Return
to Alan A. Lew’ Overseas Chinese Links
Overseas Chinese and Compatriots
Alan A. Lew
Professor, Northern Arizona University
Originally published as:
Lew, Alan A. 1995. Overseas
Chinese and Compatriots in China’s Tourism Development. In A.A.Lew and L.
Yu, eds., Tourism in China: Geographical, Political, and Economic Perspectives,
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press), pp.155-75.
An updated version of this paper is forthcoming as: Lew A.A. and Wong, A. 2002. Tourism and the Chinese Diaspora. In A.M. Williams and C.M. Hall, eds., Tourism and Migration.
There exists a China other than the
People’s Republic of China (PRC). This ‘other
China’ is more than just the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan. It consists of over 50 million ethnic
Chinese around the world who are not under the direct rule of the PRC. These include ‘compatriots’ in Hong Kong,
Macao, and Taiwan, and overseas Chinese elsewhere in the world. Most of the citizens of this other China
maintain strong personal and cultural ties to their motherland. Most of them have also experienced economic
success in their adopted lands. It is
impossible to understand the dynamics of tourism development in China without
including consideration of the other China.[1]
Ethnic Chinese who live outside the PRC
are a major force in the country’s tourism development. They form the majority of travelers to China
and are the principal foreign investors in its tourism industry. The desire to visit China stems from a
history of well maintained familial and cultural ties, despite many years of
separation. Investment in China’s
hotels and resorts by ethnic Chinese residing outside the PRC reflects these
close personal ties. Such investments
also reflect the personal wealth accumulated by Chinese who have been living in
capitalist societies. Through the combination of these factors, the other China
provides the PRC with a development resource the likes of which few countries
can compare.
A Brief History of the Chinese Diaspora
For most of its
recorded history, emigration from China proper has been minimal. By the 3rd century A.D. (the Three Kingdoms
period), expansion out of the north China cultural hearth had extended the area
of Han Chinese settlement into what is today central and southern China. While China became a major trading nation
in the Indian Ocean during the Tang Dynasty (618-906), emigration during this
and subsequent periods was both illegal and generally not on a large
scale. Most of the emigration that did
occur consisted of traders (actually pirates) from the southern coastal
province of Fujian.
The first major period of emigration
beyond China proper occurred in the late 14th and early 15th centuries, and
again in the 16th century (during the Ming Dynasty) when Chinese traders and
naval vessels again traveled the southern seas as far as Africa (Lyman 1974:
3). These travelers encountered
scattered Chinese settlements founded on the pirating and smuggling activities
of previous centuries (Pan 1990: 4-6).
Throughout the Ming Dynasty large numbers of Chinese traders migrated
and settled in the Philippines, the Malacca Strait area, and the islands of Indonesia. The fall of the Ming to the Manchurian Qing
Dynasty in 1644 resulted in yet a larger wave of emigration to Taiwan and
Southeast Asia. In 1712 the Qing,
fearing revolutionary influences, made the return of Chinese from abroad
punishable by death.
It was not until the mid-nineteenth
century that treaties forced on China by European powers during the Opium Wars
changed Qing Dynasty policy to legally allow emigration (Pan 1990: 48,51). The colonial powers sought Chinese ‘coolie’
laborers to work in Southeast Asia and the Americas. Chinese workers willingly sought these opportunities, in part to
escape natural and manmade disasters that plagued their homeland in the 19th
century (Lyman 1974: 3; Pan 1990: 13).
The vast majority of Chinese who took advantage of these opportunities
were from the southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. Emigrants from this period were the original
settlers in most of the Chinatowns found throughout the world today. Indeed, Lyman says that ‘Nineteenth century
China is more alive in twentieth-century American Chinatowns than in the
contemporary villages of Kwangtung [Guangdong] and Fukien [Fujian]’ (1974:
6). It is the culture of the overseas
Chinese from southern China that has largely defined the traditional relationship
between China proper and the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia and the
Americas.
The most recent wave of Chinese
emigration began with the liberalization of mainland Chinese society in the
late 1970s.[2] While southern Chinese still predominate, in
general this new group of overseas Chinese comprises a broader mix of people
from different parts of China than had previous periods of emigration. Economic motivations, however, remain the
dominant force in their decision to emigrate to their preferred destinations of
the U.S., Canada, and Australia.
