transgression transgressive? In Joseph Bristow and Angelina Wilson, eds.,
          Activating Theory: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Politics, pp. 107–117. London:
          Lawrence and Wishart.
Woolard, Kathryn and Bambi Schieffelin
  1994   Language ideology. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 23: 55–82.
Zbavitel, Dušan
  1961   The development of the Baromasi in the Bengali literature. *Archiv Orientalni* 29:
          583ff.

Address for correspondence: Dr James M. Wilce, Jr, Department of Anthropology,
Northern Arizona University, P.O. Box 15200, Flagstaff, AZ 86011-5200, USA