

# *World Religions and Secularization from a Postcolonial and Anti-Eurocentric Perspective*



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Thirty years ago, we examined this subject for the first time; now we will renew our reflection in an anti-Eurocentric, postcolonial critique.<sup>1</sup> One must begin by distinguishing *secularism* from *secularization*. Secularism is a Eurocentric, metropolitan ideology belonging to colonial expansion. It is the fruit of the Enlightenment and liberalism (which is the ideology of the Second Modernity).<sup>2</sup> Secularization, on the other hand, is a process that began at least twenty centuries ago with Christianity itself and even earlier in Chinese culture (with its secularized Mandarin bureaucracy in the third century B.C.E.) and Islamic culture (in which philosophy had an autonomous place with regard to the faith of the Quran). Secularization is a requirement for a healthy autonomy of reason and for political, economic, and sexual freedoms. Thus, we will affirm the need for secularization, for the purpose of creating an atmosphere of freedom, but not secularism.

Second, one must distinguish religion as a mytho-ethico-ontological nucleus from religion as fundamentalism. The mytho-ethico-ontological nucleus generated by universal religions (such as the Taoist and Confucian components of Chinese religions; the Egypto-Mesopotamian component of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; or the ontology and ethics of Hinduism and Buddhism) originated from their respective universal cultures.<sup>3</sup> In this first sense religion has a solid mytho-critical nucleus, a collection of rites, symbolic narratives, and a community institutionalized and organized in time and space. But religion also has a second dimension: structured as fundamentalisms, religions that had been

central to the origin of their cultures are transformed in times of decadence (although frequently also in cultural splendor) into ideological rationales that justify the dominating expansion of the cultures from which they came. These dogmatized, bureaucratic, and decadent forms include, among others, Chinese Mandarin Confucianism, the antiprophetic Judaism of Jerusalem, Christiandoms since Constantine,<sup>4</sup> Buddhism in Thailand, and Islam since the Caliphate of Baghdad. These are the fundamentalist forms of religion which secularism would oppose in Europe (confronting the modern Catholic, Anglican, Lutheran, Evangelical, and other Christiandoms) and which would be transformed into secular ideologies, inadvertently colonialist, opposing all non-European religions and cultures in the name of enlightened Reason. This process (of religious redefinition) runs concurrently with the capitalistic imperial expansion against more ancient and profound religious expressions of humankind, which still live and continue to expand among the great masses of humanity at the periphery at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

### **The Unilinear View of the Progress of History: From Religion to Secularism**

A certain view of history, that of the romantics such as Johann Winckelmann, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Johann Gottfried von Herder, Georg Friedrich Hegel, Friedrich von Schlegel, and Wilhelm von Humboldt in Germany, but equally that of Auguste Comte in France, tries to explain the development of mankind as a progression from primitivism to secularism. Beginning with a mythical, irrational, infantile time of primitive cultures, history in this view continues to reach superior levels of humanization, from the Orient (from China, Hindustan, and Persia) to the "Classic Age" par excellence of the West (through the Greeks and Romans), passing from antiquity through the "Dark Ages" of medieval Christiandom. Through this world history of religions final and universal maturity is reached in Latin-Germanic Modern Europe, where self-conscious rational individuality is discovered and expressed in reasoned Enlightenment, knower of its own content. Religion, say the secularists, has given way to the "Absolute Knowledge" of reason (this is the movement from religion to the philosophy of the *Encyclopedia* and Hegelian *Logic*, from myth to Logos, from belief to science, from traditional feudalism to modern innovative capitalism). With Émile Littré in France, this secularism of institutions, systems, beliefs, theories, and daily life arrives (as a natural development of the Jacobin position) at its most developed point. The only thing missing is for this antireligious laity to reach the uttermost parts of the earth, from the "barbaric" cultures of Africa to the "despotism" of Asia or to the "primitivism" of Latin America, so that the "false consciousness" of religion (a concept that is still shared with the militant leftists of the second Enlightenment, of bureaucratic Marxism) or fanaticism (for the liberals) may be replaced by a utopia of pure

scientific rationality and liberal freedom in daily and political life. This is the vision of the second Modernity, the Enlightenment: Eurocentric, colonialistic, and reductive of other types of rationality which nonetheless have not been exhausted, despite such definitive judgment hurled at them by modern secularism.<sup>5</sup> The problem is more complex than that and very relevant today.

