nau | english | rothfork | teaching | Taylor

Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (1995)
Notes, Questions & Answers & #1: "Overcoming Epistemology"

1. ". . . It is clear what overcoming epistemology has to mean. It will mean abandoning foundationalism." What does this mean? What is foundationalism?

It is the Platonic metaphysical outlook that believes in pre-existing, objective transcendentals, such as Forms. This outlook considers that actual events/objects are flawed examples/instances of ideal Forms. The question is how could these Forms exist? They are not physical objects. They are comparable to ideas that require language to exist.

2. On p. 3 Taylor talks about Platonic metaphysics & the machine metaphor of the 17^th c. (Newton), saying that knowing something meant that you could explain the (theoretical/mathematical) principles of which the phenomena was a logical (& determinative) effect. Taylor says that before this, in Europe, knowing something - in the outlook provided by Aristotle - meant what?

That "the mind (nous) becomes one with the object of thought. . . . Mind & object are informed by the same eidos." One can authentically know how to throw a pot, how to raise children, or how to govern a polis, without necessarily knowing foundational or ideal principles of which these would be instances. Know-how is genuine knowledge, not mere opinion or an instance of "my way is as good as your way" taste. Know-how is performative rather than conceptual or theoretical knowledge.

3. A (Platonic) correspondence or representational model/theory of truth says that the true concept/statement must be a photocopy of the original Form. However, "Aristotle's model could much better be described as participational [dynamic, developmental]: being informed by the same eidos, the mind participates in the being of the known object, rather than simply depicting [photocopying] it" (3). How can one "participate in the being of the known object"?

You answer this one (1).

4. According to Taylor, why does Platonic/Aristotelian epistemology make no sense today?

"This theory totally depends on the philosophy of Forms. Once we no longer explain the way things are in terms of the species [Form/ideal type] that inform them [i.e., of which the individual is an instance], this conception of knowledge is untenable [&] . . . almost unintelligible." Most of us doubt that Forms are "out there" floating around as objective patterns in the universe.

5. Taylor writes, "If Plato or Aristotle were right, the road to certainty [truth] couldn't be inward - indeed, the very notion of certainty would be different: defined more in terms of the kinds of being that admit of it . . . ," 5. Why would this be the case?

If transcendentals exist (e.g., justice, goodness, etc.), then "good" actions would replicate or actualize an instance of the Form. Choice or variation could only mar the process. The authority is not personal ("my choice"/inward/subjective); the standard would be objective & universal. Obedience & imitation would be the chief moral virtues as indeed they were in medievalism & in devotional forms of religion that profess in Forms.

What is the profound difference in Cartesian/modern epistemology?

It is not enough to have faith in ideals/Forms. Authority for truth shifts from the external/objective to the subjective. One's choice is made on the basis of logical self-evidency: "this choice makes sense to me." (This shift is illustrated by the Reformation. In Catholicism [& Islam] the believer was told how to pray (what to say) & how to live. In Protestantism, one had to decide individually how to pray & how to live by making personal deductions from the New Testament.)

6. According to the cybernetic/computer metaphor of the mind, how do human beings make their "way around rooms, streets, and gardens or pick up & manipulate the objects we use"?

There is a "widespread faith that our intelligent performances are ultimately to be understood in terms of formal operations." Do you see how this relies on Formalism or Platonic thought? Our behavior is thought to be an instance of general principle or code. "It is as though they [individuals] had been vouchsafed some revelation a priori that it must all be done by formal calculi." As in Plato, the math or code is considered more real than the behavior or skill that it supposedly explains.

7. According to Taylor, "To be free in the modern sense is to be self-responsible, to rely on your own judgment, to find your purpose in yourself." Doesn't this simply abandon (moral) truth & license Romantic anarchy? "My notions are as good as yours or anyone else's."  Consider Jean-Jacques Rousseau: "I am not made like any of those who are in existence.  If I am not better, at least I am different."   How can this position be reconciled to a belief in truth?

You answer this one (2).

8. On p. 12 Taylor rejects the foundationalism that runs from Plato through reductive (Modernist) science, saying that "What you get underlying our representations of the world . . . is not further [better or deeper] representation [Forms] but rather a certain grasp of the world that we have as agents in it." How does this affect epistemology?

Truth is defined as know-how, as appropriate technique or skill. Surgeons, pilots, scientists, & judges do something more than follow a logic diagram or computer program. They exercise judgment that relies on a global sense of know-how (cf. the unconscious).

9. The Western social theory spectrum looks like this:
(the individual has all rights) anarchy - Romanticism - Marxism - utilitarianism - Burke's conservatism - aristocracy - fascism -totalitarianism (society has all rights).

On p. 13 Taylor & pragmatists fall to the right of utilitarians (& left of historical fascists), claiming that much, if not all, of what is claimed as unique to the individual (what makes me uniquely me) is the result of what?

You answer this one (3).

10. If pragmatism rejects "moralities based purely on instrumental reason " (15), what kind of morality would it likely develop?

"Thick" descriptions (Clifford Geertz's anthropological term); historiography; a morality in which axioms/principles are replaced or at least supplemented with a recognition of contexts, of numerous situations & complications. Instead of 10 Commandments, we would have a thousand novels. Confucian ethics & Japanese etiquette illustrate a historical model of ethics derived from authoritative performance instead of absolutes. How does this work? Let's say that the question was how to play basketball. The answer is best found in the performance of Kobe, Shaq, Michael Jordan, or other "authoritative performances" rather than in rulebooks or theory.

11. What, according to Taylor, is wrong with Nietzsche & his postmodern followers? See p. 17.

"How do we adjudicate . . . dispute[s]?" For N. there is no objective (Platonic) standard/Form. Nor is there Aristotlean knowledge/know-how that is acknowledged as superior or that illustrates the right way to do something. All choices are arbitrary, hence without logical justification. This position entails abandoning philosophy/reason (including science) & moral truth, which N. condemns as rationalizations of a will-to-power.

On to #2: "The Validity of Transcendental Arguments"
17.08.02