Taiwan has periodically experienced lengthy
periods of independence from mainland China. It was occupied in the seventh century by Chinese agriculturalists
who migrated seasonally to Formosa and the Pescadore Islands (Lyman 1974:
3). When the Ming Dynasty temporarily
banned overseas trade in 1433, Formosa became a haven for Chinese pirates.
Ming Dynasty loyalists fled to the island in 1644 to escape the conquering
Manchurians (Qing Dynasty). The Ming maintained a separate Chinese state
there until 1683 when they were overcome by Qing forces. Japan controlled Taiwan from 1895 to 1945.
A repeat of the 17th century scenario occurred in 1949 when some two
million Nationalist Chinese government officials, soldiers, and sympathizers
fled to Taiwan, leaving the mainland to the Chinese Communist Party.
Although voices calling for the formal independence of Taiwan from
China have existed since at least the 1940s, both the Nationalist and Communist
governments of China consider Taiwan an integral part of the mainland (Andrews
1992a).
It was the last period of separation from
the mainland that caused contemporary differences between Taiwan and the PRC to
develop. Cold War politics intensified
divisions between the Nationalist ROC government on Taiwan and the Communist
PRC government on the mainland.
Economic and cultural ties were nonexistent as both sides sought the
support of the Chinese outside of East Asia.
This situation changed considerably with the liberalization of the
mainland society and the death of the old Nationalist leaders in Taiwan. Today, visitors and investments from Taiwan
play a major role in China’s tourism development.
The Ming Dynasty ceded Macao to Portugal
in 1557 as a gift for assistance in fighting pirates along the south China
coast. The mainland Chinese government,
however, has always had considerable say in the policies of the tiny colony
that will return to PRC administration in 1999. No other European power was able to make significant inroads into
trading and colonizing China, until the start of the Opium Wars in 1841. By this time, Great Britain had become the
major European colonial power in Asia, and opium from India had become the
major product being traded for Chinese goods.
In an effort to stop the opium trade, the Chinese government confiscated
European opium caches in Guangzhou.
British traders responded by calling on the English Royal Navy to attack
the coast of China. Hong Kong was
subsequently ceded to the British government in a treaty signed while British
gunboats threatened to destroy the coastal cities of China.
The population of Hong Kong grew rapidly
as large numbers of Chinese from neighboring Guangdong Province migrated to the
colony. Hong Kong received a major
influx of Shanghai industrialists and capital when the communists came to rule
the mainland in 1949. British colonial
policies were based on liberal economic theory and Hong Kong developed into the
epitome of laissez faire capitalism at the same time that mainland China sought
to epitomize the communist ideal under the leadership of Mao Zedong. In the early years of communism, the door
between mainland China and Hong Kong was wide open. By the mid-1950s, however, a ‘bamboo curtain@ was raised
preventing mainland Chinese from migrating to Hong Kong and Macao. Although Hong Kong will come under PRC
administration in 1997, its economic and social policies, and its relationship
to the mainland are scheduled by treaty to remain unchanged for 50 more years.
One important part of the relationship
between Hong Kong and the mainland has been that even with the Bamboo Curtain,
Hong Kong and Macao Chinese have always been able to travel easily into the
PRC. This special access to mainland
China has given Hong Kong Chinese an advantage over all other groups, making
them the single largest investor in China’s tourism industry and the largest
visitor group by far to the PRC.
Tourism and the Existential Tie to China
The strong sense of nostalgia that
Chinese of the other China feel toward their ancestral land is particularly
pronounced among those who reside the farthest away from it. Today, this feeling consists of sentiments
that both pull them to China as a place where they feel a sense of belonging,
and push them toward their adopted lands as a place where they prefer to
physically live and work. While the
following discussion focuses on the overseas Chinese experience, the mixed
emotions that all Chinese have as descendants of China extends to Taiwanese and
Hong Kong Chinese, as well.
Historically, the overseas Chinese
experience has been described as one of a ‘sojourner.@ For the Chinese sojourner, the basic
motivation for leaving home was to seek opportunities to increase one's status
at home. This was usually accomplished
through increased economic opportunities in another place. Unlike the economic immigrants of today, the
sojourner had no intention of remaining in the host place. While this situation has changed for overseas
Chinese over the years, the sojourner model describes a basic foundation that
explains how overseas Chinese today continue to relate to their motherland.