### **A Non-Eurocentric, Postcolonial Vision: Religion and Secularization**

Religion (as I defined it in the first sense, as a mythical-ethical core) and secularization (as tending to the autonomy of reason) are not only not opposed to each other, they actually rely on each other. In fact, by making rationality autonomous, some universal religions have produced the conditions that made secularity possible. In Western culture it is impossible to think of secularization without Christianity (but not fundamentalist Christianity). The great historian of science Pierre Duhem writes:

Modern science will be born, it can be said, on the day that it has reached this truth, that it is the same mechanisms, the same rules, which regulate the celestial and sublunar movements, the circulation of the sun, the rise and fall of the seas, the fall of bodies. So that it was possible to conceive of such movement, it was necessary that the stars be divested of their divine status, where Greco-Roman Antiquity had placed them. It was necessary that a technological revolution be produced. This revolution will be the work of Christian theology. Modern science has been ignited by the spark produced in the clash of pagan and Christian theology.<sup>6</sup>

This is not only true for science but for politics and social action as well. In *La Philosophie de la misère*, Proudhon wrote: "As I study in the silence of my heart and far from all human consideration, the mystery of social revolutions, God, the great Unknown, has been transformed for me into a hypothesis: that is to say, into a necessary dialectic instrument."<sup>7</sup> To what does this socialist so criticized by Marx refer? As I have explained in my works,<sup>8</sup> Proudhon shows that the social transformation of the entire social and economic system presupposes the fact of its nondivinity. But how could a divine, eternal social structure, loved wholly by God, be transformed in a revolutionary way? All social transformation presupposes that God, the great Unknown, the creator, is neither the cosmos nor historical social systems. Creationism says the Absolute is creator. The cosmos is created; it is not God. Thus both the cosmos and the political-social world are secularized. Creationism is the metaphysical and ethical basis for the secularity of the created, of everything that surrounds us, since the Divine is transcendental exteriority. Marx understood that unfetishized atheizing of social structures was a condition for revolutionary praxis. But well before him were

Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Jesus, all of whom affirm that "the origin of all criticism is the criticism of (fetishist) religion."

A non-Eurocentric view of world history understands that European hegemony has existed for just over two centuries (to give it a date: 1789, for both the industrial and political revolutions). In only two centuries, Europe has been able to impose its definitive domination on the periphery.<sup>9</sup> It was never the center of history, nor was it history's necessary reference point, contrary to what Hegel imagined. Instead, the neolithic process of the urban revolution passes from Mesopotamia and Egypt, through the Indus Valley, the Yellow River, and later appears in Mesoamerica, where it culminates in the world of the Mayas and Aztecs and in Tiahuanaco in Bolivia (later the Incas of Peru).<sup>10</sup>

