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REMAKING WOMEN

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IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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CHAPTER 4

Schooled Mothers and Structured Play: Child Rearing in Turn-of-the-Century Egypt

OMNIA SHAKRY

THIS ESSAY attempts to explore some of the conjunctures and disjunctures between European colonial and metropolitan discourses and indigenous modernizing and nationalist discourses on women and mothering in turn-of-the-century Egypt. Tracing the proliferation of debates on motherhood and proper child rearing through a number of scientific-literary and religious journals, I will attempt to elaborate the changing conception of the "good mother" and proper mothering as situated within the contemporaneous discourses of domesticity.¹ I will be analyzing what Dipesh Chakrabarty has recently referred to as "*public* narratives of the nature of social life in the family."² Such narratives crystallized into a normative and didactic discourse that helped to re-create and redefine the parameters of what was considered ideal in conceptions of motherhood, child rearing, and domesticity within a colonial context.

A fundamental shift, I will argue, occurred at the turn of the century in which mothers came to be responsible for the physical, moral, and intellectual development of children within the nexus of a nascent nationalist discourse.³ With the onset of a "modernizing" discourse, the emphasis shifts in a number of ways toward the problematization of *tarbiya*⁴ (upbringing, education) and its recasting along scientific lines according to modern, hygienic, and rational principles for developing "productive members of society." As child rearing became localized within the realm of motherhood, its aim became the creation and cultivation of new types of children "acclimated to physical, mental, and moral work" and imbued with an ethic of industry and economy. This discursive shift and elaboration of a new notion of motherhood occurred at a juncture of colonial-hygienic discourse in which the onus would be placed on the competence of the Egyptian mother, with a consequent policy of encouraging the "rational upbringing of children" through private philanthropic and governmental organizations.

Motherhood, as taken up within the context of colonialism, was fundamental to the constitution of national identity and entailed the formation of a series of discursive practices that demarcated women as both a "locus of the coun-

try's backwardness" and a sphere of transformation to be reconstituted and raised up onto the plane of enlightened rationality.⁵ As such, it figures centrally in turn-of-the-century modernizing discourse and was essential to the nationalist project. Thus the focus on proper rational and scientific mothering is situated within both the colonial discourse on motherhood and the nationalist discourse on modernity.

Within the Egyptian colonial setting, untutored "ignorant" mothers were problematized by both colonial administrators and indigenous modernizing reformers as particularly unsuited for the preparation of a new generation. Those who asserted their unsuitability held up the example of an advanced and scientific European pedagogy to corroborate their argument, pointing to the relationship between proper mothering and the progress of the nation. Parallel European metropole discourses on mothering and the nation, aimed primarily at the lower classes, positioned women analogously as markers of progress and backwardness, but the concern for motherhood was often couched in terms of an imperial imperative, essential for the preservation of a national and cultural ascendancy and a concomitant concern with physical and racial degeneration.⁶

Moreover, discussions on proper mothering, in both the metropole and colony, intersected with philanthropic movements geared toward a pedagogy of the lower classes. Such discursive practices sought to isolate "internal others" (metropole lumpenproletariat; working-class mothers in both metropole and colony; poor whites in the colonies) and will be analyzed as an attempt to reconstitute motherhood along middle-class lines of rational-economic and scientific-hygienic domesticity and child rearing, serving both to efface and to recast class differences under the rubric of an "ideal mother." This helped to consolidate a bourgeois family form.⁷

The conjunctures between colonial and nationalist discourse on women are truly striking, and thus I hope to show that Egyptian discussions of motherhood need to be situated within the context of both colonial and anticolonial nationalist discourses on modernity. I attempt to draw attention to these continuities, focusing specifically upon the ways in which the colonial and nationalist projects intersected with issues related to gender and class. Analyzing views from both the liberal secular-nationalist and Islamist press, I attempt to highlight the common set of assumptions shared by both about the nature of mothering, child rearing, the progress of the nation, and the backwardness of Egyptians.

I also argue, however, that it would be wrong to presume that anticolonial nationalist discourses on motherhood, and in particular those of the Islamists, were merely parasitic upon colonial or European discourses. Crucial to the discourse of *tarbiya* was the indigenous concept of *adab*, entailing a complex of valued dispositions (intellectual, moral, and social), appropriate norms of behavior, comportment, and bodily habitus.⁸ Further, the formation of the

new "private sphere" within the Egyptian setting was fashioned within the parameters of a historically constituted Islamic discursive tradition. Both Westernized modernizing reformers and Islamist reformers situated their own projects as a defense of true Islam and a critique of *taqlid* (or blind imitation of customs and traditions). In particular, the advocacy of Islamic reform in the sphere of education and *tarbiya* on the part of the thinkers in the *salafiyya* movement was rooted in a desire for a national nonsecular modernity, producing a fundamental difference between the colonial and nationalist discourses on modernity.⁹

Islamist reformers were able to draw upon resources indigenous to the Islamic discursive tradition that emphasized the proper pedagogy for children, the cultivation of the body, and the moral education of the self as essential for the constitution of a rightly guided Islamic community. Such norms of pedagogy were complementary, and not antithetical, to the modernist disciplining of the body and rationalization of the household.

"THE MEN OF TOMORROW AND THE MOTHERS OF THE FUTURE"

The colonial project was marked by the intensive generation and elaboration of modes of knowledge production that would seek to contribute to the *moral and material* improvement of the native population. The discourse of uplifting an entire population onto a higher plane of material and moral well-being intersected with colonial representations and constructions of gender and segregation. Women, perceived as sequestered beings isolated from the machinery of "society," could be demarcated as "the locus of the country's backwardness" and would come to be instrumental in practices aimed at "social and political discipline."¹⁰ Colonial policy sought to "penetrate that 'inaccessible' space . . . and thus commence . . . to 'work from the inside out.'"¹¹

As Gayatri Spivak has pointed out, "imperialism's image as the establisher of the good society is marked by the espousal of woman as the object of protection from her own kind."¹² The particular interplay between British colonial discourse on Islam and women (with its rhetorical fetishization of the veil, seclusion, and polygamy), in which colonial discourse constructed the subject "woman" as a category to be isolated and penetrated, articulated with anticolonial nationalist discourse on that very same terrain.¹³ I will begin, then, with the earl of Cromer as I take *Modern Egypt* to be a hallmark text of the colonial period, laying the foundations for much of the later colonial discourse on the condition of women and the general standard of living of the Egyptian people. As Cromer elaborates, "The position of women in Egypt, and in Mohammedan countries generally, is, therefore, a fatal obstacle to the attainment of that elevation of thought and character which should accom-

pany the introduction of European civilisation, if that civilisation is to produce its full measure of beneficial effect. The obvious remedy would appear to be to educate the women."¹⁴ In fact, female education was perceived as one of the main contributions to the "moral and material" improvement of the Egyptians that the British had been able to achieve.¹⁵ Yet Cromer is quick to qualify his statement.

It, of course, remains an open question whether, when Egyptian women are educated, they will exercise a healthy and elevating influence over the men. . . . If it can be once admitted that no good moral results will accrue from female education in Egypt, then indeed, the reformer will despair of the cause of Egyptian education generally in the highest sense of the word. . . . [T]his much is well-nigh certain—that the reformer may instruct, may explain, he may argue, he may devise the most ingenious methods for the moral and material improvement of the people . . . but unless he proves himself able, not only to educate, but to elevate the Egyptian woman, he will never succeed in affording the Egyptian man . . . the only European education which is worthy of Europe.¹⁶

The colonial civilizing project, thus postulated, stood or fell with its ability to permeate and reconstruct the domain of women. These very same themes of the moral and material improvement of the Egyptian woman reverberate throughout nationalist discourse, which would later come to construct women as serving a productive function, as bearers of the nation and its children, essential for the development of a generation of morally upright, intellectually developed, and productive citizens.

Partha Chatterjee's discussion of Bengali Hindu anticolonial nationalist discourse has pointed to its situating of the "women's question" in an inner domain of spirituality, localized within the home and embodied by the feminine, enabling nationalist discourse to construct a cultural essence distinct from that of the West.¹⁷ Thus he states,

[N]ationalism did in fact provide an answer to the new social and cultural problems concerning the position of women in "modern" society, and . . . this answer was posited not on an identity but on a difference with the perceived forms of cultural modernity in the West. . . . [T]he relative unimportance of the women's question in the last decades of the nineteenth century is to be explained not by the fact that it had been censored out of the reform agenda or overtaken by more pressing and emotive issues of political struggle. The reason lies in nationalism's success in situating the "women's question" in an inner domain of sovereignty, far removed from the arena of political contest of the state.¹⁸

The case of Egypt highlights, I think, some of the dangers of generalizing across colonial or postcolonial histories. The "women's question" in Egypt clearly linked both the moral and material domains and articulated in complex ways with colonial discourse. Although Egyptian nationalist discourse clearly

sought to uphold women as a source of cultural integrity, it also localized them as an arena for the social, political, and cultural progress of the nation. That is to say, the advancement of the nation in the "material" fields of law, administration, economy, and statecraft¹⁹ was positioned in such a way that progress for the *umma*, or community, could not be achieved independently of progress in the domain of women, and more specifically mothers.

It is thus useful to view the positions women were placed in by colonial and nationalist discursive formations, as an articulatory practice that sought to reconstruct women, by protecting, advancing, or developing them, as *both* a domain of culture (Chatterjee's inner domain) and progress (outer domain). Nationalist discourse continuously situated women as the mothers of the (social and political) men of the future. The localization of proper and rational mothering as integral both to woman's primary definition and to the production of the nation was essential to such a process. This double "ideological work of gender" localized women as backward and ignorant but simultaneously delineated them as a sphere of transformation. It required both a positing of mothering as a naturalized and universal function of women and an assertion that Egyptian mothers were particularly unsuited for the preparation of the new generation.

In 1911 Shibli Shumayyil, a medical doctor who practiced and taught in Egypt, underscored the importance of motherhood in the creation and progress of a nation in an article entitled "Men of Tomorrow."²⁰ Shumayyil was particularly focused upon science as part of a rational universal faith and was concerned with issues of public health, hygiene, and welfare in Egypt. He states,

If you want to know the future of a country, look to their children, for they are the results of the past and the mark of the future. Look to their health, their *tarbiya*, and their education, from the time that they are a fetus in their mother's womb until the day they are born and raised in their mother's lap, until the day they leave the schools and are added to society as productive members. For it is on the basis of their health and plenitude that the community (*umma*) develops, and on the strength of their education and upbringing that its prosperity and success are achieved.²¹

In fact, a theme that threads through the turn-of-the-century literature in Egypt is the need to create a "generation of mothers" who would be able to care for the well-being of their children and hence secure the well-being and advancement of the family and the nation.²² Beth Baron has analyzed the discourse on mothers, morality, and nationalism, pointing to the ways in which "the women's question" was taken up in tandem with the "Egyptian question" by male authors, as well as female authors in the women's press at the turn of the century.²³ In contrast to Bengal, where Chatterjee has argued that the "women's question" disappeared with the rise of nationalist politics, the Egyptian nationalist movement took up the two questions si-

multaneously. Women's participation in anticolonial nationalist struggle was consistently framed in terms of their role as mothers of the nation. Liberal nationalists were eager to promote women's "progress" along the lines suggested by Qasim Amin.

Salama Musa, an intellectual and women's advocate, stated, "In those years there were two subjects that we used to discuss more than anything else, as they concerned the whole of Egyptian society. They were the English occupation, and Qasim Amin's movement for the liberation of women."²⁴ Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayyid, the editor of the nationalist newspaper of the *Umma* party, *Al-Jarida*, was equally involved in the "emancipation of women" and the reform of Egypt's current educational practices. As Albert Hourani states, al-Sayyid viewed education as the "only effective means to national maturity and real independence . . . even more important than the education given in the schools was that given in the family. 'The welfare of the family is the welfare of the nation' and the problem of the Egyptian family was at the heart of the problem of Egypt."²⁵ Within the nexus of anticolonial nationalist struggle, then, mothering took on a supplemented value: that of inculcating nationalist virtues in the face of colonial oppression.

Much of the discourse on the education of women and the importance of child rearing was gleaned from Qasim Amin's core text *The Liberation of Women (Tahrir al-mar'a)*, published in 1899. Amin, known for advocating "women's liberation" through education, the removal of the veil, and an end to seclusion, emphasized the importance of civilizing women in order to enable them to provide the proper "physical, intellectual, and moral upbringing" for their children, and hence to ensure the progress of the nation.²⁶ A brief discussion of Amin is useful because of the extent to which the arguments he puts forth on child rearing resonate in the later *tarbiya* literature.

Amin inextricably links the development and progress of the nation to the condition of women, a link that is forged precisely by women's ability to properly raise a generation of children. Indeed, this is how differences between nations are to be understood, for "we cannot consider traditions to be the same in a civilized nation as in an ignorant, barbaric one, because the behavior of every individual in a society is appropriate to the intellectual abilities of that society and to the method by which its children are brought up . . . [The] evidence of history confirms and demonstrates that the status of women is inseparably tied to the status of a nation."²⁷ Amin is quite keen to point out that "the inferiority of Egyptians is a consequence of their deprivation from this early education. An Egyptian child grows like a weed. . . ."²⁸ One of the points that he consistently underscores is the importance of mothering for the formation of "adult men."²⁹

Amin begins a discussion titled "Women and the Nation" with an overview of European global hegemony, linking it to Darwinian theories of natural selection and survival of the fittest. How, according to Amin, can Egyptians

"preserve their existence," "strive toward security and survival," and "gain control over [their] own wealth"—how can "the land . . . justifiably belong to its inhabitants rather than to strangers"—in the face of this battle? It is, indeed, "those intangible intellectual and education capabilities that are central to every other type of power." As such, for a nation to survive in the face of this form of competition, it must be "concerned with the structure of its families, for the family is the foundation of a country. Consequently, since the mother is the foundation of the family, her intellectual development or underdevelopment becomes the primary factor in determining the development or underdevelopment of the country."³⁰

Amin's central concern lay with the proper cultivation of mothers who would be able to create the necessary "men of the future." And indeed, the expressions "the men of tomorrow and the mothers of the future" (*rijal al-ghad wa ummahat al-mustaqbal*)³¹ surface repeatedly in the *tarbiya* literature and signal the interconnections between motherhood and national progress.