Woon (1984) has identified several
reasons for sojourning (i.e., working away from home and returning home to
retire.) These include:
1. The importance of the extended family and a
feeling of insecurity in a place without the extended family reference
group. A Chinese proverb says that ‘Being
away from home only one li [about one‑third mile] is not as good as being
home.@ Unlike northern China, most of
the villages in southern China are patrilocal, clan communities, with everyone
in the village related by male lineage and marriage (Pan 1990: 18; Woon 1983). Southern Chinese, in particular, identify
themselves to one another in terms of the village or group of villages from
which they descend. Even when direct
ties to home village relatives are severed, overseas Chinese will find
comradeship with other Chinese from their home county or who have the same
surname. Surname-based associations
often replaced village-based networks for Chinese when they arrived in a
foreign land.
2. Group pressure from villagers to return home
and acceptance upon returning home, despite having left. A strong sense of filial piety, expressed in
terms of caring for both aged parents and the graves of ancestors, is
reinforced by village relatives on those who are working away from home. In areas of southern China where ties between
the home villagers and overseas sojourners were strong communist
collectivization efforts in the 1960s were less successful (Peterson
1988). In return for remittances for
overseas relatives, villagers made every effort to maintain the property rights
of sojourners. Despite over 40 years of
communist rule many of the Chinese who left before 1949 still maintain
ownership of their village homes.
3. The existence of an open class society
allowing upward socioeconomic mobility, particularly for males. Southern China has been referred to as a ‘cultural
borderland@ (Pan 1990: 13). The Chinese
of the south have a greater diversity of language and genetic influences than
elsewhere in China. A dominant
Confucian land owning class was also less pronounced in the clan villages of
southern China, and an openness to new ideas was more common. The idea that one could leave China was,
therefore, more accepted, as was the concept of an economic-based social class
system.
While away from home, the overseas Chinese
sojourner gained prestige among fellow sojourners based upon these same
values. The more trips home one could
make before retirement increased one’s prestige. So did the amount of money sent home to relatives, and the amount
donated for public works projects for the villages (e.g., schools, roads, and
bridges.) Saving a large amount of
money to bring back to China also increased the sojourner’s prestige. If a sojourner died while away, he typically
was buried for several years, after which his bones would be dug up and sent
back to the village for a proper reburial (Pan 1990: 55).
Unfortunately, the unsettled political
situation in China in the first half of the 1900s made it increasingly
difficult for overseas Chinese sojourners to return. The victory of the communists in 1949 all but closed the country
to return migration. In the 1950s
anti-Chinese movements in Southeast Asia did result in some 50,000 ethnic
Chinese returning to China to settle, but most of these were distrusted by the
government and encouraged to leave in the early 1970s (Godley 1989). The vast majority of the world’s overseas
Chinese sojourners became resigned to remaining in their host country
permanently.
The sentiments and ties to China of the
earlier sojourner period, however, remained strong. Money continued to be sent back to the village throughout the
Maoist period, and this continued to be a source of prestige among overseas
Chinese. When China reopened to tourism
in 1978, a new form of returning ‘sojourner-tourist@ quickly developed.
For overseas Chinese, China is an ‘existential
home.@ It serves as the center of their
personal and social value systems, which are based on the extended family. Though they cannot live in China, it remains
the place where they feel most at home.
Relph refers to this experience as ‘existential insideness,@ which
includes the experience of permanent residents of a place (1976: 55). Cohen, in describing different modes of
tourist experiences, refers to the ‘existential tourist@ as one who is spiritually
alienated from their place of physical residence and physically
alienated from their spiritual center (1979).
The ‘spiritual center@ may be either elective or ancestral. Cohen argues that existential tourism is
increasing as forced and voluntary emigration has increased in recent decades.
There are many reasons why overseas
Chinese find existential tourism preferable over sojourning. The decades during which China was closed to
most of the world fostered a greater degree of assimilation of overseas Chinese
in their host society than in earlier periods.
When restrictions on return migration occurred among Southeast Asian
Chinese in the 15th and 16th centuries a distinctive Southeast Asian Chinese
culture developed, known as ‘Peranakan Chinese@ culture in Malaysia and
Singapore (Clammer 1980). Nineteenth
and twentieth century emigrants faced a similar situation after the communist
victory in 1949. Greater assimilation
contributed to a permanent state of sojourning.[3] Continuing difficulties in China made
contributions sent home ever more valued.