These great civilizations have symbolic macro-stories, and ethical systems, of long history and influence. Within the cultures of the eastern Mediterranean, this is clearly expressed by the founding ethical macro-story of the god Osiris, a story more influential in the so-called Eastern culture than the myths of Prometheus or Adam, so well interpreted by Paul Ricoeur in *The Symbolism of Evil*. Osiris, perhaps a historical king later converted into a god, judges the dead, becoming their personal Ra (a sort of *principium individuationis*) in the Great Universal and Final Judgment in the hall of Maat (goddess of Order and Justice). Osiris is represented in Egyptian hieroglyphics by an eye, a figure still present on the Masonic pyramid found on the U.S. one dollar bill because he sees all human works, even the most secret. His is a founding myth of the Mediterranean, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim cultures and through them the Western secularized culture. The dead in all their physical flesh (not the soul nor the body, for there are no such dualistic beginnings) are judged by the ethical criteria of life: "I gave bread to the hungry," declare the deceased in the *Book of the Dead*, chapter 125. The most private acts are seen by their perpetrator as they would be judged by the universal intersubjectivity of the justice of Osiris. Upon performing that intimate, secret act in private, the actor experienced in advance the judging presence of humanity and thus should offer up some argument before the invisible but present god: a discursive moment of consensual rationality (an intersubjective ethical discourse of the "have-mores" from five thousand years ago!). The Osiris narrative deals with nothing less than the birth of the personal ethical conscience, responsible before others and before the community for the consequences of all personal, individual acts, seen *sub lumen aeternitatis*. This ethical tradition, which is so much a part of Judaic, Christian, and Muslim thought, is found in the Egyptian Osiris story. Had Charles Taylor known of it, this is where he would have found "the sources of Self."<sup>11</sup>

The founding religious myths of cultures continue until today to feed the sense (or the "common sense," as Alasdair MacIntyre or Taylor would say) even of postconventional, secularized, modern, globalized ethics. The experience of liberty, of personal responsibility, of moral argumentation<sup>12</sup> as justification for individual personality, of "remorse for blame" (is Freud's *Über-Ich* not still

Osiris?), is explicitly explained in that Egyptian mythical macro-story born more than two thousand years before the "Pivotal Age" of Jaspers. The urban revolution was then founded in the East.

Similarly, Indo-European cultures, beginning with the invaders from the Gobi into China, or from Kabul toward Hindustan, would expand toward the south. Originating in the Euroasiatic steppes, these Indo-European cultures domesticated the horse, used iron, and worshiped the God of the day.<sup>13</sup> Like the Medes and the Persians, like the Greeks, Latins, and Germans, these invaders left their mark on the Promethean macro narrative in the mytho-ethical nucleus of later cultures, as valued everyday contents present in secularized form until today.

The spread of the universal religions born in the first millennium B.C.E.—among others, the pre-Socratics, the prophets of Israel, the Zoroastrian Iranian Manichaeism movement, and the definitive books of the Hindu, Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian traditions—produced a planetwide religious geography enduring almost up to the present. If we were to go back to approximately 300 C.E., we would observe the following panorama: in China the Confucian-Taoist dynasty of the western Tsin Dynasty ruled (265–317 C.E.), dominating the "Silk Route" toward the west; Asoka imposed Buddhism on the entire Hindu continent in 232 C.E.; the Sassanid Persian Empire was organized by Sapor II (309–379 C.E.); a corrupt Rome, which had united the Greek empire with the Latin, declined under Diocletian, and was surrounded by hostile Germanic tribes; and the Bantu kingdoms expanded from south of the Roman Empire into the south of Africa. Thus, we can observe perfectly organized "cultural blocs" (with their mythic macronarratives of original religions, always in self and mutual transformation), which still remain and which mimic each other beneath a superficial clothing of secularist and instrumental globalization.<sup>14</sup>

During the period following 300 C.E., the Semitic tradition reappeared amid the Hellenistic empires (not so much in the East with the Seleucids but, rather, in the Ptolomaic center and the Byzantine West) and expanded through the Germanic-Latin region thanks first to the Jewish Diaspora and later to the phenomenon of Christianity. With Heraclitus this Semitic tradition was established in a territory spanning Mesopotamia in the East to the Latin Empire in the West, to Portugal, England, and the Scandinavian countries. Even greater expansion can be seen in the development of Semitic Islam, built on the decadent Byzantine and Persian empires (returning in part to its pre-Hellenic traditions). At the commercial center of an "old system and world," stretching from China, Hindustan, and Southeast Asia to Europe and North Africa, was Bagdad. The Muslim world extended from the Atlantic at Morocco to the Pacific at Mindanao in the Philippines, passing through Melaka, center of the eastern market. The Hellenistic or Roman world, and to a greater extent western Latin-Germanic Europe, did not become the center of the "old system" until the end of the eighteenth century.

