nau | english | rothfork | teaching | Taylor

Charles Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (1995)
Notes, Questions & Answers & #10: "The Liberal-Communitarian Debate"

     

182: A very clear statement of Taylor's social position: ". . . Because a totally unencumbered [radically free with no uncontracted obligations] self is a human impossibility, the extreme atomist model of society [Benthem, if not J.S. Mill] is a chimera."

Rawls proposed a model for social justice that is truly blind. You must decide policies without knowing exactly who benefits. If the benefit/principle is inherently right -- the course of action inherently the right thing to do -- then it doesn't matter who enjoys the benefit. This is a version of Rousseau's social contractualism, which specifies that legislation is legitimate only when it seeks to benefit all citizens. Thus lobbies and all special interest efforts & donations are illegitimate since they seek benefits - not for all citizens - but for members of their special group: pharmaceutical companies, farmers, African-Americans, citizens of a state vs. the nation or my Congressional district vs. the nation.

1. Explain the difference: "The ethic central to a liberal society is an ethic of the right rather than the good," 186.

More argument against Util. theory. Utilitarianism is satisfied to offer economic opportunity so that everyone can earn money, which they then spend pursuing the good as they conceive it. Most social effort is focused on means/instruments with a high tolerance or indifference for what the good may be. In theory the good is a matter of individual taste. T. has argued that some, perhaps even most, of the good life is social & cannot be construed as an individual possession. If we acknowledge this, the next step is a Rousseau-ian public discussion about the good that affects us all; the quality of life in our neighborhoods & cities.

When Util. have this discussion, they assume that the goal is maximum personal freedom (e.g., lower your taxes, cut social programs, & allow the individual consumer to spend her money pursuant to her individual desires). When liberals have this discussion they assume that some virtues can only be realized socially. Consequently the discussion centers on something like Rawls' idea of justice: a benefit that consensus identifies as enhancing the quality of life for everyone.

Consider a policy like Affirmative Action or daycare at a factory or business site. Util.s run a cost-benefit analysis to determine exactly who pays & who consumes. Very few moms win this game. Rawls would ask you to imagine that you cannot exactly determine who the moms are or how many kids anyone may have. Is the policy, in general, a benefit to all of us in the group? You cannot legitimately answer, "well, that depends on whether I have a kid or not."

2. Law can be construed in at least two ways: as coercive, exterior force which threatens, punishes, & rewards. What is the status of justice in this outlook? It can also be construed (following Kant's ethics & Rousseau's social contractualism) as the righteous & reasonable thing to do. How does this play out between Util. & liberalism? See 187: "one has to replace . . . coercion with something else."

Benthem, if not Mill, said that right & wrong are reducible to pleasure & pain. Law must deal with instrumentalities (the means to produce pleasure/pain), not the ends (whether or not something is intrinsically valuable). If "coercion" has to be replaced by a commitment to some social goal, then the Util. model fails. Interestingly the Presidential debate between Clinton & Dole offered illustration on this question. Dole seemed to think that his tax cut off was irresistible; as it should be in Util. theory where the simple arithmetic illustrates a personal gain. Clinton offered a version of Taylor's liberal theory suggesting that there are social values that require personal sacrifice without a quid pro quo personal return. The return is an enhanced quality of life that is only measurable collectively or socially.

3. What is the status of patriotism "in the understanding of Hobbes, Locke, Bentham, or the 20th c. [American] common sense," 188?

Except for a possible sliver of calculated personal advantage, the usual understanding of patriotism must be tossed on the junk pile of "superstition." Superstition (mostly religion) & natural ignorance are the two evils that Util. ("useful") education seeks to eradicate. "This implicit ontology [Util.] has no place for functioning republics, societies bonded by patriotism," 188.

Although T. doesn't bring up philosophy of language issues as such, notice the allusion to how language operates, which is the paradigm model for pragmatism. Pragmatists believe language cannot be adequately explained by either atomism (Hume/Locke, etc.) or idealists (Plato). "A conversation is not the coordination of actions of different individuals [which the atomist model would claim], but a common action in this strong, irreducible sense; it is our action," 189.

9/11 & corporate fraud recently have turned our national attention away from a pure version of Benthem's Utilitarian ethics.  Most people are, of course, eclectic rather than systematic in ethics.

4. Reagan & the Republican party nearly succeeded, at least temporarily, in redefining political liberalism as a sneer. Looking at 191 how does T. define a liberal society?