This in turn relieved the pressure from home villagers for sojourners to
return permanently. When China became
more open to tourism, returning overseas Chinese found that their status was
greatly enhanced. They were, however,
expected to bring monetary gifts for all villagers on their visits. (For some overseas Chinese, this expectation
has actually limited the number of return trips they have chosen to take to
their village.) The rural areas of
Guangdong and Fujian Provinces, where an estimated half of all overseas Chinese
originate, are today among the wealthiest areas in China due to these
continuing remittances (The Economist 1992: 22).
Pan has described the experience of the
overseas Chinese tourist succinctly:
Each time they visit they ask themselves, ‘Why
are we here? Why do we keep coming
back?’ Why must they return to this
cruel, tormented, corrupt, hopeless place as though they still needed it? Could they never achieve immunity? And yet had China meant nothing to them, any
other place thereafter would have meant less, and they would carry no pole
within themselves, and they would not even guess what they had missed . . . yet
they realize that they could never live there.
Deep in their hearts they know that they love China best when they live
well away from the place. (1990: 379)
The existential overseas Chinese tourist,
therefore, can enjoy the benefits of two worlds. Tourism allows them to strengthen their ties to the extended
village and to pay proper respects to the ancestors. This, in return, strengthens their personal self esteem by giving
them a broader perspective of their place in the world. It also increases their prestige among other
overseas Chinese residing abroad. In
fact, the acceptance and value placed on ancestral-based existential tourism to
China today has lessened the pressure for younger people to stay in the village
and increased their propensity to seek opportunities abroad.
With each succeeding generation, direct
ties to the village become weaker and weaker.
This is particularly true as a family becomes more assimilated into
their new society. In recent years,
special offices in the major overseas Chinese areas of Guangdong and Fujian
Provinces have been established to help second and third generation overseas
Chinese find their ancestral villages.
However, even those who have lost all connections to China cannot avoid
a sense of existential belonging when they visit, even if it based largely on
racial grounds. Even Hong Kong and
Taiwan compatriots have a nostalgic preference for a single China that includes
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the PRC over the current divisive situation. However, like the overseas Chinese, compatriots
have grown too accustomed to their current governments to readily return to
living under the rule of the PRC. As
with overseas Chinese, visiting relatives in China is also the principal
motivation of compatriot visits to the mainland (Lee 1982)
Economic Impacts on Tourism in China
The economic
impacts of the other China on tourism and travel in the PRC are twofold. The first is in terms of visitations to
China. The second is in the area of
foreign investments in tourism. In both
of these areas, Chinese living in the other China have been the dominant force
in the development of international tourism and travel in the PRC. However, it is first necessary to clarify
the terms used to identify the different groups that comprise the other China.
Defining the Overseas Chinese
There exists two major categories of Chinese
who reside outside of the PRC. In
addition, each of these has some significant subclassifications. The first category consists of Chinese living
in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao. The
PRC considers each of these places an integral part of China proper and officially
refers to their citizens as ‘compatriots.@ However, none of the three compatriot places
has experienced direct rule under the communist government of China. Indeed, they have often represented the very
antithesis of the political and economic policies of the PRC. While significant visa differences do exist,
compatriot Chinese who visit the PRC experience similar border formalities
as do other visitors. There are two
major types of compatriot Chinese: those from the British colony of Hong Kong
and the Portuguese colony of Macao, and those from the ROC on the island province
of Taiwan.
The term ‘overseas Chinese@ refers to
ethnic Chinese who live beyond the areas claimed as territory by the PRC. Overseas Chinese reside on every continent,
although the vast majority are in Southeast Asia, followed by North America
(Table 10.1).[4] The history of overseas Chinese in Southeast
Asia dates back to at least the pirate traders of the 13th century, while many
of those in other parts of the world trace their migration back to the Opium
Wars of the mid-1800s. Despite being
separated from China for many generations, overseas Chinese still maintain
close cultural and, for more recent immigrants, familial ties to their
ancestral land. In the following
discussion, the overseas Chinese are classified into three types: those
residing in Southeast Asia, many of whom are descendants of early emigrants
from China’s Fujian Province; those who reside in North America (American
Chinese); and those who live elsewhere in the world. Most of the Chinese now residing in the U.S. and Canada trace
their immigration from Guangdong Province in the 19th and 20th centuries. Chinese residing in the rest of the world
are widely scattered and are not discussed in detail here.