The First Spanish-Portuguese (and later Dutch) expansion, prior to the

Industrial Revolution (1492–1789), was Latin Europe's attempt to open itself through the western Atlantic, subsequent to the Renaissance powers' (Venice, Genoa, Amalfi) attempt to penetrate the East (the "Holy Land" of the Crusades). The Portuguese domination from Africa to India and China and Spain's breaking through the "fence" of the Muslim-Turkish world, annexed to the "old world" an unknown one-fourth of the planet (the known portions were Asia, Africa, and Europe). The "world system" was thus born as a new structuring of the "old" and "new" world. But, in contrast to what Eurocentric historiography would seem to suggest, Europe (from 1492 to 1789) never had a hegemony in the new world system, which originated in Spain. Europe was completely peripheral and secondary to the productive, demographic, and cultural center found in China, holding sway over the Southeast Asian market as far as Hindustan. The commercial connecting belt of this old system was the Muslim world uniting China with Hindustan and through Baghdad, the commercial center for five hundred years, to Byzantium until the Turks destroyed the caliphate in the eighth century.

The Iberian expansion (Spanish and Portuguese) into America in the sixteenth century allowed Europe, principally with Mexican and Peruvian gold and silver, to purchase in Asian markets and to begin the theoretical-technological accumulation and development that bore fruit in the eighteenth century as the Industrial Revolution. This revolution was spurred by a crisis in the eastern market that created a vacuum for high-demand products. England rushed to fill this demand. Instead of handcrafted production of porcelain or silk cloth by the numerous and badly paid popular masses of China, cotton cloth, produced by new machinery that revolutionized the production process, reduced the proportion of world value (salary) while increasing earnings. Thus was born capitalism, properly speaking.

The ideology underlying this European-capitalist, colonialist hegemony, through the annexation first of new colonies in Asia and later in Africa, is the Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*). In this generational, philosophical, theoretical-ideological current, secularism imposed itself rapidly as one of the central aspects of "the coming out of self-blaming immaturity" as illustrated by Kant's definition of *Aufklärung*. It is thus necessary to remember that it has not been more than two hundred years (1789–1989) that this Eurocentric religious position we call secularism has been expanding into the political field as liberalism, into the economic field as capitalism, and into the philosophical field as the Enlightenment. In the same way, the negative attitude toward other religions, which has been a constituting ideology of colonial politics since the first modernity, is not more than two centuries old.

With the rise of metropolitan Europe as the center of the peripheral colonial world, the mythic-ethical-ontology of secular common sense (secular according to MacIntyre or Taylor but inevitably Christian) will be opposed to cultures of the periphery and most of all against its religions. These religions came to be seen as expressions of sorcery, magic, witchcraft, barbarity, savagery,

primitivism, error, unenlightened positions, or fanaticism. Through the secularist argument that religion is an expression of irrationality and underdevelopment, appropriate to non-European peoples, all the cultures of the periphery are negated. And at the same time, the internal struggle in Europe by the Jacobin secularists (in an ultramontanist France) will be extended inadvertently to the periphery as a sign of humanization: "The English assumed the huge responsibility of being the missionaries of *Civilization* in all the world." Hegel would say in his *Lessons in the Philosophy of History*.<sup>15</sup> Religion comes to be seen as a remnant of superstition and irrational mythology, a mark of a primitive age in history which has necessarily been superseded by the scientific development of humanity. On this both the bourgeois Jacobins and the revolutionary socialists of the Enlightenment agree.