"It is essential . . . that they are animated by a sense of a shared immediate common good [which cannot be reduced to personal possession]. To that degree, the bond resembles that of friendship, as Aristotle saw." T. alludes to the Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle says: "Unanimity seems, then, to be political friendship . . . for it is concerned with things that are to our interest & have an influence on our life. Now such unanimity is found among good men [who are committed to the righteous course of action regardless of personal cost; whereas] . . . bad men cannot be unanimous except to a small extent, any more than they can be friends, since they [each] aim at getting more than their share of advantages . . . and each man wishing for advantage to himself criticizes his neighbor & stands in his way. The result is that they are in a state of faction, putting compulsion on each other but unwilling themselves to do what is just." Back to T.: "The citizen is attached to the laws as the repository of his & others' dignity."

You do the rest.  Continue to define Taylor's notion of a liberal society (1).

5. On p. 195 T. proposes a question. Citizens of Argentina & Chile have tolerated "disappearances" assumably because of the principle of utility: it is an instrument that produces safe streets (i.e., produces the greatest good for the greatest number). If the USA is so radically committed to the Util. model, why didn't we wink at Watergate & Iran-Contra as realpolitik methods? Where did the sense of outrage come from? Certainly not from a Util. calculation of diminished personal possessions.

"This capacity for outrage is not fueled by any of the sources recognized by atomism," obviously including Util. theory, 196. "What generates the outrage is . . . a species [or variant] of patriotic identification." Americans possess pragmatic notions of fair play & presidential behavior. We repeat Jay Leno's jokes about Bush & Cheney, but the Washington monument, the Lincoln memorial, & JFK's grave at the Arlington national cemetery are solemn sites for Americans. It is the standards implied by these icons "that is outraged by the shady doings of a Watergate," & it is our commitment to these social values that "provokes the irresistible [moral] reaction" that drove Nixon from office in disgrace.

On 198 T. paraphrases John Dewey's political theory, which was a paraphrase of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's model of social contractual democracy. The American political system compromises one of Rousseau's requirements (because of its contrary commitment to Util.). Writing in the shadow of centuries of European religious warfare, Rousseau specified that in order to work, a social contractual democracy requires that citizens make an unconditional commitment to their identity as citizens. This means that no other identification, grounded in secondary discourse communities, can make claims that are more fundamental than the obligations of citizenship. Consequently, one cannot claim special treatment on any basis. Every citizen must have (& be seen to have) identical rights. Gays, women, African-Americans, Native American Indians, Mormons, Catholics - all such possible ways of identifying individuals or groups who require privileged treatment at the expense of the rest of us, is illegitimate & non-democratic.

T. repeats this theory in a reversed way, saying that "the procedural liberal state can indeed be neutral between (a) believers & nonbelievers in God, or between (b) people with homo -- & hetrerosexual orientations, it cannot be [neutral] between (c) patriots & antipatriots." Why not? Because "patriotism" symbolizes public values - all those qualities that make our social life preferable to the way we imagine the Iranians or Saudis or Iraqis live. This is the glue that makes society possible: "Patriotism is a common identification with a historical community founded on [& devoted to] certain values," 199. At this point you may be able to see the bridge into the 2nd set of essays we will read (which focus on anthropology) -- on how commitment to certain social values pragmatically defines cultures.

We still have a loose end. We object that Soviet poster art, Nazi propaganda, & al-Qa'ida religious propoganda  were glaringly obvious methods of "patriotic" indoctrination & that Americans merely listen to Rush Limbaugh & don't experience comparable indoctrination. Consider compulsory primary education as political indoctrination. One not only learns our common language (English) and our common history (Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, FDR, Eisenhower) and our common institutions (Wall Mart, TV news beginning with Big Bird & Sesame Street, Christian holidays); but also the fundamental rules for social discourse. Watch Oprah. Very quickly the 12 yr. whiner will complain that "it isn't fair." Perhaps she even looks around for the other two whiners or to audience members in hopes of a vote. Where did she learn what is fair and what isn't? The education began at home, but homes are American homes.  A more recognizable social dimension is found at preschool, kindergarten & in compulsory elementary classrooms. As Dewey told us, public education is the compulsory boot-camp for political indoctrination. It is the place where we pragmatically learn the social skills necessary to be a member of American society.

6. What is the danger that T. perceives to the liberal model of citizenship. Read 201.

Me-them; we-us. "In consequence, a society in which the citizens' relation to government is normally adversarial, even where they manage to bend it to their [special interest] purposes, has not secured citizen dignity," 200. Literally there seems to be less and less we have in common as a nation; and more & more that fissures us into ethnic groups, gender groups (including gays), etc. Or has 9/11 reoriented us?

You do the rest.  Continue to answer this question (2).


On to #11: "Invoking Civil Society"
20-08-02