EMPIRE IS ROOTED IN THE HOME

And some day, perhaps, the future mothers of the nation will be taught and trained in vital matters, vital for mothers and therefore for babies and empires.

(Caleb Saleeby)³²

How intimate is the connexion which exists between the women of England, and the moral character maintained by this country in the scale of nations.

(Sara Ellis)³³

Homi Bhabha has recently provided a useful theoretical venue from which to conceptualize the complex workings of national identity formation. Pointing to the "ambivalence that haunts the idea of the nation," he suggests that we evoke the ambivalent encoding of national subjects as objects of a nationalist pedagogy and subjects of a performative signification that re-creates the nation-people as subjects of a coherent national culture and life. By paying attention to the ways in which cultural and political identity is negotiated through the partial fixation of meanings, especially within the marginal spaces of national identity, he suggests ways in which the fractal nature of nationalist discourse may be opened up for analysis. The double movement of encoding what lies inside the nation but is also exterior to it (e.g., working class women, peasantry) as well as the Other outside (colonized, colonizing Others) allows us to see the multiple and fractal constitution of colonial and metropolitan national identity as formed against the multiple sites and boundaries of an Other.³⁴

Discourses on mothering in both the metropole and the colony were integral to just such a process of the constitution of national identity. In what discursive field were the discourses on motherhood and the nation structured in the metropole? Linda Colley has discussed the construction of British identity during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in terms of the "forging" of an identity not "because of an integration and homogenization of disparate cultures. Instead, Britishness was superimposed over an array of internal differences in response to contact with the Other, and above all, in response to conflict with the Other."³⁵

How were women in particular situated within the discursive field of British national identity? Anna Davin has discussed the redefinition of women's roles in early-twentieth-century Britain and provides a useful contiguous narrative of the discourse on mothering in the colonial metropole. Davin elaborates upon the ways in which the emergent ideology of motherhood and domesticity and the burgeoning of official and private activity centered upon public health, domestic hygiene, and child welfare during the first decade of the 1900s, and how these intersected with issues of class and imperial domination. The concern for proper mothering was often couched in terms of national and imperial interests, and a concern for racial degeneration. Children were posited as "citizens of tomorrow" and a "national asset" upon which "the future of the country and empire" depended.³⁶ Consequently, concern over the (white) British population's birthrate intensified. Fears about depopulation mushroomed and the focus turned to women and mothers as a site of the reproduction of the nation and the maintenance of racial health and purity. Women became "mothers of the race."

At this juncture of empire building, then, the sound condition of women and children was posited as essential for the future of England. The production of a nation healthy "in body and mind" was localized in motherhood as mothers became responsible for the physical development and character formation of children. The elevation of motherhood was linked to the production and preparation of the next generation as both an imperial and a domestic (social) obligation. Dr. Caleb Saleeby, a chief proponent of maternalism and eugenics in the early twentieth century, quite clearly illustrates many of these intersections between race, empire, nation, and motherhood. In discussing the complementary campaigns of maternalism and eugenics, Saleeby states in his characteristically polemical style,

We are about to discover that the true politics is domestics, since there is no wealth but life and life begins at home. We are going to have the right life born, and we are going to take care of it when it is born. . . . We propose to rebuild the living foundations of empire. To this end we shall preach a new imperialism . . . demanding that over all her [England's] legislative chambers there be carved the more than golden words, "There is no Wealth but Life."³⁷

His views on politics and domestics are clearly delineated. He states that "[t]he history of nations is determined not on the battlefield but in the nursery, and the battalions which give lasting victory are the battalions of babies. The politics of the future will be domestics."³⁸ Raising the level of maternal hygiene, sanitation, and education became important because "empire is rooted at home." Mothers were cast as builders and preservers of state and empire and hence also as repositories of national identity. Indeed, "parenthood necessarily takes its place as the supreme factor of national destiny . . . true patriotism must therefore concern itself with the conditions and the quality of parenthood. . . ." ³⁹ His was a "eugenic patriotism."⁴⁰

Saleeby laments what he perceives to be the inordinate attention paid to the logistics of empire at the expense of the cultivation of race culture. "Today our historians and politicians think in terms of regiments and tariffs . . . the time will come when they must think in terms of babies and motherhood. We must think in such terms too if we wish Great Britain to be much longer great."⁴¹ One of the questions that obsessed him was why empires and imperial peoples degenerate. While acknowledging the importance of an accumulated heritage of knowledge, art, and power, Saleeby emphasized that the maintenance of empire depended on the upkeep of the race.

If the race degenerates . . . the time will come when its heritage is too much for it. . . . If an Empire has been built the degenerate race cannot sustain it. *There is no wealth but life; and if the quality of the life fails, neither battleships nor libraries nor symphonies nor anything else will save a nation.* Empires and civilisations, then, have fallen, despite the strength and magnitude of the superstructure, because the foundations decayed. . . . Acquired progress will not compensate for racial or inherent decadence. If the race is going down, it will not compensate to add another colony to your empire; on the contrary the bigger the empire the stronger must be the race.⁴²

Ann Stoler has pointed to the importance of maintaining the European family and bourgeois respectability to the consolidation of the boundaries of rule in the colonies.⁴³ Early-twentieth-century eugenics discourse in metropole France, England, and Germany emphasized the importance of European women of good stock as a source of national vitality and hence glorified the "cult of motherhood" while simultaneously placing it under scientific scrutiny.⁴⁴ Stoler discusses the transplanting of eugenics discourse and its principles in the colonies, "which pronounced what kind of people should represent Dutch or French rule, how they should bring up their children, and with whom they should socialize . . . [A] common discourse was mapped out onto different immediate exigencies of empire as variations on a gender-specific theme exalting motherhood and domesticity."⁴⁵

Part of the "imperial imperatives" of colonial women was the upholding of European middle-class morality and the concomitant stress upon the culti-

vation of hygienic and economic domestic science, cleanliness, and moral upbringing. Although the focus on women's domestic and maternal roles, and particularly child rearing, was linked to metropole concerns of national welfare, the colonial situation initiated highly specific issues regarding motherhood and reproduction, such as anxieties about racial purity, degeneracy, sterility, and enervation in the colonies.⁴⁶

Metropole discourses, then, cast motherhood as an imperial imperative, essential for the preservation of national and cultural ascendancy. Proper child rearing thus became a point of condensation for a series of discourses on nationhood, race, culture, and civility. Within the Egyptian colonial setting, untutored "ignorant" mothers were problematized, and motherhood was posited as a locus of national backwardness, in contrast to the scientificity of European methods of child rearing. In the context of colonialism, among both colonized and colonizing nations, mothers were positioned as repositories of national identity, as well as markers of national progress or backwardness.

I turn now to a more detailed discussion of the prescriptive literature on child rearing in order to demonstrate how it was recast as a rational and scientific practice of women essential for modernity. Such scientific specifications, in both the metropole and the colony, entailed an idealization of middle-class norms. Further, in the case of Egypt, these discussions often set up explicit contrasts between local and foreign child-rearing practices, in order to provide a critique of "traditional" Egyptian pedagogy. The similarities between Egyptian and British metropolitan nationalist discourse both on the importance of mothering for the nation and on maternal ignorance are truly striking.

SCIENTIFIC CHILD REARING

How exactly were Egyptian women to become suitable "mothers of the future"? Baron has addressed the new discourses of domesticity⁴⁷ and child rearing that arose at the turn of the century.⁴⁸ Pointing to the tendency in the medieval literature to address issues of child rearing and the proper moral and religious training of children to the father, a point elaborated by Najmabadi in this volume (chapter 3), Baron notes the shift in the late nineteenth century "in focus and audience from the father to the mother as the central figure in shaping the child . . . [and as] a critical influence on the child's early life."⁴⁹ A proliferation of pedagogical-didactic treatises and articles appeared, discussing aspects of mothering ranging from proper health care for pregnant women to the importance of breast-feeding and the denigration of wet nurses.⁵⁰ Perhaps more significant, "[t]he importance of the endeavor [motherhood] was the theme taken up by the new tarbiya literature, which instructed women on raising and socializing their children. . . . Taken together the literature argued that child raising was no longer a job to be delegated to servants or relatives.

Mothers were directed to spend more time with their children, closely supervising their health and development."⁵¹ Indeed, in *The New Woman*, Qasim Amin points explicitly to his omission of "the father's role in bringing up children. This is not an oversight but a recognition of the fact that the central figure in this activity is the mother."⁵²

The specificity of this period's prescriptive literature, in both metropole and colony, marks the era as one concerned with the demarcation and constitution of autonomous spheres of domesticity, child rearing, and schooling, as well as the intensive pedagogy and instruction felt necessary for the construction of those spheres along the axes of modernity. That is to say, the discourses of domesticity and child rearing required a series of discursive practices that constructed them as such, as well as a problematization that defined them in their present state as inefficient, irrational, and unproductive, and hence impediments to national progress. The emphasis on proper scientific and rational mothering was thus positioned in terms of the progress of the nation, conceptualized in terms of the health, wealth, and vitality of the population.⁵³ Through proper mothering, women could be integrated into the "fabric of the nation" in the most productive manner possible.

Most relevant to our discussion is the privileging of the child and the medicalization of the family, as Michel Foucault has discussed, as a result of which the correct management of childhood became a nodal point in eighteenth-century Europe. The family emerged as "a dense, saturated, permanent continuous physical environment which envelops, maintains and develops the child's body." The nexus of obligations—and Foucault here confines his discussion to obligations of a physical kind (e.g., hygiene)—came to bind parents and children alike, turning the family into a "localized pedagogical apparatus," an agent of medicalization focused on the health of children. "The healthy, clean, fit body, [and] a purified, cleansed, aerated domestic space" figure prominently in the formation of the modern family.⁵⁴ We will have reason later to question Foucault's emphasis upon the disciplinization of the family as an individualizing (rather than, say, communal) technology of selfhood.

In nineteenth-century Europe, as the call for proper "mothers of the next generation" was being made, a didactic discourse emerged directed toward the working classes. The problem of childbearing and childrearing was localized and attributed to the "ignorance" of working-class mothers, who were faulted for their inability to teach children disciplined habits. Such maternal ignorance was often blamed for faulty hygiene and neglect of children as discussions of infant mortality and child welfare gained popularity, and justified reforms such as physical education, feeding schoolchildren, and providing food, clean milk, hygiene, and cookery classes for girls and mothers.⁵⁵

Education and pedagogy for working-class mothers sought to address this maternal ignorance in nutrition, diet, and sanitation through lectures, pamphlets, manuals, infant consultations, health visitors, and ladies' sanitary asso-

ciations.⁵⁶ These associations helped set a middle-class standard of hygiene. Schools were often crucial to the attempt to transform working-class life by instilling an ideology of domesticity and the habits of discipline.⁵⁷ These forms of pedagogy helped disseminate a middle-class ideal of motherhood and domesticity as a national duty. They constructed divergences from the domestic ideal of middle-class family life as moral and psychological deficiencies, thereby serving as an eraser of class markers.⁵⁸ The overriding importance of motherhood and the consolidation of the bourgeois family and form, with mother as child-rearer and home-keeper, thus linked the health and wealth of the nation and intersected with the maintenance of empire and the changing conditions of production under industrial capitalism.⁵⁹

The elaboration of this new conception of child rearing, conceived now as a full-time occupation of mothers, along with the perception of childhood as a critical stage of life requiring its own norms and practices, marks an important moment in the consolidation of a bourgeois domestic sphere in Egypt. To constitute the Egyptian family as modern would require both its rationalization and disciplinization. Juan Cole has discussed feminism in turn-of-the-century Egypt as reflective of indigenous transformations related to the differential impact of Egypt's integration into the world market on the upper-middle and lower-middle classes.⁶⁰ He argues that feminism was more ideologically suited to the needs of the upper-middle classes, as it served to bolster the transition from the lavish aristocratic lifestyle of the Turco-Circassian elite to the more rationalized ideal of the European bourgeoisie—an ideal fit for the new agrarian capitalist class.

For our purposes, Cole's elaboration of the very class-specific nature of feminism in Egypt is key. It points to the extent to which an idealized bourgeois private sphere related to class-specific concerns (e.g., seclusion, veiling, child rearing by nannies rather than mothers), reflected attitudes toward European values, and addressed the new role of the Ottoman-Egyptian elite at the turn of the century. Amin himself, it should be recalled, situated his reforms as applicable to the upper classes, as rural and lower-class women did not have the same restrictions.⁶¹

Discursive practices parallel to those in Europe surrounding motherhood were widespread among the Egyptian upper and middle classes within the colonial setting. For instance, faulting what he perceives as an "exaggerated" belief in fate as preordaining both virtue and corruption, Qasim Amin points to the interaction between heredity and environment, especially the stimulation of the senses that shape the child's disposition.⁶² Amin targets the same image as was dwelt on by colonial administrators and travelers: ignorant, superstitious mothers, unaware of the proper rules of hygiene, who will be unable to mold children properly. These themes recur in the prescriptive literature on child rearing I discuss below. A child's upbringing, we are told, hinges upon a mother's ability to imbue a child's personality with good qualities.

Ignorant mothers, on the other hand, simply allow their children to do whatever they please and to observe immoral actions that may lead to corrupt habits; they neglect their children's cleanliness, encourage them to be lazy, and raise them to have superstitious beliefs in charms, evil spirits, and *jinn*.⁶³ It is precisely Egyptian mothers' refusal to shape their children's personality according to proper conceptions of what is hygienic, moral, and industrious that Amin is critiquing.

As we have seen, then, with Qasim Amin, the criticism leveled against Egyptian mothers related both to their ignorance of the rules of health, hygiene, and *adab* and to their pernicious inculcation of superstitious beliefs in the minds of their children. Shibli Shumayyil similarly encodes the cultural evolution of nations through a social Darwinian discussion of mothering, echoing many of the complaints that Amin had articulated.