### Religion, Secularity, and Liberation

Presently, 85 percent of the world's population lives in the southern part of the globe, the postcolonial peripheral world, whose popular masses, and even its elites, manage secularized theoretical, technical, economic, and political instruments. Yet in their daily lives (and even publicly) people refer to the universal religious, mythical macro-stories that originated in universal cultures. I say "universal" in both cases because, for example, Islam and its cultures of origin are the result of a complex meta-process, spanning many centuries, of development of a tradition that rejuvenated and assimilated a variety of existing cultures. This process involved, among others, the Berbers of North Africa, the Asian Filipinos of Mindanao, the cultures of Indonesia, the multiplicity of Hindustanic and Iranic cultures, the steppe and desert culture of the Gobi, Chinese Turkestan or Tarim, and the Coptic Egyptian, Libyan, Turkish, or Balkan world. Islam and other religions are universal religions whose founding myths have inspired diverse texts, rituals, and institutions and which fostered the use of complex instrumental systems (from agricultural technique, navigation, astronomy, engineering, and mathematics to law, philosophy, theology, history, and politics). These religions have been globalized through a far-reaching geographical-cultural regional expansion and are regional only with reference to the modern planetary globalization, beginning in 1492 and reaching its end at the beginning of the twenty-first century. These religions have adequate capacity for dialogue and to assimilate contemporary technology.<sup>16</sup>

The question is this: has the secularist process, with its clear scorn for religions and cultures in the postcolonial periphery as well as in its own popular culture (in Europe, the United States, and Japan) imposed on contemporary humanity the rational scientific-technological vision without the presence of symbolic interpretations belonging to the traditional religious macro-stories? Has this vision become the ultimate valuing authority in the face of the realities of the existence of the universe or of the human being in life and death? Can it be

said that postcolonial popular religions have disappeared or are in danger of disappearing? Has the scientific-technical world managed to replace the everyday explicative power of the old mythic-religious stories?

In Nairobi, Kenya, I sat in the home of Odera Oruka, doctor of philosophy from Uppsala (Sweden), president of the Association of African Philosophers, who was later assassinated by the dictatorship of his nation. While I waited to speak with him, I lifted a small tablecloth on a little table. To my surprise I discovered a large drum: the heart of every African home. The doctor of western philosophy never ceased to refer back to his ethic-mythic nucleus, woven into the drum's rhythm, the dance, the ritual movement of the body, the community, and the living cosmos. Western instrumental and hermeneutic rationality coexists with ancestral symbolism. Paul Ricoeur called this instrumental and hermeneutic rationality a "universal civilization," a system of instruments (though still rational and scientific-technical and today globalized). Ancestral symbolism he called "regional culture": the ethical-mythical nucleus that is ultimately religious and found in all postcolonial, peripheral, and popular cultures.

Have two hundred years of superficial European secularizing capitalistic and imperialistic hegemony been able to destroy those profound, unconscious, symbolic, ritualistic, festive, popular worlds, so full of history and daily sense? I do not believe so. Nor do I believe such a thing would be adequate for the development of those peoples, of their cultures, of the concrete subjectivity of each participant in those worlds full of sense and celebration, despite poverty, exploitation, and alienation on other levels. If secularism were effective, religious and symbolic alienation would destroy traditional religion, leaving in its place a destructive senseless emptiness.

Is some connection possible between postcolonial peripheral cultures with their traditional religions and secularity? Could there be some connection that would go beyond the necessary confrontation of secularism and religions in their fundamentalist forms (e.g., as in the Muslim world)? Is a critically creative dialectic possible? This has been the project of the so-called Liberation Theology in Latin America since the end of the 1960s.