One problem in using the term ‘overseas
Chinese@ is due to the way the classification of ‘Overseas Chinese@ is used in
China’s tourism statistics. For
TABLE 10.1 1990 Compatriot and Overseas Chinese
Populations
![]()
Number of ethnic Chinese
(in millions)
![]()
Indonesia 7.2
Thailand 5.8
Malaysia 5.2
Singapore 2.0
Burma 1.5
Philippines 0.8
Vietnam 0.8
Southeast Asia Total 23.3
USA 1.8
Canada 0.6
Latin America 1.0
Americas Total 3.4
Rest of Asia and the Pacific
1.8
Europe
0.6
Africa 0.1
OVERSEAS CHINESE TOTAL 29.2
Hong Kong
5.9
Macao
.5
Taiwan
20.7
COMPATRIOT CHINESE TOTAL 27.1
WORLD TOTAL
56.3
![]()
Source: Kao 1993; The
Economist 1992.
official
purposes, ‘Overseas Chinese@ (upper case "O") refers to persons who
hold a mainland Chinese passport, but live outside of China. Visitors to China with these characteristics
are significant only in Indonesia, where 1.5 million (1982) Chinese hold PRC
citizenship, and in Thailand with 300,000 (1980) PRC citizens (Poston and Yu
1990). In 1991, China recorded 133,427 ‘Overseas
Chinese@ visits (Sun 1992). However,
the vast majority of overseas Chinese, as the term is used in this chapter, do
not hold a Chinese passport. These
visitors are officially classified as ‘Foreign Visitors,@ along with non-ethnic
Chinese travelers. Thus, almost all of
Singapore’s 98,097 visitors in 1991 (Sun 1992) were considered Foreign Visitors
in China’s tourism statistics, despite the fact that 77 percent of the
population of Singapore is ethnic Chinese.
A method to estimate the actual number of overseas ethnic Chinese
visitors to China from around the world is introduced below.
Chinese Tourist
Travel to China
Fortunately,
compatriot visitations to the PRC are recorded and published on an annual
basis, although like many numbers from China, especially in the past, these may
be inflated. The total number of annual
compatriot Chinese trips to China has consistently been more than 20 million
since 1986, and reached almost 34 million in 1992 (Table 10.2; see also Table
1.1 in Chapter 1). Most of these visits
are to see friends and relatives and for leisure travel (Chow 1988). The city of Guangzhou, for example, claims
to have 679,843 residents with close relatives in Hong Kong or Macao (Guangzhou
Economic Yearbook 1984, cited in Chow 1988). Family-oriented holidays, such as the Chinese New Year, witness
large numbers of Hong Kong Chinese crossing into China. An increasing number of compatriot business
trips are also part of the PRC’s total visitor arrivals.
In 1992, the
nearly six million residents of Hong Kong made 21.5 million visits across the
border into the PRC (SCMP 1993). Hong
Kong compatriots are not required to have a visa to visit China--they only need
to show a travel identity card. In
addition to family visits, many leisure travelers from Hong Kong visit resorts
in the neighboring Shenzhen and Zhuhai Special Economic Zones (Table
10.3). These are areas of China that
border Hong Kong and Macao, respectively, and in which liberal economic
policies (similar to those in Hong Kong) prevail. Hotels and full featured resorts have been built in these areas,
making for an easily accessible vacation destination for urban Hong Kong
compatriots (Chow 1988; Lew 1987).
Visits to these destinations are also organized by schools, workplaces,
and other organizations in Hong Kong.
Such groups also organize longer tours of China.
Taiwanese visits
to the mainland have increased dramatically since the Taiwan government relaxed
its restrictions on such visits in November 1987 (Andrews 1992b). Illegal visits had been taking place through
Hong Kong since the mid-1980s, when China began admitting Taiwanese without
stamping their passports. A rapid
increase in Taiwanese visitors occurred
just in time to help compensate for part of the decline in tourism to China
that resulted from the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989 (Chang 1992; He 1991;
Zhang 1990). A peak of 1.5 million
was reached in 1993. The 1994 figures
are likely to be considerably lower following the the robbery murder of a
Taiwanese tour group in Hangzhou and subsequent travel restricts enacted by
the government of Taiwan (Mark 1994a; 1994b).