Mothers are the first and foremost factor to influence children, and their influence is far greater than that of the father. . . . What the child learns from the mother in the way of natural inclinations, habits, manners, and rational thought is most influential, and nothing thereafter exceeds its influence regardless of its strength. Imagine, then, a mother who does not know the rules of hygiene or manners (*adab*) . . . , is ignorant of science, and knows nothing but superstitions and common sayings that corrupt her mind. She might, for example, leave her child dirty to avert the evil eye, or teach her children to fear . . . ghouls and spirits! After she nurtures him with this milk of ignorance, she then leaves him with a wet nurse, who does not favor the child or treat him kindly in any way. . . . Can you imagine the state of this poor child's health, morals, and mind? Imagine the difference when this child meets another whose mother is in the vanguard in terms of what develops her mind, is polite and familiar with all the rules of proper, scientific manners (*adab*), and whose nobility derives from her simplicity in life, her *tarbiya*, and her cleanliness. She does not have superstitious beliefs that she plants in her child's head until his ideas are corrupt; rather, her *tarbiya* leaves his reason free and unfettered by ignorance and superstition. She cares for his health, his bodily cleanliness, his clothing, food, and drink, and allows for sufficient air in his room. Judging between these two children will be as easy as judging between the two mothers, and this difference is further evidenced in differences between nations. Thus will we find there are differences between the children of various nations, by which the civilized nations emerge victorious.⁶⁴

Shumayyil's discussion of mothering not only encodes a logic of progress and civilization but also serves to localize the development of nations within a domestic space. The home in general, and mothers in particular, are demarcated as the locus of social disorder—expressed as ignorance, superstition, immorality, or lack of hygiene.

A final example is provided by Saleh Effendi Hamdi Hammad in an excerpt taken from his book *For the Sake of Life (Fi sabil al-hayat)* and reprinted in

Al-Hilal in 1907.⁶⁵ In the piece, entitled "Proper Child Rearing," he distinguishes among three types of *tarbiya* that correlate with three phases of life and socialization.⁶⁶ His typology illustrates the compartmentalization that modern socialization was thought to need in order to be effective:

[N]atural or physical *tarbiya (al-tarbiya al-tabaiyya)*: this is the *tarbiya* of bodies with a view to all the necessary health measures encompassing proper food and drink, clothing, rest, and physical exercise, because the strength of the body is one of the most important ways to develop and strengthen the mental faculties and to spiritualize the self. . . . The second type is mental or rational *tarbiya (al-tarbiya al-'aqliyya)*, which entails the use of science and information in order to develop the mental faculties; this is usually acquired in schools and libraries, although it benefits greatly from the proper environment. . . . The third type of *tarbiya* is moral *tarbiya (al-tarbiya al-adabiyya)*. . . if a person's actions are not built on the principles and components of morality . . . then it follows that we will not find these righteous characteristics in him and that he will increase in evil and will be a negative force in society.⁶⁷

These three "schools" of *tarbiya*, as Hammad refers to them, have three corollaries in the child's phases of socialization: the family in which the child is brought up, the school in which the child learns the necessary principles of science and knowledge, and the society in which he lives.

Representations of backward mothers and unhealthy children served to prop up a bourgeois ideal of motherhood and rationalize a series of pedagogical and philanthropic interventions that placed women and children within a nexus of regulatory and supervisory controls. Such controls, however, were never purely repressive. Rather, they functioned as positive injunctions defining what a good Egyptian mother should be—if she were to care for the health and welfare of her children and, by extension, the nation.

SCHOOLED MOTHERS AND STRUCTURED PLAY

As stated earlier, nineteenth-century Europe was the site of a series of reform movements that sought to isolate and problematize the care children were receiving and provide them with more "stimulating environments." Foremost among these movements was the kindergarten and day-care movement in imperial Germany. Articles in *Al-Hilal* and *Al-Muqtataf* often described the European kindergarten movements as models to be emulated. Both journals usually carried columns giving practical advice and tips for mothers and housewives on child rearing and household management.⁶⁸ Many of the pieces discussed developments in these fields in other contexts, primarily Anglo-American and European. For instance, two published in the November 1903 issue of *Al-Hilal* dealt with the importance of kindergartens or some form

of structured play for children.⁶⁹ One of the articles described the German kindergarten movement, as developed by Froebel. Pointing to Froebel's discovery that the development and health of plants was most influenced by their early stages of care, and to his later application of the principle to humans, the author is careful to show the earlier European origins of the idea. From Pestalozzi in the late eighteenth century onward, with the development of "play schools" or "schools for infants," we are told, the importance of mothers' proper upbringing of children in their first years of life was acknowledged, and particularly the inadequate care that poor mothers provided for their children.⁷⁰ Froebel's project, the article continues, differed from these earlier movements in that

its purpose is to raise children such that they are acclimated to physical, mental, and moral work in this world, without exposing their health or mind to any harm. In his observation and monitoring of children's nature, Froebel noticed that physical activity is of the utmost importance, followed by mental activity, as may be seen in a comparison between an unresponsive child and a child who actively responds to and engages with his environment. . . . What we may conclude from all of this is that children must be trained in whatever cultivates their talents and refines their morals but does not tax their minds or tire their bodies. This is why Froebel developed lessons on the principles of play and music in which children may be comfortable and be educated from the ages of two to six. . . . It did not take long for the results of these schools to be visible and to popularize themselves all over Europe and the United States, and there can be no doubt that [this movement] has greatly affected the bodies and minds of [these nations'] people.⁷¹

The articles highlight the European origins of play schools or schools for infants and, more important, try to show the connection between the exercising of children's bodies and minds and the development or advancement of European nations.

This last point is forcefully made in a March 1913 piece in *Al-Muqtataf* entitled "Child Rearing." The article begins with a discussion of infant mortality. "Every child's death," we are told, "deprives the nation of a man or woman in the future." After acknowledging the infant's particular susceptibility to illness, the article asserts that more than half of all infant deaths may be attributed to "the ignorance and negligence of mothers."⁷² Citing European progress in reducing infant mortality, the article refers specifically to the decreased rate of infant death in Paris following the recent opening of institutes for the instruction of mothers (*ma'ahid li-irshad al-ummahat*) in the proper sanitation, hygiene, and nutrition of infants. Supervised by doctors and run by nannies, the schools required mothers to come once a week to hear lectures and advice to mothers on proper child rearing, and they supervised and carefully monitored the progress of children (weight, general health, cleanliness). The two factors considered most important in child care were cleanliness and sani-

tation. Mothers were advised to bathe their children daily in the morning, and with respect to nutrition the doctor would specify the type and amount of food mothers should give their children. After diatribes against swaddling and artificial feeding, the article ends with some basics of child care: "a child must be exposed to light and air, and must be assigned specific times for feeding, sleeping, and bathing every day. His cleanliness must be cared for as well as everything he eats or comes in contact with. He must be allowed space for movement, in order for his body to develop properly."⁷³

TOWARD AN ETHIC OF ECONOMY

One of the trends in the *tarbiya* literature was to encourage mothers to care for their own children, thus consolidating and maintaining both class and cultural divisions. Servants were often vilified as corrupting morals with their ignorance and bad character and indeed even destroying the possibility of building noble character traits in children, a discourse that widened the gap between children raised by nannies and those raised by their mothers.⁷⁴

Similar discourses emerged that called into question both the lower classes' ability to care for children, owing to harsh environments, and the extravagance of the upper classes, who produced indolent, slovenly, and unproductive children unaware of the importance of an ethic of economy or labor. Both types of argument attempted to inculcate an ethic of rational child rearing, guided by industry and economy. In a 1905 piece entitled "The Woman and Household Chores," the editor cites an article published in a nineteenth-century American magazine in which the author discusses the degradation of women and their children's health. The quotations selected are indicative of contemporary anxieties perceived to be plaguing the upper-class Egyptian household:

[S]he stated, "there is no cure for this deterioration except for avoiding the dangers that threaten the nation by teaching women household chores. Just as our ancestors taught their women, so must we teach them cooking and baking and train them to raise their children and to pay attention to household care and management," and then she described the wealthy woman and said, "How can the [wealthy] woman who is concerned only with extravagance and beautification properly raise her children, when she is distracted from them by taking care of herself, and she simply hands them over to nannies, because she considers nothing but herself important?" And much of that statement is applicable to us.⁷⁵

The focus on upper-class women's ability to participate in domestic management and to raise their children properly had become a contentious issue.

Labiba Hashim, discussed in more detail below, was also quick to fault the wealthy for leaving the care of their children to servants, warning that they would not be able to create men and women of the future. Excess lavishness,

she argued in her 1911 lectures, lead to the cultivation of selfishness, slovenliness, and laziness. She continued, "When parents know how to . . . instill the proper attitudes and tendencies toward work, economy, uprightness, and modesty, they will find their children one day serious men who will work toward the betterment of themselves and humanity and be loyal to the nation, and well-mannered cultured women who will be able to raise their children according to the proper rules of *adab* and be proud of them."⁷⁶ Industry and economy were perceived as among the most important habits to inculcate for all classes. In a 1903 piece giving "advice to the children of the wealthy," the author, Ahmed Hafez, warns against the phenomenon of

wealthy children who detest work and consider humans created for food, drink, and the enjoyment of the pleasures of the body. . . . They are in grave error and have exposed themselves to the dangers of the self (*nafs*). . . . Their parents have also endangered their wealth, for if they die and leave the wealth that they have created, with great effort, to their sons who do not understand the meaning of earning, they will surely squander all that their parents have worked for. If they do lose their wealth, it would have been better had they been born poor, for the poor at least have their strength and health, which is the capital of the poor. . . . The only solution, then, is to provide them with knowledge and develop their rational faculties, which would fortify their future. Knowledge . . . is the only true inheritance; money is only a supplement. . . . Isn't the wise thing for parents to do, then, to teach and train their children, for money will be useless if the child cannot use it wisely. Indeed, an ignorant wealthy person would be better off had he been born poor. If, however, the wealthy child is left with wealth and developed reason, he will be a most useful person.⁷⁷

Similarly, a 1908 entry under the rubric of "Household Management," a column that appeared regularly in *Al-Muqtataf*, entitled "Child Rearing according to the Principle of Economy," attempts to communicate the importance of raising children with an ethic of economy:

[I]f you compare the differences among people in terms of their industry and economy, you will find that [this aspect of character] harks back to whether they were raised with an ethic of economy in their childhood. Those raised on economy, even if their parents are wealthy, will know the value of money and will not waste it, and will understand the value of time, health, and labor. . . . Those raised on improvidence, even if their parents are poor, or who do not know the value of time, health, and labor, will live an idle and indolent life and will leave this world without having made any impact.⁷⁸

The article then continues to emphasize the necessity of teaching children, especially of the wealthy, the value of labor and the necessity of *tarbiya* and education regardless of individual or familial wealth. America is held up as an example of a country in which emphasis is placed upon teaching children the

value of labor, and an anecdotal illustration is given about teaching children the value of money and of saving through a system of chores in the home performed in exchange for small wages. This applies equally for boys and girls since "the girl who is taught to help her mother in the home will be a judicious wife able to run her household." But "the most important principles to inculcate in children are industry and economy."⁷⁹

Educating mothers in scientific child rearing and the importance of an ethic of economy was part and parcel of the nineteenth-century transformation of *tarbiya*. This entailed the modernist demarcation of the "public" and the "private" into separate spheres and related to new conceptions of the space of the household, as separate from politics, economy, and statecraft. Women, now conceived of as "mothers of the future," were integral to the construction of the home as a rationalized space of order and cleanliness now referred to as *tadbir al-manzil*. At the same time, proper child rearing was inserted into a larger framework of modern education and schooling.

Child rearing came to be understood as a public responsibility, essential for the constitution of morally upright, productive, efficient citizens of the nation. The demands of "this world" necessitated the creation and cultivation of new types of children "acclimated to physical, mental, and moral work" and imbued with an ethic of industry and economy. The home was meant to provide the groundwork for a national future by preparing children for citizenship and, ultimately, the nation for modernity.

THE IGNORANCE OF MOTHERS

In what follows I would like to juxtapose two sets of discussions on child rearing in order to illustrate the extent to which feminist authors in the liberal-secular press and the Islamist press shared a common set of assumptions about the nature of mothering, child rearing, the progress of the nation, and the backwardness of the Egyptians. Despite the very real differences in these discourses, I want to highlight the extent to which women were similarly localized as a sphere of backwardness and defined as individuals who *were* to be uplifted. Nevertheless, the two sets of discussions differed substantively regarding the manner in which this uplifting should be done and the impetus behind the reform of the family in the first place.⁸⁰

After discussing a series of lectures given by Labiba Hashim at the Egyptian University in 1911, I will turn to the writings of Malak Hifni Nassif. I do this not with the intent of effacing the important differences between writers such as Nassif who explicitly situate their reforms within an Islamic discursive tradition, and others who do not, a point to which I return later. Rather, it is to illustrate how a fundamental shift occurred at the turn of the century that affected a wide range of thinkers.

Labiba Hashim, a Syrian editor and writer who migrated to Egypt at the turn of the century, was a prominent member of the women's press and edited the journal *Young Woman of the East (Fatat al-sharq)* from 1906 to 1939. A member of the Women's Educational Alliance, she was active in both women's and educational reform.⁸¹ Hashim begins her lectures on child rearing, published later as *Kitab fi al-tarbiya*, by emphasizing the importance of proper child rearing for the country, as this is the principle manner in which useful and contributing members of society are produced. Nevertheless, she faults contemporary mothers for doing little to facilitate this process, despite the best of intentions and personal character traits.