In Latin America, after the 1959 Cuban Revolution, a revolutionary air swept the continent. Marxism won the will of the youth, even within the church youth movements. If the first bourgeois Enlightenment was secularist, the second (Marxistic) Enlightenment<sup>17</sup> was social, critical, socialist, and in this case atheistic, at least in its best-known doctrine since the Second International.<sup>18</sup> Its objection to religion was not, as in the first Enlightenment, that it was irrational but, rather, that it was alienating, justifying the domination of classes, nationals, and oppressed cultures. Latin American Christian thinkers who were committed to social struggle had to separate themselves from this objection. So it is that since 1968 an entire sociopolitical, practical, massive, and theoretical movement of Christians has been produced which has tried to show that Chris-

tianity was not the fundamentalist Christendom. Rather, this movement has shown that the solid ethical-mythical nucleus of the message of Jesus of Nazareth in the Roman Empire and Palestine of its day was directed in favor of victims, the poor, and the excluded. Jesus' religious criticism was leveled at the temple of the priests, who had turned their backs on the "people of the land" (*ham ha'aretz*) and who had reinterpreted the foundational text of Judaic tradition, the macronarrative of the liberation of the slaves from the Pharaoh's Egyptian domination under the prophetic leadership of Moses. It was not difficult for Latin American theologians to demonstrate a similarity between Latin American revolutionary processes and the "flight from Egypt."

It is a clearly defined, methodical, and political process not in line with secularism. Secularism had insisted that to be revolutionary and for the revolution to triumph one had to be an atheist and be done with popular religion. On the contrary, the methodology of Liberation Theology began with the religion of the people, taking it as an ancient symbolic production by that same oppressed people. Elaborating on a basis of this religiosity, Liberation Theology began a critical work, discerning that which alienated and dominated and which justified oppressive structures. It then developed to the maximum the liberating aspects of that most ancient and long-lasting message of Christianity: "Blessed are the poor, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven!" "I was hungry and you fed me!"

The simple oppressed people, submerged in their popular religion and culture, heard these suggestions not as something coming from a foreign ideological horizon but, rather, as emerging in a coherent form from their own tradition, which they had jealously guarded, even against the oppressive Christianity of the elite. They could now, in the name of those original religious symbols and from the solid ethical-mythical nucleus of their own popular religiosity, rise up against the oppressive order. This happened in the year 2000 in Chiapas, Mexico, where the secularity of the practices of Subcommandante Marcos did not contradict the critical-popular or prophetic religiosity of Bishop Samuel Ruiz but, instead, articulated itself in the actions of the popular community. The secularized rationality of the revolutionary agenda was thus united with the symbolism of the revitalized, clarified traditional mythic story. Christianity was made again (as in its origin) a criticism against the dominators, just as when Jesus of Nazareth rose up against the Roman Empire or criticized the Hebrew elite who collaborated with the empire, the ossified bureaucratic priesthood of the temple with their rites that had lost their meaning, the moralizing hypocritical leaders who in the name of the law opposed life. Liberation Theology brought up to date in revolutionary Latin America the critical capacity of religion while still being respectful of political, economical, and rational autonomy. It is not hard to understand that in the decades since then this post-secularist theology has extended itself through Africa and Asia and among the minorities in those

countries that are central to capitalism. It did likewise in those feminist, antirational, ecological movements in cultures that were indigenous prior to the European invasion of 1492.

This movement is a critical affirmation of religion and a mature affirmation of secularity. In Nicaragua, during the time of the Sandinista Revolution, there could be heard all over the Plaza de la Revolución, "Entre cristianismo y revolución no hay contradicción!" ("Between Christianity and Revolution there is no contradiction!") The same could be repeated: between a critical-liberating religion and the secularization of political, economical, educational, and other institutions, there is no contradiction. On the contrary, one demands the other.

Thus we have gone beyond the necessary opposition between fundamentalist religion (as an alienating and irrational myth) and secularism (a Eurocentric, colonialist, and dominating ideology) to arrive at a mature, healthy relation between critical-liberating religion and the necessary secularization of political, economic, and other institutions, which are part of the contemporary development of history in this age of globalism.