Although the
Taiwan government initially stipulated that travel to the PRC would only be
allowed to visit relatives, this condition was gradually dropped (Andrews
1992). Increasingly, these visits have
included large numbers of business travelers.
Limited visits by mainland Chinese to Taiwan have been allowed since 1990,
the same year that Taiwan sent a large delegation to the Asian Games held in
Beijing. Taiwan, however, still bans
direct air and sea links to the mainland, although it may be only a matter of
time before this restriction is liberalized, as well.
TABLE 10.2 Compatriot and Overseas Chinese Visitor
Arrivals to China
![]()
Overseas Chinese % Foreign
Hong Kong and Macao Taiwan Number Visitorsa
![]()
1987 25.09 million <2,500 202,155
11.7
1988 29.34 million 437,700 320,544
17.4
1989 22.43 million 541,000 270,279
18.5
1990 24.68 million 947,600 277,823
15.9
1991 29.56 million 946,632 409,225
15.1
1992 32.63 million 1,317,800 n/a n/a
1993 35.18 million 1,526,969 n/a n/a
![]()
aThe percent of foreign
visitors that ethnic overseas Chinese comprise is the mean of an estimate high
and an estimated low for each year using the method described in the text for
1991.
Source: He 1991; The Yearbook
of China Tourism Statistics 1992; Xiang 1991; Ministry of Public Security
1994.
TABLE 10.3 Major Cities visited by Compatriots and
Foreign Visitors, 1991a
![]()
Compatriot Chinese Foreign Visitors
![]()
Shenzhen SEZ (Guangdong) 1,704,807 108,379
Guangzhou (Guangdong) 1,473,721 444,555
Zhuhai SEZ (Guangdong) 433,076 24,124
Beijing 381,707 913,887
Shanghai 331,783 612,723
Hangzhou 229,690 136,809
Quanzhou (Fujian) 220,902 7,286
Guilin 207,556 199,159
Xiamen (Fujian) 135,324 66,816
Nanjing 121,921 96,803
Shantou (Guangdong) 114,229 76,705
Fuzhou (Fujian) 110,113 34,656
Suzhou 103,262 116,294
Kunming 100,713 57,539
Xian 68,943 237,824
TOTAL 30,506,231 2,710,103
![]()
aThis table is extracted
from a list of 53 cities. All cities
which received 100,000 or more compatriot or foreign visitors in 1991 are
shown. The city counts are from the
National Tourism Administration. SEZ
stands for Special Economic Zone.
Source: The Yearbook of China
Tourism Statistics 1992.
Southeast Asian
Chinese also helped to compensate for the decline in tourist visits to the PRC
in 1989 and 1990, though the numbers were less significant than among the
Taiwanese. Part of the reason for the
Southeast Asian increase was due to new laws adopted by Southeast Asian countries
making travel to China more accessible (Zhang 1990). As in Taiwan, mainland China had become the new place to go for
the more wealthy of Southeast Asia. In
1991, China received 104,791 foreign visitors from the Philippines, making it
the fourth largest market behind Japan, the U.S., and the U.K. (Sun 1992:
24-5). The small city-state of
Singapore was China’s fifth largest market with 98,097 visitors. Germany was slightly ahead of Thailand,
which was China’s seventh largest market at 88,624 visitors.
The per capita
expenditures of Hong Kong Chinese, Taiwanese, and Southeast Asian Chinese are
much lower than that of other international visitors, including American
Chinese and overseas Chinese elsewhere in the world. Compatriot and Southeast Asian Chinese are more likely to stay
with relatives or in inexpensive Chinese hotels rather than in international
hotels, while Taiwanese have received special incentive prices that cut into
profits. The rise in tourists from
among these groups has provided a new market for the older Chinese hotels in
the PRC (Zhang 1990). It has also
resulted in an increase in the production of rosewood furniture, screens, and
calligraphy art which are popular among these groups.