[Good intentions and character traits] are not enough for knowing how to care for the health of our children and the stimulation of their minds. *Tarbiya* is a wide field of knowledge, and it is not adequate for child-rearers to be of sound constitution and morals; they must learn the knowledge necessary for the proper upbringing of children until they earn the right to care for children who will be the men and women of the future.⁸²

Unfortunately, according to Hashim, the difficulty of learning the science of *tarbiya* had led many men and women to simply leave the task of child rearing to governesses or teachers, in contrast to the response of Europeans and Americans of the era who "treat it [child rearing] as more than a science, and so their nations have advanced and their peoples progressed astonishingly while we still remain ignorant of the rules of *tarbiya* . . . and we do not teach parents how to raise their children."⁸³

Hashim praises recent attempts in Egypt to reform schools but states that this in no way absolves parents, especially mothers, of the responsibilities of child rearing. Iterating the contemporary theme that the early years of childhood are the most essential for the development of the intellect, she states,

The mother is more essential to the proper development of the child, and *tarbiya* is mostly in her hands. There is no doubt that the early years are those in which the child's reason is formed and in which he is most susceptible to habituation and external influences. It is therefore a grave oppression for a mother to be ignorant of the rules of *tarbiya* since she will raise her child according to whatever is in her mind of corrupt principles and ill beliefs, which will be impossible to remove later.⁸⁴

In a rhetorical trope quite common to the *tarbiya* literature, and seen above in Qasim Amin, Hashim asks us to imagine a child whose mother is steeped in ignorance and engages in all types of superstitious practices, forcing her child to wear amulets and leaving him dirty to avert the evil eye. This child, we are told, will remain unaffected by the entire process of schooling. And even if the child is from a wealthy family, "he will be no better than ignorant illiterates or lowly vagrants."⁸⁵

The central problem of Egypt, then, according to Hashim, is the "ignorance of mothers of the principles of hygiene." Hashim even cites studies on the rate of infant death (Egypt's is among the highest) and explains that infant mortality may be correlated with the backwardness of a nation.⁸⁶ Mothers, whether ignorant or educated, are ignorant of the process of child rearing and know nothing of the rules of health, hygiene, and manners. Thus she states, "This is what called me to *tarbiya* as a topic of research, in order that we [may] find ways to improve *tarbiya* by teaching girls in schools the rules of health, hygiene, and *adab* in preparation for the day that they will become mothers, and in order for them to recognize their duties as parents. In this way our society may advance and reform itself through a generalization of proper *tarbiya*."⁸⁷ "*Tarbiya*," Hashim explains, "is a science that entails the inculcation of the good virtues in the child and the removal of evil germs." It is a two-pronged process of physical *tarbiya* (*tarbiya badaniyya*) and the training of the child's disposition (*tahdhib al-'aqida*), in contrast to the common pattern in which children of the fellahin and those of the intelligentsia are raised to develop only one of the two principles.⁸⁸ Hashim's emphasis on the unitary nature of *tarbiya* for all classes, and the equal implication of the upper classes and fellahin alike in ignorant child rearing practices, highlights the extent to which the ideology of motherhood being promulgated entailed its embourgeoisement.

Malak Hifni Nassif, or "Searcher in the Desert" (Bahithat al-Badiya) as she was then known, was quite concerned in both her lectures and her articles with the reform of *tarbiya* and education. Nassif, who graduated from Saniyya Teacher Training College, was active as a teacher, writer, and lecturer. Many of her articles appeared in *Al-Jarida*, the newspaper of the nationalist *Umma* party during the first and second decades of the twentieth century.⁸⁹ Strident in her critique of both current child rearing practices in the home and contemporary schooling for girls, she advocated the dual reform of the home and female education. For Nassif, girls who were not offered the opportunity of schooling were unjustly deprived, but at the same time schools could not be deemed solely responsible for the "retrogression of females," as the mere fact of sending girls to school was insufficient for the process of *tarbiya*. In fact, she feared that many of the benefits, like orderliness, that would be obtained from the education of girls and could be usefully applied to the home, would be corrupted by a poor home environment. This was especially the fault of "ignorant" mothers. Nassif recounts a story told to her by a schoolmistress regarding the "filthiness" of her female students. She uses this as a paradigmatic example of the "vast difference" between the English mother and her Egyptian counterpart with respect to their knowledge of the rules of *tarbiya*.⁹⁰

In a lecture in which she discussed the importance of female education and work outside the home, Nassif clearly points out the ill effects of female ignorance. "We know that the deficiencies of our primary *tarbiya* and that of our young peers is no doubt related to the ignorance of our mothers. . . . and

the home will have its own specific impact regardless of the effort expended by schools on educating and disciplining (*tahdhib*) minds and morals.⁹¹ She saw *tarbiya* and education as inextricably linked, faulting those who would wish to separate the two. Further, it was not knowledge that ruined the morals of girls, but faulty or insufficient *tarbiya* (*al-tarbiya al-naqisa*). "The home is the edifice upon which *tarbiya* should be built, and if homes are not appropriate for the improvement of the *tarbiya* of our children, then we should work for their reform." Nassif argued that it would be simply wrong to blame schools for though they have an influence upon *tarbiya*, the flaw is in the family (*al-'ayb fi al-usra*).⁹²

How did Nassif view the purpose of the *tarbiya* of girls generally, and Egyptians in particular? Proper *tarbiya* should aim to make women useful members of the body politic and should prepare them for their roles as wives and mothers. It is clear that the form of female education she was advocating related to the practicalities of what were perceived as gendered differences in nature, tasks, and futures. For instance, girls needed to be educated sentimentally, to pity the poor and less fortunate; they also needed to be physically trained in order not to succumb to any of the illnesses currently afflicting educated girls (poor sight, infertility, and the like). Nassif found the problem of poor physical health among educated girls particularly troubling, as it endangered their reproductive capacities as well as the health of the new generation. A decrease in births among the educated would be especially harmful, as it would negate any possible future benefit accrued from mothers who knew the rules of hygiene, whose children would inevitably be better cared for in health and manners. Girls also needed to be educated practically in the skills of household management, and Nassif suggests the incorporation of a practical household training component into their education.⁹³

Nassif was often solicited for advice to women about improving or uplifting themselves. She recommended such innovations as compulsory primary education for all classes of girls; opening schools for girls at the primary and secondary level; teaching religion in girls' schools; having at least one Egyptian woman overseer in each girls' school, her task being to supervise the morals of girls and, in particular, their adherence to the fundamentals of religion.⁹⁴ Unlike Hashim, however, Nassif was concerned primarily with the inculcation of the proper moral and religious virtues in schoolgirls. Thus her specific proposals for topics of instruction included the following: teaching girls proper religion, that is, Qur'an and sunna; teaching household management at both the practical and the intellectual levels; and teaching hygiene. Further reforms proposed were to expand schools for female nurses; to establish dispensaries and hospitals in every district, with medical lectures for the sick; and to teach mothers about their own and their children's well-being and cleanliness, especially in light of mothers' ignorance of the rules of hygiene. Teaching Egyptian women practical arts such as sewing, embroidery, and the

principles of child rearing also lay at the root of Nassif's reforms—reforms that would free them from reliance on foreign women.⁹⁵

In a lecture in which she compares Western and Egyptian women, Nassif expounds on this last point more explicitly, going through all the phases of womanhood from the moment when the female child is born, to infancy, then adolescence, and marriage (including household economics and management, morals, and customs), and finally the role of motherhood. In comparison to their Western counterparts, Nassif finds Egyptian women sorely lacking in the ability to care for their own children. Whereas Western women nurse and clean their own children, in Egypt the upper classes consider breast-feeding a shame and hire nursemaids and servants. Egyptian mothers are also negligent about their children's health. Indeed, she argues, "there is the greatest difference between our pallid-colored rude-tongued child and the healthy-bodied and well-raised (*muhadhib bi'l-tarbiya*) Western child. There is nothing lovelier than to see him in the mornings and evenings greet his parents or excuse himself or thank someone." Western children, we are told, learn to please their parents and are never beaten. Egyptians, however, have two equally pernicious methods of *tarbiya*: either a rigorous and harsh discipline or a lax pampering. Further, Nassif compares Western and Egyptian children in terms of their exposure to natural sites and the "special equipment" used to facilitate their development and structure their play. Simply put, "Western women have advanced stages beyond us in both their knowledge and their work, even though we are no less intelligent than they."⁹⁶

In a review of *Al-Nisa' iyyat*, a collection of articles published by Nassif in *Al-Jarida*, Rashid Rida takes the opportunity to emphasize the importance of educational reform in Egypt, especially in light of changing social conditions, but is careful to point out and critique the increased Westernization of education. Taking other male writers on "the women's question" as a point of contrast to Nassif, he praises her writings on women for avoiding two pitfalls—excessive theoreticism and slavish imitation of foreigners. The strength of Nassif's approach, rather, lay in its foundation in religion and practical experience and its concern for the benefit of the Egyptian woman.⁹⁷

Nassif's mobilization of Western women and mothers in her critique of Egyptian child-rearing practices functioned within a complex set of assumptions about the backwardness of Egypt—in particular, as it related to the education and advancement of its women. This is not at all to imply that Nassif ever advocated wholesale Westernizing reforms or even that her reformist impulse was rooted solely in a comparative vein rather than in an indigenous tradition of Islamic reform or critique. Rather, it is simply to highlight what Partha Chatterjee has explicated in terms of the double bind in which anti-colonial nationalist thought finds itself. Nationalist discourse, to constitute itself as nationalist, must "demonstrate the falsity of the colonial claim that the backward peoples were culturally incapable of ruling themselves in the

conditions of the modern world. Nationalism denied the alleged inferiority of the colonized people; it also asserted that a backward nation could 'modernize' itself while retaining its cultural identity. It thus produced a discourse in which, even as it challenged the colonial claim to political domination, it also accepted the very intellectual premises of 'modernity' [i.e., the theoretical framework of post-Enlightenment rational thought] on which colonial domination was based.⁹⁸

THE REASONS FOR OUR BACKWARDNESS

Are we to conclude from the preceding discussion that nationalist discourses on motherhood were merely derivative of colonial or European discourses? As Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued, the creation of a domestic sphere in colonial Bengal confronted resistances that refused to align along the bourgeois public-private axis. Pointing to other configurations of self and community, he elucidates the construction of bourgeois domesticity in colonial Bengal as hinged upon two fundamental strategies of exclusion: the rejection of companionate marriage (denial of the bourgeois private) and of the secular historical construction of time by an invocation of collective memory (denial of historical time). Both were linked to an explicit rejection and reformulation of the Western rhetoric and teleology of freedom. Chakrabarty is careful to assert that this is not to be interpreted as yet another example of India's incomplete, failed, or inadequate transition to modernity. Rather, it should be understood as a voice of ambivalence.⁹⁹

Indeed, much the same could be said of the Egyptian setting, where the formulation of a modern "private" sphere was articulated in tandem with an explicitly nonsecular conception of proper pedagogy. Even Westernized modernizing reformers like Qasim Amin or the turn-of-the-century feminists, such as Huda Sha'rawi and Malak Hifni Nassif, situated their own projects as a defense of Islam and a critique of *taqlid*.¹⁰⁰ Their projects were often conceptualized as an illustration that "true Islam"—that is, Islam unadulterated by "traditional" accretions, such as superstitious practices—was entirely compatible with modernity. Thus they were engaged in a complex dialogue with colonial discourse, which had posited Islam as the locus classicus for both the backwardness of the nation and the subordination and oppression of its women. The articulation, then, of an anticolonial nationalist modernity with colonial discourse, as Chatterjee has argued, lay within the same discursive field.

The case of child rearing is instructive. Virtually all the educational reformers used the West as a form of contrast to "our backwardness." Such an internalization of notions of backwardness implied along with it the adaptation of a unilinear, progressive, and secular concept of historical time. How did these reformers seek to explain Egypt's backwardness within this teleological

framework? For the colonized intelligentsia the concept of the potential educability of backward peoples, rather than an innate inferiority, served as a point of entry into progressivist debates. Education, then, formed a nodal point around which a series of reformist polemics were framed. In particular, it was women's inadequate education and the lack of a proper science of *tarbiya* that were targeted as impediments to national progress. Mothers were deemed "ignorant" of the principles of modern child care, and explicit contrasts were set up against a scientific European pedagogy, both to explicate the "reasons for our backwardness" and to point the way to a modern postcolonial nationalist future. Indigenous modernizing reformers, women's philanthropic and feminist organizations, and colonial administrators were all implicated in this project.

Qasim Amin, for instance, attributed great importance to the role of mothers in *tarbiya* and was quite critical of what he perceived to be Egyptian society's neglect of women's role in child rearing and its "animalistic" emphasis on childbearing. For Amin, the backwardness of Egypt was in large part attributable to the inadequate attention paid to *tarbiya*. He states,

I believe that the time has come to base our upbringing on correct, sound scientific principles. We should aim for an upbringing that produces superior men with sound judgement and knowledge. They should be able to combine education, good manners, knowledge and work. It should be an upbringing that can rescue us from the shortcomings that foreigners hurl at us everyday, in every tongue. All these short-comings . . . are products of one phenomenon—our inadequate process of upbringing. All Egyptians involved in the formulation of various theories believe that a proper upbringing is the only medicine for this disease. This pertinent viewpoint is widespread, found in books, newspapers and at discussions held at social and intellectual gatherings. It is even accurate to state that this viewpoint has become popular opinion. It has produced the shared feeling among people that the country's future depends upon its methods of upbringing.¹⁰¹

An anonymous article, printed in *Al-Hilal* shortly after the publication of Amin's book, entitled "The Nation Is the Fabric of Its Mothers and Thus We Must Educate Girls," attempts to argue along similar lines:

Those who have studied the reasons for the backwardness of our country have found ignorance to be the primary cause and have encouraged the generalization of knowledge, but have limited their discussion to boys, whereas women should be the primary concern since they are the foundation for society and no society whose mothers are ignorant and know only their room, home, and family will ever succeed. . . . How can we entrust to women in such a state [of backwardness] the upbringing of our children, the men of the future? Children are constituted as their mothers wish, and if we do not raise the level of mothers, we will not raise the level of children, unless we cultivate them [mothers] with proper knowledge.¹⁰²

Saleh Effendi Hamdi Hammad, quoted earlier, echoed many of the themes found in Qasim Amin. Here, the degenerate household was posited as the locus of ignorance and the reason for the immaturity of Egyptian civilization. In his 1907 piece entitled "Proper Child Rearing" he asserts,

If we look closely and critically at our national condition and the organization of our affairs in order to determine the degree to which these necessary principles have been applied, and hence our level of civilization, we will find that we have not achieved a state of maturity and advancement with respect to the principles of *tarbiya*. . . . The *tarbiya* in the household and family is in a degenerate state. Unfortunately, in our part of the world concern and care for the health of children and their proper *tarbiya* is nonexistent among mothers and fathers. Both are immersed in ignorance; they do not care for the proper feeding, cleanliness, health, and morals of their children. . . . We deny them [children] the right to a proper *tarbiya* and, therefore, ourselves and our society the right to the men of tomorrow and the mothers of the future.¹⁰³

Despite the seeming consensus indicated by the quotations selected above, there remained important differences between the Westernizing reforms advocated by someone such as Qasim Amin and the suggestions made by the contributors to *Al-Manar* I discuss below. Within the terms of the debate used by Islamists, a clear distinction was to be made between modernity, or modernization, and Westernization. Arguing from within an Islamic discursive tradition, they presented moral and religious pedagogy geared toward the inculcation of virtues and bodily dispositions as an integral part of the process of *tarbiya*. Further, the overarching framework within which the disciplinization of the child's body and the rationalization of the home were to occur was a communal conception of this-worldly, rightly guided ethical being. Finally, Islamists subscribed to a nonsecular concept of historical time—framing reform (*islah*) as a project of renewal (*tajdid*) in the face of the decline and digression of the Muslim world from the true path of Islam. I turn now to a discussion of the journal *Al-Manar* and its views on the reform of *tarbiya*, with its explicit critique of Westernization, as articulated in the first decade of the twentieth century.