### Notes

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1. See "From Secularization to Secularism: Science from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment," *Concilium* 47 (1968): 93-119.
2. Second Modernity refers to the period of European global and intellectual dominance following the late eighteenth century. The First Modernity was the period in world history during which China was the center of the world system, with the Spanish and Portuguese empires as peripheral centers of power. See André Gunder Frank, *ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).—Eds.
3. The "mythic-ethico-ontological" nuclei of religions originated in a continuous dialogue with their own cultures: cultures are the fruit but at the same time the seeds of religions; religions are also the fruit and yet at the same time the seeds of culture. See my work *A History of the Church in Latin America: Colonialism to Liberation (1492-1979)* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1981).
4. We have expounded at great length in numerous works of history about the Hispanoamerican Christianity (1492-1992) as a prolongation of the history of Greek Christianity (Oriental, tied to Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, and Constantinople) and Latin Christianity (Western Roman, which makes up European, Germanic-Latin Christian culture at least since the sacred Roman Germanic Empire). See my work *History and the Theology of Liberation. A Latin American Perspective* (New York: Orbis Books, 1976); and especially "The Christiandoms," in *Historia General de la Iglesia en América Latina*, ed. CEHILA (Salamanca: Ediciones Sígueme, 1983), 1:173-205.
5. Dusset here advances an argument that has been central to his work: that modernity was not conceived prior to Europe's colonial expansion but was, rather, a way that

an expanding, capitalist Europe differentiated itself from religious others. As he puts it in another essay: "European Modernity is not an independent, autopoietic, self-referencing system, rather it is a part of the world system: its center. Modernity, then, is a phenomenon that globalizes itself" (Enrique Dussel, *Ética de la liberación en la edad de la globalización y de la exclusión* [Madrid: Editorial Trotta, 1998], 68; trans. in Roberto Goizueta, "Locating the Absolutely Absolute Other," in *Thinking from the Underside of History: Enrique Dussel's Philosophy of Liberation*, ed. Linda Martin Alcoff and Eduardo Mendieta [Oxford, U.K.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000], 181–193).—Eds.

6. Pierre Duhem, *Le système du monde. Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic* (Paris: Hermann, 1954), 2:453. See also my work *El humanismo semita* (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1969), 118ff.
7. P. J. Proudhon, *Système des contradictions économiques ou la philosophie de la misère* (Paris: Union Générale d'Éditions, 1964), 25. See also Henri de Lubac, *Proudhon et le Christianisme* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1945).
8. See my book *Filosofía ética latinoamericana: Política*, vol. 4 (Bogotá: USTA, 1979).
9. See the controversial work of A. G. Frank, *ReOrient*.
10. See my recent work *Ética de la liberación*, 24ff.
11. Dussel engages with Taylor at greater length in Eduardo Mendieta, ed. and trans., *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities, 1996).—Eds.
12. The dead one had to "justify" his justice before Osiris in a true court. For this his good deeds were carefully recorded (on papyrus for the poor, texts sculpted into the pyramids for the Pharaohs) so as not to forget them before the judge. He should then argue his goodness rationally in order to show he deserved resurrection. There is thus a denial of the immortality of a noncorporeal soul; there is a valuable affirmation of the living embodiment, which could merit eternal life or not. This stamps its character on future Judaic, Christian, Muslim, and modern Western European ethics, becoming worldwide secularity today. An originating myth—one of many—which is behind and continues valid in present-day secularized rationality.
13. *Dios* (God) and *día* (day) have the same etymology.
14. The history of ethnicities has been of long-standing interest for Dussel; see *Ética de la liberación*.—Eds.
15. As Hegel wrote, "Die Engländer haben die grosse Bestimmung übernommen die Missionarien der Zivilisation in der ganzen Welt zu sein" (*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* [Frankfurt: Theorie Werkausgabe, 1970], 538.)
16. It is said that (Bill) Gates has indicated that the best Microsoft research team is found in China. This should not be surprising to those familiar with the high level of analytic rationalization Chinese reading and writing require.
17. The "second Enlightenment" to which Dussel refers is the ongoing dialogue in Latin America over Marxist social theory and praxis.—Eds.
18. See my work *La Teología metafórica de Marx* (Estella [Navarre, Spain]: El Verbo Divino, 1994).