As discussed
above, estimating the total number of overseas Chinese visitors is difficult
due to the way in which China collects tourism statistics. One method
of estimating the true number of overseas Chinese visitors to China is
to compare the number of foreign visitors from each country that are serviced
by the China Travel Service (CTS). CTS
primarily handles the travel arrangements of ethnic Chinese living outside the
PRC.[5]
In 1991, CTS serviced 225,036 foreign visitors (Sun 1992). This amounted to 8.3 percent of all foreign
visitors and 21.9 percent of foreign visitors who traveled under the auspices
of one of China’s major travel agencies.[6] (It is possible to travel without using a
major travel agency by being on government business or as guests of trade
associations, schools, and other organizations that provide their own travel
agency-type services.) Because most of
the travel agencies that are not listed individually in the NTA statistics
primarily handle non-ethnic Chinese visitors, a safe assumption is that about
15.1 percent of foreign visitors to China in 1991 were overseas Chinese. (The figure of 15.1 percent is half-way
between the low of 8.3 percent and the high of 21.9 percent.) Using this estimated percentage, the total
number of ethnic Chinese that comprise China’s foreign visitor count in 1991
would be 409,225.
While low in
comparison to compatriot visits, the number of ethnic Chinese is a good
proportion of the total foreign visitor count.
In addition, since the majority of overseas Chinese come from localized
areas in Guangdong and Fujian, they frequently include these provinces on their
itinerary. Their concentration in these
areas is a major source of income and
economic development for rural southern China.
Table 10.2
shows the estimated number of ethnic overseas Chinese visitors dating back to
1987. The low percentage of 11.7 in
1987 reflects restrictions on travel to China that were still in existence then
in many Southeast Asian countries. This
began to change in 1988, while the high of 18.5 percent in 1989 accurately
shows the importance of ethnic Chinese in supporting China’s tourism economy
when visitors from most Western countries canceled their visits following the
June 4th Tiananmen Square Incident.
It should be
cautioned that these are rough estimates.
With the liberalization of travel services in China, CTS has started to
handle larger numbers of non-ethnic Chinese visitors. Using CTS as a guideline in the future will be more
difficult. In 1991, however, CTS was
still the dominant travel agency for overseas ethnic Chinese. This can be seen in the statistics for
Singapore, where 77 percent of the population is ethnic Chinese. In 1991, 88 percent of the Singaporeans who
came to China under the auspices of one of the country’s two major travel
agencies used CTS, while only 12 percent used CITS. For Thailand, another major source of overseas Chinese visitors,
90 percent used CTS. By contrast, only
16 percent of visitors from Japan, and 13 percent of those from France, used
CTS in 1991.
Tourism
Investment in China
It is estimated
that the liquid assets of the 50 million overseas and compatriot Chinese
worldwide are between $1.5 and $2 billion (The Economist 1992). On a per capita basis, this amount is higher
than the approximately $3 billion in liquid assets held by Japan’s 124 million
people, and is far higher than any of the other countries in the world. This personal wealth was built on the same
traditions of family ties and economic mobility which drives overseas Chinese
tourism to China today. Family-owned businesses,
combined with social and business networks built through larger family
associations, enabled overseas Chinese communities to become dominant economic
forces in many countries (Kao 1993; Sender 1991). The reestablishment and strengthening of direct ties to China
since 1978 has also worked through these traditional business networks.
The government
of China has encouraged foreign investment to rapidly bring the country into
the global economic system. Outside interests invested approximately $11 billion
in China in 1991, and 1993 saw that amount more than double to $25 billion in
pledges in the first quarter alone (although only $3 billion was actually spent
during that period) (The Economist 1992; Koan and Kaye 1993). While Japan is the main source of loans to
China, Hong Kong and Taiwan comprise about two-thirds of the actual direct
investments. Some of this amount is in
wholly foreign owned enterprises.
However, the vast majority (about 95 percent of all investments) are as ‘equity
joint ventures@ (hezi jingying) and ‘cooperative or contractual
agreements@ (hezou jingying) (Leung 1990: 406; Thoburn, et al. 1990:
16-7). For both of these arrangements,
foreign investors and local Chinese government entities or state companies
share the cost, management, and profits of a factory or hotel.
Most Hong Kong compatriots speak the same language as in neighboring Guangdong province where they have placed 80 percent of their investments in China. Hong Kong accounts for approximately two-thirds of all foreign investments in Guangdong Province (Thoburn, et al. 1990: 1). Hong Kong developers are also leading the way in real estate investment in the PRC, and in particular in the development of resorts and golf courses (Karp 1992; PB 1993; Ross and Rosen 1992).<