AL-MANAR AND THE CRITIQUE OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION¹⁰⁴

In a 1911 conference devoted to developing an agenda for educational reform (*islah al-tarbiya wa al-ta'lim*), many of the usual concerns found in the journal *Al-Manar* were expressed in the form of programmatic statements. Among the reforms called for were religious instruction in schools, compulsory primary education, the inclusion in curricula of several practical forms of knowledge (agriculture, mechanical engineering, and the like), the publication of a book,

or compendium, of morals ("comprehensible enough for the masses"), evening literacy classes, and village education. Bahithat al-Badiya, who also attended the conference, suggested reforms similar to those mentioned above. These included expanding schools for nurses, teaching women medicine, and establishing girl's schools, with instruction in sewing, embroidery, general household management, and child rearing.¹⁰⁵

This programmatic agenda highlights several features that characterized the reformist impulse of the journal. I want to focus on the intense dissatisfaction expressed with current educational and child rearing practices. This was framed in terms of a desire to place Egypt solidly on a trajectory of progress conceptualized in terms of an Egyptian backwardness in contradistinction to an advanced European path of modernity), and, more important, in terms of a specifically Islamic conception of the reasons for the decline of nations and communities. From the perspective of Albert Hourani, Islamic thinkers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh, and Rashid Rida all begin from the question "Why are Muslim countries backward in every aspect of civilization?" and formulate their religious and secular reforms in accordance with a modernizing and Westernizing impulse. However, there are other ways to view these thinkers.

The *salafiyya* reforms can be seen instead as part of an Islamic discursive tradition and the attempt to formulate an Islamic modern. Talal Asad has defined an Islamic discursive tradition as a "tradition of Muslim discourse that addresses itself to conceptions of the Islamic past and future with reference to an Islamic practice in the present."¹⁰⁶ That is to say, it is a historically constituted and evolving argument about the goods that constitute the tradition, extended both historically through time and geographically through space. It entails modes of argumentation and reasoning internal to the tradition, as well as embodied practices.¹⁰⁷

Crucial to the concept of Islamic reform is a mode of historical consciousness that includes a conception of the decline (*inhitah*) and reform (*islah*), renewal (*tajdid*), or revivification (*ihya'*) of the moral, religious, and political sciences. John Voll has provided a useful overview of the historical continuity in the themes of *islah* and *tajdid* in Islamic history.¹⁰⁸ At the core of these concepts is a return to the fundamentals of religion (*usul al-din*) and the core texts of the Qur'an and hadith. The concept of *islah* refers to reform but also embodies a conception of rightly guided moral and ethical behavior and aims to increase the righteousness of the *umma*. The concept of *tajdid*, or revival, refers to renewal of the authentic Islamic spirit and also embodies a moral-ethical dimension. These modes of reform, then, need not depend upon a unilinear progressive concept of historical time insofar as their referent is the perfect model existent in revelation. At the same time *tajdid-islah* does not lie outside the realm of historically constituted human experience. Although inspired by the first centuries of Islam, Islamist reformers do not aspire

to re-create it. Further, though the standards that inspire *tajdid-islam* are constant, the specific nature of the reforms does reflect historical specificities of time and place.¹⁰⁹

More specifically, nineteenth-century Islamic reformers drew upon and continued many of the themes of the eighteenth-century Islamic renewal movements.¹¹⁰ These were characterized by a critique of current orthodoxy and the reformulation of an Islamic intellectual orthodoxy to counteract what was perceived as moral decline. Themes common to the eighteenth-century reform movements that recur in the nineteenth century were the call for a return to the Qur'an and sunna of earlier generations as the basis for Islamic law; a revival of hadith studies (*'ilm al-hadith*); a rejection of *taqlid* (blind imitation of customs and tradition, and especially of the legal schools of thought); a critique of certain forms of popular religion, as well as superstitious or un-Islamic practices; and a reassertion of *ijtihad*, or independent legal interpretation.¹¹¹

Thus the concepts of *tajdid-islam* represent a radical mode of critique indigenous to the Islamic discursive tradition, although the contexts in which they are mobilized and the crises to which they respond are historically specific. For the nineteenth-century Muslim reformers, the crisis was that of colonialism. The nature and context of the reforms and the fact that at the turn of the century the Muslim intelligentsia were responding to colonial allegations of Muslim stagnation are, of course, crucial. The distinction I want to make, however, is between defining the call to reform the state of Muslim society as rooted in a Westernizing impulse and understanding it as a genuine attempt from within the Islamic tradition to formulate an Islamic modernity, within the context of a historically specific and newly constituted constellation of power relations.

Reading through the multitude of articles in *Al-Manar* on the reasons for the rise of European nations and the decline and colonization of the East, one gets the distinct impression that thinkers were attempting to make sense of a nexus of sociopolitical relations of subjugation and domination in which the Arab Muslim East was perceived as backward. But the reasons for that backwardness were related not only to a technological or industrial retrogression but to a *digression* from the true path of Islam. Hence there was a call for a re-vivification of the core texts and arguments of the Islamic discursive tradition. Although appropriating the concepts of progress and retrogression, Islamists redefined them within the terms of the Islamic tradition, as revival (*tajdid*) and decline (*inhitat*) or digression (*inhiraf*), superimposing a moral dimension onto both. Further, through the reformation of the household, and *tarbiya* in particular, the East could reclaim its glorious past, freed from the constraints of Turkish backwardness and decay, as well as European colonization. Central to this argument was the critique of *taqlid*, or blind imitation, of both indigenous and European customs and mores.

The fact that the reforms proposed are modern should not at all be surprising, unless of course one simplistically bifurcates tradition and modernity. One

should see this Islamic modernism, rather, as indicative of the reforms' position of interiority both to the historically constituted Islamic discursive tradition and to the project of modernity. Muhammad 'Abduh and his disciples' advocacy of Islamic reform in the sphere of education (*al-tarbiya wa al-'ilm*), as elsewhere, was not an "invented tradition" of an Islamic modernity that operated as a mere ruse, or a cloak for a modernizing impulse.¹¹² It must be recognized as rooted in a genuine sense of belonging to a tradition, combined with a desire for a national nonsecular modernity.

Further, as Asad has pointed out, crucial to the Islamic discursive tradition are embodied practices. That is, "prescribed moral-religious capabilities, which involve the cultivation of certain bodily attitudes (including emotions), the disciplined cultivation of habits, aspirations, and desires," and which necessitate correct, apt, and effective performance. They are "practical rules and principles aimed at developing a distinctive set of virtues (articulated by *shari'at* [religion])."¹¹³ Nineteenth-century Islamist reformers, then, were able to draw upon an indigenous body of thought and writing from within the tradition that specifically addressed proper pedagogy for children; this entailed the cultivation of the body, the disciplining of the self, the formation of moral character, the inculcation of the virtues, and correct conduct—all to be embodied in practice.

Hence the modernist focus on hygiene and the cultivation and disciplinization of the body (*tarbiyat al-jasad*) was not antithetical to Islamic discourse at the turn of the century but was in fact complementary to it. The larger framework within which the disciplinization of the child's body and the rationalization of the home were to occur, however, was a concept of rightly guided moral and ethical practice, to ensure both the salvation of the child's soul and the upholding of a this-worldly communal norm of ethical being. Thus the conception of the child's self-actualization was understood not in terms of the liberal ideal of the sovereign, autonomous, and self-constituted subject. Rather, actualization—understood as the cultivation of religious sentiments, the inculcation of the moral virtues, and the formation of disciplined souls and bodies—could occur only under the aegis of the collective subject (i.e., the community). The aim of this disciplinization, as well as the product, was to be irreducibly different from that of the West. Instead of self-mastery and freedom, the ideals posited were rightly guided ethical being and ethical know-how, to be achieved within the Muslim *umma*.¹¹⁴

For the turn-of-the-century Islamists, the techniques of the self to be inculcated in children through a proper religious pedagogy were inconceivable once divorced from communal norms of ethical being.¹¹⁵ The cultivation of bodies, minds, and selves (*tarbiyat al-jasad, al-'aql wa al-nafs*) was to be undertaken in accordance with the public good and modeled on the religious virtues. The inculcation of the virtues in the self was intended explicitly to serve the renaissance of the *umma*. European pedagogies that endorsed a cultivation of the self

disarticulated from religious instruction, based on science and utilitarian logic alone, were singled out in *Al-Manar* for critique. The entire process of *tarbiya* itself would be rendered nonsensical in the absence of religion as a guiding principle for the cultivation of the virtues. In a 1912 lecture reprinted in *Al-Manar*, the appropriate modular forms that *tarbiya* was to assume were delineated as follows: the *tarbiya* of nations (*tarbiyat al-ummam*), the *tarbiya* of households and mothers (*tarbiyat al-buyut wa al-ummahat*), that of selves by selves (*tarbiyat al-mar' li-nafsu*), the cultivation of the virtues and religious *tarbiya* (*al-fadila wa al-tarbiya al-diniyya*), and the *tarbiya* of the will (*tarbiyat al-irada*).¹¹⁶

Questions centered on whether a *tarbiya* could be found that would combine religion and nationalism, and whether this existed in Egyptian schools, in religious, secular, or European pedagogy.¹¹⁷ The issue of education for girls was particularly sensitive. *Al-Manar* was virulent in its critique of the practice of sending girls to foreign schools run primarily by Europeans. Realizing that this was done partly because of the Egyptian neglect of women's upbringing (*ihmal tarbiyat al-mar'a*), they asked whether girls taught in foreign schools would learn the manners, morals, principles, and forms of worship (*'ibadat*) of their religion. They would not, asserted the critics; rather, they would leave the schools Christianized or Westernized, neither Muslim nor Egyptian, leading to discord in their marital households.¹¹⁸

What, then, was the real purpose of female education? To prepare women for household management (*tadbir al-manzil*) and child rearing (*tarbiyat al-awlad*). Which merely rendered moot the question of how foreign schools could provide a solid foundation for the family if they estranged girls from the manners, customs, and morals of their religion and nation. Government schools, too, taught girls along Western lines, and in fact all schools in Egypt could be said to be unsuitable for the proper *tarbiya* of girls. All of this boded ill for women's future ability to raise their own children and care for their households. The call needed to be made for a radical revamping of Egyptian educational and pedagogical practices, before corrupt influences spread throughout all social classes in the nation.¹¹⁹

Again and again, *tarbiya* and education were asserted as the cornerstones upon which the prosperity of the nation should be built, as the marker of the progress and advancement (or backwardness) of all nations. *Tarbiya* was conceived of as an art—that of raising children properly from their infancy until the time when they could work and become productive members of their society. *Al-Manar* asserted that although many had realized the urgent need for reform, very little action had been taken. Even worse, people had come to believe that teaching foreign languages or European laws was sufficient, as it prepared people for government jobs, never realizing that such a self-interested approach was diametrically opposed to the interests of the nation. It was suggested that students obtain a grounding in the fundamental principles of reli-

gion (*'ilm usul al-din*), which included a knowledge of the forms of worship and the prescribed norms of Muslim conduct (*'ibadat*; *'ilm fiqh al-halal wa al-haram*) and the study of disciplining morals and reforming manners (*'ilm al-hadhib al-akhlaq wa islah al-'adat*). The latter required a knowledge of philosophical reasoning and psychology, sociology (*'ilm al-ijtima'*) (the study of peoples, civilizations and their characters, manners and customs),¹²⁰ geography, history, political economy, household management (especially relevant for girls, as it would be their occupation and they were currently ignorant of it), accounting, languages, hygiene, and public health.¹²¹

By 1912, it could be claimed that no one could question the need for reform in *tarbiya* and education, as the call was being made all over the Muslim world, even at al-Azhar, the prestigious center of religious learning. In a lecture given by Rashid Rida, the decline of Muslim nations is bemoaned, the crisis seen as spanning language, religion, morals, and manners. In asking what kind of *tarbiya* Muslims needed to reform their morals, and what kind of education would refine their reason, the Islamic intelligentsia of *Al-Manar* sought to ground the renaissance of Islamic nations in the articles and principles of the Islamic faith. Moreover, such a grounding needed to be aligned with the modern concerns of an ordered household and proper child rearing if the East were to "catch up" with European advancements in scientific pedagogy and education.¹²²

Such concerns, then, were applicable to child rearing as well as to education. For instance, a favorable description of a book on *tarbiya* by Dr. 'Abd al-'Aziz Effendi Nazmi, which *Al-Manar* urged its readers to purchase, claimed that "it is apparent that no mother can do without a knowledge of the rules of hygiene with respect to such matters." The text itself was written specifically with an audience of mothers in mind. In fact, each of the chapters was presented as an actual lecture to mothers. The chapter topics are instructive: the importance of breast-feeding; the rules of breast-feeding; the infant's bed and bedroom; the rules of psychological health (*sihat al-nafs*); infant weaning and nutrition; the infant's clothing; bodily cleanliness and the child's play; proper care of wounds; children's exercise; and the development of their intelligence.¹²³

Often the neglect of household *tarbiya* as an object of study and reform was lamented. The critique of contemporary child-rearing practices was aimed against both those who left their children to do as they pleased according to their whims and caprices, and those "Westernized among us . . . who have taken on foreign nannies who teach children their language and raise them according to the customs of their lands (*'adat aqwamihim*)."¹²⁴

The call for the total and systematic reorganization of both child-rearing practices and schooling, however, was cast not in terms of an imitation of Western practices and institutions but in terms of the cyclical time of the decline and rise of nations and peoples, as Ibn Khaldun and others had taught. Especially salient, as *Al-Manar* points out, was the tradition of Islamic re-

formism, with a lineage including Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Abu Bakr al-ʿArabi al-Maghribi, Zakariyah al-Ansari, and, of course, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. Such a renaissance (*nuhud*) was perceived as the means by which the circulation of an illness in the body politic could be remedied, and the glorious past of Islam be restored through the reform of education.¹²⁵

Similarly, in a sermon (*khutba*) given in 1912 the upbringing of homes (*tarbiyat al-buyut*) is posited as the foundation of all that may be built subsequently, and it is mothers who bear the primary burden of this role. "How will this matter be dealt with when our women are ignorant of everything related to *tarbiya*—all forms of knowledge, and religious and secular manners (*adab*)? . . . A national upbringing cannot proceed unless we teach women what it is necessary for them to know in order to raise their children." Again, Muslims who imitate foreigners, or allow their children to be raised by foreign nannies, are berated. The construction of the argument itself is intriguing and relates, in part, to the growing interest in the new social sciences. The assumption that women's foreign upbringing would result in the complete transformation of Egyptian society along the lines of the West is asserted to be a gross misunderstanding of sociology, of the characters of nations (as anyone who had read Le Bon would surely know), and an error in the science of *tarbiya*. What would result, in effect, would be the decimation of national character, not the creation of a society like those of the West. Women, then, ought to be taught in the language, customs, morals, and religion of their own country, and they should also learn the science of child rearing and household management, the rules of health and hygiene, accounting, and a rudimentary knowledge of history and geography. Here, the critique of European nannies is made more forcefully. "Many of the wealthy use European nannies, who teach the children a language, morals, and manners that are not their own—resulting in children who will be formed so as to become incommensurate with their mothers. Yes, those who are raised by foreign women will be more refined in contemporary social manners and cleanliness than others . . . but what we are calling for is a *tarbiya* with which we can be a vibrant and united nation, as other civilized nations are, but we cannot achieve this through imitational Westernization."¹²⁶

CONCLUSION

In discussing the discourses on motherhood in the context of colonialism, I have put forth several arguments. First, that Egyptian discussions of motherhood need to be situated within the context of both colonial and anticolonial nationalist discourses on modernity. As Lila Abu-Lughod points out in her introduction to this volume, the "women's question" interacted in complex ways with modernity and postcoloniality—gender figured centrally in anticolonial nationalist resolutions to problems of national backwardness and how

best to become modern. Within the Egyptian colonial setting the discourses on mothering were integral to the constitution of a national identity, with women positioned as markers of national backwardness. Mothers were deemed "ignorant" of the principles of modern child care, and their ability to function as proper mothers of citizens of the modern nation was questioned. Explicit contrasts were thus set up between Egyptian child rearing and a scientific European pedagogy, both to explicate the "reasons for our backwardness" and to point the way to a modern postcolonial nationalist future.

Second, I argued that the specific manner in which women were to be "re-made" entailed the constitution of a private sphere of bourgeois domesticity, with motherhood recast as a rational, scientific, and hygienic vocation of women. Such a project often attempted to erase and recast class differences by consolidating an "ideal mother" modeled along middle-class lines. Further, to reconstitute the Egyptian family as both national and modern, the new discourses of child rearing aimed to cultivate new types of children—physically, mentally, and morally fit, industrious and productive citizens.

More important, however, I also argued that one should not presume that anticolonial nationalist discourses on motherhood were merely derivative of colonial or European discourses. Indeed, the formation of a "private sphere" within the Egyptian setting was often articulated from within the parameters of nonsecular conceptions of proper pedagogy. Whether Westernized modernizers or Islamist reformers, thinkers situated their own projects as a defense of Islam and an illustration that "true Islam" was not antithetical to modernity. Such assertions arose in a complex dialogue with colonial discourse, which had posited Islam as the reason for the backwardness of Muslim nations.

Thinkers of the *salafyya* movement, in particular, explicitly situated their reforms within an Islamic discursive tradition and a national nonsecular project of modernity. Islamists framed their projects within a nonsecular concept of historical time and drew upon an indigenous tradition of moral and religious pedagogy geared toward the cultivation of the body, the disciplinization of the self, and the formation of moral character. Hence the modernist focus on health, hygiene, and the cultivation and disciplinization of the body was not antithetical to Islamic discourse at the turn of the century but complementary to it. The larger framework within which the disciplinization of the child's body and the rationalization of the home were to occur, however, was a concept of rightly guided moral and ethical practice. The child's actualization, understood as the cultivation of religious sentiments, the inculcation of the moral virtues, and the formation of disciplined souls and bodies, could occur only within the framework of the community (*umma*). The aim of this disciplinization, as well as the product, was to be irreducibly different from that of the West.

Rather than view the Egyptian experience as merely a bad copy of a supposedly uniform and coherent European model of modernity, we can explore

the ways in which cultural translations and hybridizations sought to negotiate other speaking positions from which the national modern could be formulated.¹²⁷ If we are to construct the beginnings of what Gyan Prakash has referred to as a “critique of the colonial genealogy of the discourse of modernity,” we must come to understand not only the ways in which colonialism was constitutive of European modernity but also the ways in which modernity, and its concomitant regime of power/knowledge, was refashioned, renegotiated, and rendered intelligible in non-European contexts. As postcolonial critiques often remind us, the signification of the modern as such requires its articulation with the nonmodern Other; it must be authorized as such, and that process of authorization is itself fractured.¹²⁸ The “women’s question” in Egypt is a perfect illustration of how a local nationalist discourse articulated in very complex ways with colonial discourse, seeking to situate itself as *both* modern and Islamic. It was an ambivalent articulation of identity and difference with the West.

NOTES

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1. The main sources drawn upon are journal articles from *Al-Hilal*, *Al-Muqtataf*, and *Al-Manar* (with the proliferation of articles on child rearing from 1890 to 1920); Qasim Amin’s core text on women, *Tahrir al-mar’a (The Liberation of Women)*; as well as classic colonial texts, such as the earl of Cromer’s *Modern Egypt. Al-Hilal* (1892) founded by Jurji Zaydan, and one of the most widely circulated Middle Eastern periodicals at the time, and *Al-Muqtataf* (1876), founded by Ya’qub Sarruf and Faris Nimr, were both Lebanese-Egyptian (literary-scientific-cultural) journals, decidedly secular in tone, that advocated Westernizing reforms. *Al-Manar* was founded in 1898 by Rashid Rida, a disciple of Muhammad ‘Abduh, as a journal of religious interpretation (*tafsir*) and philosophy, as well as social criticism. I do not wish to bifurcate *Al-Hilal* and *Al-Muqtataf*, on the one hand, and *Al-Manar*, on the other, as “modernist” versus “traditionalist.” I see all three as decisively modern and reformist, but whereas *Al-Manar* belongs to and situates itself with respect to an Islamic tradition, the other two do not.

2. Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Difference-Deferral of a Colonial Modernity: Public Debates on Domesticity in British Bengal,” in *Subaltern Studies VIII*, ed. David Arnold and David Hardiman (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 50–88; quotation p. 52.

3. Previous notions of child rearing, it seems, were geared primarily toward the moral development of the child and were conceptualized in terms of notions of moral

being and personhood, as in medieval texts such as al-Ghazali’s *Ihya’ ‘ulum al-din* and al-Jawziyya’s *Tuhfat al-mawdud fi ahkam al-mawlad*. It would be beyond the scope of the present study to trace the shift that is presupposed to have occurred during the nineteenth century; I can merely suggest what earlier notions of child rearing may have entailed. See Avner Gil’adi, *Children of Islam: Concepts of Childhood in Medieval Muslim Society* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992).

4. Timothy Mitchell has discussed the shift that occurred in the use of the term *tarbiya* (education). “The word *tartib*, meaning such things as ‘arrangement (into ranks)’, ‘organisation’, ‘discipline’, ‘rule’, ‘regulation’ (hence even ‘government’) was replaced in the field of learning by the like-sounding word *tarbiya*. Until perhaps the last third of the nineteenth century *tarbiya* had meant simply ‘to breed’ or ‘to cultivate,’ referring, as in English, to anything that should be helped to grow—the cotton crop, cattle, or the morals of children. It came to mean ‘education,’ the new field of practices developed in the last third of the century.” Timothy Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 88. It is this new constellation of practices, with respect to the education and rearing of children, and by extension the fostering of community and nation, that I am trying to trace. For an insightful discussion of transformations in the process of education and Qur’anic schooling in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Yemeni pedagogy, see Brinkley Messick, *The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), especially chaps. 4 and 5.

5. Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, p. 113.

6. Anna Davin, “Imperialism and Motherhood,” *History Workshop* 5 (1978): 9–65; Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Class and Gender in the Colonial Contest* (New York and London: Routledge, 1995); Ann Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995), and “Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Gender, Race, and Morality in Colonial Asia,” in *Gender at the Crossroads of Knowledge: Feminist Anthropology in the Postmodern Era*, ed. Micaela di Leonardo (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 51–101.

7. See Davin, “Imperialism and Motherhood”; Ute Frevert, “The Civilizing Tendency of Hygiene: Working-Class Women under Medical Control in Imperial Germany,” in *German Women in the Nineteenth Century: A Social History*, ed. John Fout (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1984), pp. 320–44; Anita Levy, *Other Women: the Writing of Class, Race and Gender, 1832–1898* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Mary Poovey, *Uneven Developments: The Ideological Work of Gender in Mid-Victorian England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

8. Messick, *The Calligraphic State*, pp. 77–79. The activities denoted by the verbal noun *ta’dib* (to educate, discipline, punish) and its corollary process of *tahdhib* (to instruct, correct, train, educate, culture) were meant to ensure the formation of a child endowed with good breeding, manners, decency, morals, decorum, etiquette, and civility.

9. The *salafiyya* reformers were a group of Islamic thinkers centered on the thought and writing of al-Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–97) and Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), who formed the critical mass of the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Islamic reform and revival movement. Their ideas on educational reform and in particular those espoused by Rashid Rida, ‘Abduh’s disciple, in the journal *Al-Manar*

are discussed at length below. For a general background, see Charles Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), and Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1789–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

10. Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, pp. 111–13.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
12. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), pp. 271–313; quotation p. 299.
13. Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* (London: Zed Books, 1986); *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
14. The earl of Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1908), 2:539.
15. As Harry Boyle, Cromer's Oriental secretary, states, "It is difficult to exaggerate the benefits which will accrue to the country at large when the unwholesome—and frequently degrading—associations of the old harem life give place to the healthy and elevating influence of a generation of mothers, keenly alive to the responsibilities as regards the moral training and welfare of their children." Clara Boyle, *Boyle of Cairo: A Diplomatist's Adventures in the Middle East* (Kendal: Titus Wilson and Son, 1905; reprint, 1965), p. 56; cf. Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, p. 112.
16. Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, 2:540–42.
17. Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments*, pp. 116–34.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 117.
19. Chatterjee's outer domain, *ibid.*, p. 26.
20. On Shumayyil, see Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, pp. 248–53.
21. Shibli Shumayyil, "Rijal al-ghad wa al-tarbiya al-madrasiyya," *Al-Hilal* 19, no. 7 (April 1911): 413–18; quotation p. 413.
22. The recent literature on women, motherhood, and the nation is vast; see, for example, *Woman-Nation-State*, ed. Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias (London: Macmillan, 1989); *Mothers of a New World: Maternalist Politics and the Origins of Welfare States*, ed. Seth Koven and Sonya Michel (London: Routledge, 1993). On Egypt, see Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, pp. 111–13; Beth Baron, "Mothers, Morality, and Nationalism in Pre-1919 Egypt," in *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, ed. Rashid Khalidi et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 271–88, "The Construction of National Honor in Egypt," *Gender and History* 5, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 244–55, and *The Women's Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society and the Press* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Leila Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), chaps. 7–10; Thomas Philipp, "Feminism and Nationalist Politics in Egypt," in *Women in the Muslim World*, ed. Lois Beck and Nikkie Keddie (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 277–94. See also Meredith Borthwick, *The Changing Role of Women in Bengal 1849–1905* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), especially chap. 5, for a discussion of the changing conception of motherhood in colonial Bengal and the proliferation of mother-oriented and child-care manuals from the 1860s onward. For critical discussions on the discourses of motherhood and domesticity in colonial Bengal, see Pradip Kumar Bose, "Sons of the Nation: Child Rearing in the New Family," in *Texts of Power: Emerging*

Disciplines in Colonial Bengal, ed. Partha Chatterjee (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), pp. 118–44; Chakrabarty, "The Difference-Deferral of a Colonial Modernity"; and Samita Sen, "Motherhood and Mothercraft: Gender and Nationalism in Bengal," *Gender and History* 5, no. 2 (Summer 1993): 231–43. On Iran, see Afsaneh Najmabadi, "Zanha-yi millat: Women or Wives of the Nation," *Iranian Studies* 26, nos. 1–2 (Winter–Spring 1993): 51–71.

23. Baron, "Mothers, Morality, and Nationalism," and *The Women's Awakening in Egypt*.
24. As cited in Baron, "Mothers, Morality, and Nationalism," p. 276.
25. Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, pp. 181–82.
26. On Qasim Amin, see Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, pp. 112–13; Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, pp. 164–70; and Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam*, pp. 144–68.
27. Qasim Amin, *The Liberation of Women* (1899), trans. Samiha Sidhom Peterson (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1992), pp. 5–6.
28. Qasim Amin, *The New Woman* (1900), trans. Samiha Sidhom Peterson (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1995), p. 60.
29. "We have forgotten that an adult man is a product of his mother's influence during childhood. I wish that men would understand the importance of this complete tie between a man and his mother. It is the crux of everything that I have written in this book, and I repeat: it is impossible to have successful men unless their mothers prepare them for success. This is the worthwhile goal that civilization has entrusted to the women of our era. Women carry out these heavy responsibilities in all the civilized countries of the world, bearing children then molding them into adults." Amin, *The Liberation of Women*, p. 71.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 64, 72.
31. See, for instance, Saleh Hamdi Hammad, "Al-Tarbiya al-sahiha," *Al-Hilal* 15, no. 6 (March 1907): 371–73.
32. Caleb Saleeby, *The Progress of Eugenics* (London: Funk and Wagnalls, 1914), p. 79.
33. As cited in Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 276.
34. Homi K. Bhabha, "DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation," in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 291–322.
35. Colley, *Britons*, p. 6. Colley deals more directly with the question of Otherness in her article "Britishness and Otherness," in which she questions the dearth of scholarly attention paid to the constitution of British identity against the Other. She points to the need for attending to the dynamics that obtained between "Britishness" and the wider context of the "external" empire, rather than the Four Nations (or "white" empire) model so widely focused upon. The salience of Otherness, particularly after 1783, so Colley argues, emerged out of the incorporation of difference (religious, linguistic, racial) into empire and the export of "internal" others (Irish, Scottish) in large numbers to the colonies, practices that enabled a sense of British selfhood in relation to these colonized Others. See Linda Colley, "Britishness and Otherness: An Argument," *Journal of British Studies* 31 (1992): 309–29.

36. Davin, "Imperialism and Motherhood," p. 10.
37. Caleb Saleeby, *Parenthood and Race Culture: An Outline of Eugenics* (New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1910), p. 38.
38. As cited by Davin, "Imperialism and Motherhood," p. 29.
39. Saleeby, *Parenthood and Race Culture*, p. 164.
40. Saleeby, *The Progress of Eugenics*, p. 108.
41. Saleeby, *Parenthood and Race Culture*, p. 313.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 304; emphasis in original.
43. See Stoler, "Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power"; *Race and the Education of Desire*, chap. 5; and "A Sentimental Education: Native Servants and the Cultivation of European Children in the Netherlands Indies," in *Fantasizing the Feminine: Sex and Death in Indonesia*, ed. Laurie Sears (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995), pp. 71–91, in which she deals more specifically with the focus upon proper child rearing and education in the colonial context and the education of sentiments as a strategy for preserving racial and class boundaries in the Netherlands East Indies. Such colonial concerns included assaults on native mothers and nursemaids as corrupting or contaminating influences on children's morality, as well as attempts to inculcate appropriate psychological dispositions and national-cultural attachments, thereby defining motherhood as a full-time occupation. On the idea of an *internal frontier* and the politics of exclusion, see her "Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers: European Identities and the Cultural Politics of Exclusion in Colonial Southeast Asia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 34, no. 2 (July 1992): 514–51.
44. Stoler, "Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power," pp. 71–73.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 73–74.
46. *Ibid.*
47. The discourses of domesticity entailed the elaboration of women's role as primarily involved in the domestic sphere in keeping with the rational, efficient, and productive ordering and "economic" management of the household. Baron discusses the inauguration of the terms "mistress of the house" (*rabbat al-dar*) and "household management" (*tadbir al-manzil*), as well as the manuals that popularized them. Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt*, pp. 155–58. The specificity of the prescriptive literature, although reminiscent of medieval conduct literature, differs in both the audience addressed and the explicit topos of domesticity, which had only recently been elaborated as a domain of women. Marilyn Booth's discussion of domesticity and women's biographies is particularly illustrative of the intersections among nationalist discourse, bourgeois familial identity formation, and the privileging of the maternal-domestic role concomitant with its inscription as modern. See Marilyn Booth, "'May Her Likes Be Multiplied': 'Famous Women' Biography and Gendered Prescriptions in Egypt 1892–1935," *Signs* 22, no. 4 (1997): 827–90.
48. Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt*.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 158–59.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 159–61; Margot Badran, *Feminists, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 61–65.
51. Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt*, p. 163.
52. Amin, *The New Woman*, p. 51.
53. Michel Foucault has situated the emergence of the health and the physical well-being of population in the eighteenth century as an essential objective of political power

within what he terms the governmentalization of the state. The emergence of governmentality, he argues, entailed a shift in modes of governance in which the family no longer served as a model of government and sovereignty was no longer conceived of as the management of the household. Instead, population became the ultimate end of government, inaugurating the instrumentalization of the family. Foucault discusses this "power over life"—a dual process of optimizing the strength of the population and its constituent subjects while simultaneously rendering them more governable—as a fundamental site for the deployment of modern power. For Foucault's elaboration of governmentality, bio-power, and the political investment of the individual body and the body politic, see Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 1, *An Introduction*, trans. R. Hurley (New York: Vintage/Random House, 1978); "The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century," in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews 1972–1977*, trans. C. Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), pp. 166–82; "Governmentality," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. G. Burchell, C. Gordon, and P. Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 87–104; and "The Political Technology of Individuals" in *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*, ed. L. Martin, H. Gutman, and P. Hutton (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), pp. 145–62.

54. Foucault, "The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century."

55. Davin, "Imperialism and Motherhood," p. 16; cf. Colley, *Britons*, pp. 240–41.

56. Davin, "Imperialism and Motherhood," 24–28. Ute Frevert has discussed what she terms the "civilizing tendency of hygiene," a medico-hygienic pedagogy directed primarily toward working-class women in imperial Germany. By the early twentieth century pedagogy was institutionalized through baby-care centers, often run by women or welfare organizations, which problematized working-class mothers' abilities in household management as well as child care and laid an emphasis on "rational child care." Frevert analyzes the medicalization and hygienic civilization of the working classes as part of the wider attempt at normalizing and maximizing the economic rationality and efficiency, as well as the health, and therefore labor vitality, of the working classes, through their "adoption of middle-class values and habits and the[ir] . . . mental integration into capitalist society and economy." Frevert, "The Civilizing Tendency of Hygiene," p. 321.

57. Davin, "Imperialism and Motherhood," pp. 36–43.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 53. Mary Poovey has discussed the "ideological work of gender" in terms of its fractured and uneven development across subject positions of class, race, and gender, showing how the consolidation of the idealized image of the domestic woman within midcentury Victorian bourgeois ideology served to depoliticize class relations. Poovey, *Uneven Developments*. Anita Levy has also looked at Victorian middle-class intellectuals' representations of "disorder in the house of the poor" as a means by which the middle class attempted to secure its hegemony: by "representing *what it was was not*, the middle class defined *what it was* and so secured its corporate identity," as well as enmeshing working-class families within "a machinery of governance exterior to them." Such representations coded social and economic information in moral and hygienic terms, focusing upon the family, along with the individual self, as a locus of social disorder, and consolidating the ideal of the healthy middle-class body within the confines of a new domestic space. Levy, *Other Women*, chap. 2; quotation p. 24.

59. Davin, "Imperialism and Motherhood," pp. 55–56. On the nature of the transition to the modern bourgeois family, new conceptions of childhood and child rearing, and their relation to the development of bourgeois individualism, private property, and industrial capitalism in the European context, see Phillipe Ariès, *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1962); Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, *Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class 1780–1850* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Friedrich Engels, *The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State* (New York: International Publishers, 1884; reprint, 1972); Edward Shorter, *The Making of the Modern Family* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), and Eli Zaretsky, *Capitalism, the Family and Personal Life* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978). Taken together, this literature points to the coeval development of socialized production under capitalism, the development of private property, and the emergence of the nuclear family and household as a single isolated and seemingly independent unit. The family came to be characterized by a domestic ideology, the idealization of the familial role for women (especially child rearing), companionate marriage, and the "invention of childhood" as a stage requiring a specific form of pedagogy and education. Zaretsky, in particular, argues that the family must be understood as part and parcel of the development of a capitalist mode of production, and bourgeois familial ideology as constitutive of the demarcation of the family as apparently autonomous and separate from the "economy" and "production."

60. Juan Cole, "Feminism, Class, and Islam in Turn-of-the-Century Egypt," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 13 (1981): 387–407. Cole focuses on the anti-theoretical positions on feminism taken up by the upper-middle class (as embodied by Amin) and the lower-middle class or petite bourgeoisie (as embodied by Tal'at Harb), relating the latter's refusal to take up the injunction to "emancipate women" to a differential class positioning and a more negative attitude toward European values.

61. See, for example, Amin, *The Liberation of Women*, p. 50.

62. *Ibid.*, pp. 23–25. For a sense of what other conceptions of mothering, some of which Amin is critiquing, may have been, see Lila Abu-Lughod's discussion of perceptions of mothering and child rearing among the Awlad 'Ali Bedouin, in "The Marriage of Feminism and Islamism in Egypt: Selective Repudiation as a Dynamic of Post-colonial Cultural Politics," chap. 7 in this volume; and *Writing Women's Worlds: Bedouin Stories* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), especially chap. 3.

63. Amin, *The Liberation of Women*, pp. 26–27.

64. Shumayyil, "Rijal al-ghad wa al-tarbiya al-madrasiyya," pp. 413–14.

65. Hammad had translated Fénelon's *L'éducation des filles* as *Tarbiyat al-banat* (Cairo: Matba'at Madrasat Walidat 'Abbas al-Awwal, 1909) and John Stuart Blackie's *On Self Culture, Intellectual, Physical and Moral* as *Tarbiyat al-nafs bi'l-nafs* (Cairo: Matba'at Madrasat Walidat 'Abbas al-Awwal, 1906); see Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, p. 198 n. 53.

66. Hammad, "Al-Tarbiya al-sahiha," pp. 371–73.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 371.

68. The columns often contained a wealth of miscellaneous information. For example, *akhbar 'ilmiyya* (scientific news) contained entries on topics as varied as fear of

cats, the increased population of Germanic peoples, schools in Japan, trees, the wireless telephone, types of food, and the prevention of cancer. See "Akhbar 'ilmiyya," *Al-Hilal* 14, no. 1 (October 1905): 49–55.

69. "Kindergarten aw riyadat al-af'al," *Al-Hilal* 12, no. 3 (November 1903): 76–77; "Falsafat al-la'b," *Al-Hilal* 12, no. 3 (November 1903): 91–92.

70. "Kindergarten aw riyadat al-af'al," pp. 76–77.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

72. "Bab tadbir al-manzil: tarbiyat al-af'al," *Al-Muqtataf* 42, no. 3 (March 1913): 294–95.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 295.

74. For similar discourses in the colonial East Indies, see Stoler, "A Sentimental Education" and *Race and the Education of Desire*, chap. 5.

75. "Al-Mar'a wa ashghal al-manzil," *Al-Hilal* 14, no. 1 (October 1905): 51–52.

76. Labiba Hashim, "Al-Tarbiya," *Al-Muqtataf* 38, no. 3 (March 1911): 274–81; quotation p. 281.

77. Ahmed Hafez, "Nasiha li-abna' al-aghniya'," *Al-Hilal* 12, no. 5 (December 1903): 153–54.

78. "Bab tadbir al-manzil: tarbiyat al-awlad 'ala al-iqtisad," *Al-Muqtataf* 33, no. 3 (March 1908): 255–56; quotation p. 255.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 256.

80. Leila Ahmed has recently discussed Qasim Amin, and other Westernized modernizing reformers in Egypt, in terms of their class position within the colonial formation and subsequent reproduction of colonial discourse on women. However, her presentation of Amin as an example of an androcentric, patriarchal individual who internalized orientalist and colonial discourse and simply rearticulated it "in native, upper-middle class voice" elides certain similarities (women as a sphere of backwardness) and occludes certain differences (the role of religious pedagogy) between the modernizing reformers she speaks of and what she refers to as "indigenous feminists," such as Malak Hifni Nassif. This is, in part, what I am trying to address in this subsection. See Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam*, p. 162.

81. Baron, *The Women's Awakening in Egypt*, pp. 26–27, 179.

82. Hashim, "Al-Tarbiya," p. 274.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 274.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 275.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 276.

86. *Ibid.*, p. 277.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 278.

88. *Ibid.*, p. 277.

89. On Nassif, see Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam*, chapter 9; and Hoda al-Sadda, "Malak Hifni Nassif: halqa mafquda min tarikh al-hayat," *Hajar: Kitab al-Mar'a* 2 (1994): 109–19.

90. Bahithat al-Badiya, "Tarbiyat al-banat fi al-bayt wa al-manzil," in *Al-Nisa'iyyat: majmu'at maqalat nushirat fi al-jarida fi mawdu' al-mar'a al-misriyya*, 2 vols. (Cairo: Matba'at Al-Jarida, 1910), 1:18–21.

91. Bahithat al-Badiya, "Khutba fi nadi hizb al-umma," in *Al-Nisa'iyyat*, 1:104.

92. *Ibid.*, pp. 95–118.

93. Bahithat al-Badiya, "Muhadara fi tarbiyat al-banat," in *Athar Bahithat al-Badiya: Malik Hifni Nassif 1886-1918*, ed. Majd al-Din Hifni Nassif (Cairo: Wizarat al-thaqafa wa al-irshad al-qawmi, al-mu'asasa al-misriyya al-'amma li'l-ta'lif wa al-tarjama wa al-tiba'a wa al-nashr, 1962), pp. 136-42.

94. This was perceived as especially important, as most of these schools had foreign teachers, ignorant of the manners and customs of the country, leaving the girls with no one to correct any errors they made in religion or mores. Nassif asks us to imagine them as they leave the schools, with a *tarbiya* that would differ from their husband's—a potential source of marital tension. Cf. the discussions in *Al-Manar* cited below.

95. Bahithat al-Badiya, "Ashar wasa'il li-tarqiyat al-mar'a al-misriyya," in *Athar Bahithat al-Badiya*, pp. 124-29; Bahithat al-Badiya, "Khutba fi nadi hizb al-umma," in *Al-Nisa'iyat*, 1:95-118.

96. Bahithat al-Badiya, "Khutba fi al-muqarinitayn bayn al-mar'a al-misriyya wa al-mar'a al-gharbiyya," in *Al-Nisa'iyat*, 1:118-42.

97. Rashid Rida, "Al-Nisa'iyat," *Al-Manar* 14, no. 1 (1911): 71-73.

98. Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*, p. 30.

99. Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for 'Indian' Pasts?" *Representations* 37, no. 4 (Winter 1992): 1-26.

100. Indeed, it could be argued that for Amin even to enter the debate on women he had to mobilize the idiom of the Islamic discursive tradition as a legitimating framework; on Amin's appropriation of Muhammad 'Abduh, see Ahmed, *Women and Gender in Islam*, p. 270 n. 16. For a discussion of the debates surrounding Amin as refracted through *Al-Manar*, see the reviews of *Al-Mar'a al-jadida* in *Al-Manar* 3, no. 32 (1901): 750-54, and *Al-Manar* 4, no. 1 (1901): 26-34.

101. Amin, *The Liberation of Women*, p. 28.

102. "Al-Umma nasij al-ummahat fa'alayna ta'lim al-banat," *Al-Hilal* 16, no. 4 (January 1908): 239-43; quotation pp. 240, 242.

103. Hammad, "Al-Tarbiya al-sahiha," pp. 371-73.

104. For a discussion of *Al-Manar* and Rashid Rida's positioning within the *salafiyya* movement, see Adams, *Islam and Modernism*, pp. 177-204; Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 68-83; and Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, pp. 222-44.

105. "Al-Mu'tamar al-misri: al-tarbiya wa al-ta'lim," *Al-Manar* 14, no. 6 (1911): 457-60.

106. Talal Asad, "The Idea of An Anthropology of Islam," (Washington D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies Occasional Papers, Georgetown University, 1986); quotation p. 14.

107. Asad's conceptualization of an Islamic discursive tradition is based upon Alasdair MacIntyre and must be distinguished from any concept of an "invented" tradition. MacIntyre conceives of a living tradition as "an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition . . . [T]he history of a practice in our time is generally and characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in terms of a larger and longer history of the tradition through which the practice in the present form is conveyed to us. . . . Living traditions, just because they continue a not-yet-completed narrative, confront a future whose determinate and determinable character, so far as it possesses any, derives from the past." MacIntyre's notion of a tradition is inextricably linked to a conception of

virtues and practices that presuppose the individual's situatedness within a (moral) community. It is this form of membership, constituted through a historical and social identity, that renders your present identity as bearer of a tradition. See Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2d ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), chaps. 14 and 15; quotation pp. 222-23.

108. John Voll, "Renewal and Reform in Islamic History," in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, ed. J. Esposito (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 32-47. The renewal tradition, according to Voll, is marked by three continuing themes: the call for a return to or strict application of the Qur'an and sunna of the Prophet (often targeting popular religion, the orthodox Islamic establishment, and the innovations of non-Islamic ideas and practices—*bid'a*); the assertion of the right to *ijtihad* in this application, rather than a reliance upon *taqlid* (*ijtihad* is to be understood not as simply an individual intellectual exercise but as a legitimizing basis from which to pose a critique of existing conditions and institutions in society, a way to challenge communal consensus, *ijma'*); and the reaffirmation of the authenticity and uniqueness of the Qur'anic experience in contrast to other Islamic modes of synthesis. For a useful discussion of *ijtihad*, see Wael Hallaq, "Was the Gate of *Ijtihad* Closed?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 16 (1984): 3-41.

109. Thus, as Voll states, "it is an effort of socio-moral construction or reconstruction making use of a normative standard found in the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet. This standard is independent from the changing historical conditions and specific contexts and it is available as a criterion to be used by renewers as a standard for judging the value of existing conditions and institutions." Voll, "Renewal and Reform in Islamic History," p. 35.

110. See Samira Haj, *Reconfiguring Tradition: Islamic Reform, Rationality and Modernity*, forthcoming. I am grateful for her clarification on the continuity of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century themes of Islamic reform and the attempt to formulate an Islamic modern.

111. The names most commonly associated with the eighteenth-century Islamic reform movement are Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703-87), Muhammad Ibn 'Ali al-Shawkani (1759-1834), Shah Wali Allah (1702-62), and 'Uthman Ibn Fudi (1754-1817). See Daniel Brown, "The Emergence of Modern Challenges to Tradition," in *Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought* (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 21-42; Ahmad Dallal, "The Origins and Objectives of Islamic Revivalist Thought, 1750-1850," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 113, no. 3 (1993): 341-59, and Fazlur Rahman, *Islam*, (Weidenfeld and London: William Clowes and Sons, 1966), chaps. 12 and 13.

112. The most powerful critique of such oppositions, specifically as they relate to the Islamic tradition, is Talal Asad's "The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam," in which he critiques the post-Enlightenment bifurcation of tradition (religion) and modernity (reason), arguing against interpretations that posit traditions as somehow spurious, as "fictions of the present, reactions to the forces of modernity—[suggesting] that in contemporary conditions of crisis, tradition in the Muslim world is a weapon, a ruse, a defense against a threatening world, that it is an old cloak for new aspirations and borrowed styles of behavior," p. 15. See also his *Genealogies of Religion* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), chap. 6, and Haj, *Reconfiguring Tradition*.

113. Talal Asad, "Modern Power and the Reconfiguration of Religious Traditions. Interview by Saba Mahmood," *Stanford Humanities Review* 5, no. 1 (1995): 1–16; quotation pp. 12–13. For an interesting use of Bourdieu's notion of bodily hexis and bodily manifestations as "master symbols of differences between [Victorian and Muslim] pedagogies" in the context of colonial and Egyptian discourses on indigenous pedagogy, Muslim body ritual, and education, see Gregory Starrett, "The Hexis of Interpretation: Islam and the Body in the Egyptian Popular School," *American Ethnologist* 22, no. 4 (1995): 953–69. Marcel Mauss provides a more useful conception of bodily practices as techniques of the body—which entail a habitus implying education rather than imitation, acquired abilities, faculty, apt performance, and craft. Such techniques are both effective and tradition-informed. "Man's first and most natural technical object, and at the same time technical means is his body." The techniques of the body, then, are culturally specific and historically constituted, and they entail a basic education of the body. See Marcel Mauss, "Techniques of the Body," in *Incorporations*, ed. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter (New York: Zone Books, 1992), pp. 455–77.

114. A noteworthy medieval example is Abu Hamid al-Ghazali's core text *Ihya' 'ulum al-din* (The revivification of the religious sciences), which includes a discussion of the proper guidance for children during the early stages of life and with respect to the improvement of their morals and *adab* (see vol. 3, "Kitab riyadat al-nafs wa tahdhib al-akhlaq wa mu'alajat amrad al-qalb," "bayan al-tariq fi riyadat al-subyan fi awwal nushu'ihim wa wajh tahdhibihim wa tahsin akhlaqihim." Ghazali's discussion is noteworthy in several respects: first, pedagogy is understood as primarily a moral education—one that creates dispositions and is therefore crucial in the formation of the child's character. Its main purpose is to ensure the salvation of the child's soul, and parental responsibility for the child's education is to be understood as a religious duty. Its orientation, then, is spiritually eschatological. That is, this-worldly, rightly guided practice is oriented to the hereafter. Second, Ghazali's conception of the modes of training appropriate for children before the age of discernment (*tamyiz*) is one of *ta'wid* (or, roughly, habituation) and entails the disciplining of the body and the cultivation of the senses in order to inculcate the appropriate dispositions toward good deeds, morally upright behavior, religious practice, moderation in the sensory stimulation, instincts, and pleasures of the body (food, drink, sleep) and revulsion toward evil deeds and morally reprehensible actions. The process of *ta'dib* was to be developed by the cultivation of shame and shyness and the elaboration of the faculty of distinction or discernment (*tamyiz*). It was to entail the regulation of the child's environment as well as specific instruction in religious obligations. Among the qualities desired were obedience to parents, humility, moderation, generosity, decency, and modesty. Children were to be taught to avoid lying, envy, gossip, garrulousness, boasting, and laziness. See al-Imam Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali, *Ihya' 'ulum al-din* (1097–1109) (Cairo: Matba'at al-Istiqa, 1965), pp. 72–74.

115. My discussion of techniques of the self is reminiscent of the Foucauldian concept of technologies of the self, which he defines as "modes of training and modification of individuals, not only in the obvious sense of acquiring skills but also in the sense of acquiring certain attitudes" and concerned with the specific modalities by which individual subjectivities and dispositions are constituted by techniques of self-management. For Foucault it is the interface between technologies of the self and technologies

of power (or the objectivizing of the subject) that constitutes governmentality. Foucault's historical explication of technologies of the self is, however, marred by a curious subordination of the ways in which selves monitor selves within a positive economy of truth in relation to others, be it through relations of authority or community. How technologies of the self relate to the social body and body politic is crucial to the understanding of the mechanisms of power that help selves to constitute selves. See Foucault, *Technologies of the Self*, pp. 16–49; quotation p. 18.

116. "Al-Tarbiya wa wajh al-haja ilayha wa taqsimiha: wa al-kalam 'ala tarbiyat al-ummum wa al-islam, wa al-tarbiya al-diniyya wa al-islam, wa tarbiyat al-irada," *Al-Manar* 15, no. 8 (1912): 567–86.

117. See "Al-Tarbiya al-sahiha wa al-ta'lim wa al-islam," *Al-Manar* 14, no. 3 (1911): 181–82.

118. Of course, the critique applied to more than the education of girls. In a critique of current educational practices, the article attacks both private and governmental institutions, the former for profiteering motives and the latter for fostering education as merely an avenue for jobs. The thrust of the critique hinges on the aims of this type of education, which merely fosters personal self-interest and materialist interests and, in the case of Europeanized institutions, has led to the enslavement and servitude of people to the chimera of freedom (*tawahum al-huriyya*). Indeed, the pernicious effect of Western influences and slavish imitation of Western mores was said to have led to the corruption of *tarbiya*. It was argued that students left these schools as Europeans, no longer Muslim or Eastern. Further, their European *tarbiya* led them to become contemptuous of their ancestors (*salaf*) and to worship all things foreign, all in the name of civilization (*al-madaniyya*). Their adoration of foreign civilization (*ghururihim b'ism al-madaniyya al-ifrinjiyya*) corrupts the nation, while they claim to be reformers. Nonetheless, Rida does not deny the need for European manufactures, knowledge, and practical arts. Such adaptations, however, were to proceed in tandem with the preservation of language, customs, religion, and *shari'a*. See "Fatihat al-sana al-sabb'iat 'ashar," *Al-Manar* 17, no. 1 (1913): 1–11.

119. "Tarbiyat al-banat," *Al-Manar* 1, no. 23 (1898): 436–38; "Al-Madaris wa al-tarbiya wa al-ta'lim," *Al-Manar* 14, no. 4 (1911): 293–95.

120. It would seem to be precisely the type of sociology, or social science, popular in fin-de-siècle France, and in particular that of Gustave Le Bon, whose *Les lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples* was translated into Arabic by Ahmad Fathi Zaghul, as *Sirr tatawwur al-ummam*. Zaghul also translated the immensely popular *A quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons?* by Edward Demolins, translated as *Sirr taqaddum al-inklis al-saksuniyyin*; see Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, pp. 110–11, 122–24, 200 n. 112. Other popular translated works were Edmond Demolins, *L'éducation nouvelle*, translated as *Al-Tarbiya al-hadiha* by Hassan Tawfiq al-Dijni (Cairo: Matba'at Misr, 1901), and Gustave Le Bon's *Psychologie de l'éducation* (Paris: Flammarion, 1904), translated as *Ruh al-tarbiya*, by Taha Husayn (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, 1922). Several installments of the latter appeared in *Al-Hilal* in 1923. Le Bon's influence could be felt strongly even in less Westernized journals, such as *Al-Manar*. For a discussion of the influence of Le Bon on turn-of-the-century political thought among the Egyptian bourgeoisie, see Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, pp. 122–25, and p. 201 n. 112 for other Arabic translations of Le Bon's work.

121. "Ma la bud minu," *Al-Manar* 1, no. 30 (1898): 567–74.

122. "Al-Khutba al-ra'isiyya: hajatuna ila islah al-tarbiya wa al-ta'lim," *Al-Manar* 15, no. 5 (1912): 336-41.
123. "Kitab tarbiyat al-atfal," *Al-Manar* 6, no. 19 (1903): 754.
124. "Al-Khutba al-ra'isiyya," *Al-Manar*, p. 338.
125. *Ibid.*, p. 340.
126. "Al-Tarbiya wa wajh al-haja ilayha wa taqsimiha," *Al-Manar*, pp. 572-73.
127. See Chakrabarty, "The Difference-Deferral of a Colonial Modernity."
128. Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994); Gyan Prakash, "Subaltern Studies as Postcolonial Criticism," *American Historical Review* 99, no. 5 (1994): 1475-90.

CHAPTER 5

The Egyptian Lives of Jeanne d'Arc

MARILYN BOOTH

IF YOU WERE a consumer of women's magazines in Egypt, 1922, you might well pick up an issue of the *Magazine of the Women's Awakening*. You would immediately encounter two framing declarations on the magazine's front cover: "Awaken your women, and your nations will live"; and "Nations are made by men, and men by mothers." If you were reading the November 1922 issue, you would find, a few pages in, a regular if short-lived series, *Shams al-tarikh* (The sun of history), and beneath it in smaller letters you would read, "An excerpt from the history lessons that Professor Shaykh Mukhtar Yunus delivers to the pupils of the Government Secondary Girls' School in Hilmiyya al-Jadida, Cairo."¹ You might be quickly caught up in the solemnity of the lesson, for it opens in the tones of a Friday mosque sermon.

Some of those whom God created in the image of humankind think Woman unfit for momentous deeds. By your Lord! those people are prone to error, and mistaken is their vision. Throughout history [Woman] has refuted their view, proving them to be on the wrong track. Here is a fragrant image for you: a short life history of a young woman. Aged men whom earthly life had made senile were incapable of doing what she did. For in 1429 the English besieged Orléans. A peasant girl came forth to rescue it, one sprouted from the earth of Domrémy. . . . With great effort she won over the hearts of the naive and gained the favor of Charles VII, after he and more than one of his ministers had mocked her. Yet such derision was in line with the "women's awakening" in France at that time.²

Mukhtar Yunus's two-page biographical sketch of Jeanne d'Arc appeared some nine months after Britain's unilateral announcement of Egypt's independence, a first formal step for Egypt out of colonial rule, but one that left Britain in control of financial, military, and foreign affairs. Published in a milieu of nationalist, anti-imperialist activism, this "short life history of a young woman" was anything but remote from contemporaneous struggles to define a nationalist agenda for an Egypt that would be modern and independent. Jeanne's life as narrated by the shaykh addressed an urgent question: How must inherited notions of a gendered and classed division of labor shift if the envisioned nation was to emerge?